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The U.S. Navy anticipates moving to a shipboard high-energy laser program of record in 
the fiscal year 2018 and achieving an initial operational capability by 2020. The design of 
a distance support capability within the high-energy laser system was expected to assist 
the Navy in reaching this goal. This capstone project explored the current Navy 
architecture for distance support and applied system engineering methodologies to 
develop a conceptual distance support framework with application to the high-energy 
laser system. A model and simulation of distance support functions were developed and 
used to analyze the feasibility in terms of performance, cost, and risk. Results of this 
capstone study showed that the implementation of distance support for the high-energy 
laser system is feasible and would reduce the total ownership cost over the life of the 
program. Furthermore, the capstone shows that moving toward the team’s recommended 
distance support framework will address current gaps in the Navy distance support 
architecture and will provide a methodology tailored to modern enterprise naval systems. 
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MH man hours 
MIL-STD military standard 
 xxii 
MLDT mean logistics delay time 
MOE measure of effectiveness 
MOP measure of performance 
MOPA master oscillator, power amplifier 
MOSA modular open system architecture 
MPT&E manpower, personnel, training, and education 
MRC maintenance requirement card 
MTBF mean time between failures 
MTBM mean time between maintenance 
MTTR mean time to repair 
MTU minimum transmit unit  
NAS network attached storage 
NAVSEA Naval Sea System Command 
NAVSEAINST Naval Sea Systems Command Instruction 
NCT Navy Core Test 
NIPRNET Non-Secure Internet Protocol Router Network 
NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology 
NMP-MOM Navy Modernization Process - Maintenance Operations Manual 
NOC network operations center 
NPS Naval Postgraduate School 
NSDSA Naval Systems Data Support Activity 
NSS national security system 
NSWC PHD Naval Sea Warfare Center Port Hueneme Division 
NTC Naval Tactical Cloud  
O&S operation and support 
OEM original equipment manufacturer 
OET Office of Engineering and Technology 
OLA Operational Level Agreement 
ONR Office of Naval Research 
ORTS Operational Readiness Test System 
ORTSTARS Operational Readiness Test System Tech Assist Remote Support 
OS operating system 
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OSA open system architecture 
OT&E operational test and evaluation 
OV operational view 
PEO IWS Program Executive Office Integrated Weapon Systems 
PESTO personnel, equipment, supplies, training, ordnance 
PIT platform information technology 
PM program manager 
PMBOK Project Management Book of Knowledge 
PMS planned maintenance systems 
POI platform of interest 
POM program objective memorandum 
PPBE Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution 
PPS ports, protocols and services 
PSP platform service provider 
QRC quick reaction capability 
RAID redundant array of independent disks 
RHEL Red Hat Enterprise Linux 
RF radio frequency 
RMC regional maintenance center 
RMF risk management framework 
RMG risk management guide 
S2E sailor to engineer 
S&T science and technology 
SATCOM satellite communications 
SCD ship change document 
SD standard deviation 
SE Systems Engineering 
SEI Software Engineering Institute 
SHF super-high frequency 
SIPRNET Secure Internet Protocol Router Network 
SLA service level agreement 
SLOC source lines of cod 
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SME subject matter expert 
SNMP simple network management protocol 
SOVT system operational verification test 
SPAWAR Space and Naval Warfare System Command 
SRA ship restricted availability 
SSA software support activity 
SSL solid state laser 
STIG Security Technical Implementation Guides 
SVN subversion 
SWAN shipboard wide area network 
TCP/IP transmission control protocol/Internet protocol 
Tech Assist technical assistance 
TEMP test & evaluation master plan 
TOC total ownership cost 
TRL technology readiness level 
TSCE Total Ship Computing Environment 
TSCEi Total Ship Computing Environment Infrastructure 
UCC Unified Code Count 
UDP universal datagram protocol 
USB universal serial bus 
USC University of Southern California 
USN United States Navy 
USS United States Ship 
VLAN virtual local-area Network 
VoIP voice over Internet protocol 
WAN wide-area network 
WSESRB Weapon System Explosive Safety Review Board  
XO executive officer 
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In an attempt to reduce mean down times (MDT) and total ownership costs (TOC), the 
United States Navy (USN) is currently researching the concept of distance support (DS). 
Distance Support is the process of providing a maintenance/support product or service 
from an offsite location.  
The team developed and analyzed the requirements for implementing a DS 
system for the high energy laser (HEL). This included what was necessary from the 
perspective of the DS system itself, as well as what is required of the HEL system to 
provide a complete interface to a DS system. A generic DS framework was developed to 
fit the USN’s unique requirements and policies. While the DS framework could be 
applied to any system, the HEL was chosen as the platform of interest (POI).  
The team performed functional analysis and allocation. During this step, the DS 
pillars (primary supporting elements) and architecture were decomposed into the next 
lower level functions. Additionally, the team started to develop and refine the functional 
interfaces both internal to the DS system as well as external to the HEL system. It was 
important to determine and define the DS system level boundaries as this would facilitate 
the development of the physical requirements for the DS system in the next stage. The 
system architecture diagrams were developed to describe the system. The team chose to 
use the IDEF0 as the basis for the conceptual model of the DS system that was tested. 
IDEF0 was chosen for DSHEL because it is well understood, adapted well for 
information systems, and aligns to the DS framework and platform service architecture 
developed. 
Through the employment of modeling and simulation (M&S) tools, the effects of 
three types of support alternatives were analyzed: The Status Quo Distance Support 
Model based on level of repair analysis (LORA) currently implemented on most USN 
platforms; the Integrated Distance Support Model representing the model that is proposed 
in the CONOPS of this effort; and the No Distance Support Model consisting only of 
sailor actions and contractor in-port support. The baseline status quo DS model (non-
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integrated DS) indicated a MDT of 149.0 hours, a standard deviation of 91.5 hours, with 
a resulting operational availability (Ao) of 0.770. Integrated DS showed significant 
improvement with a MDT of 83.8 hours, a standard deviation of 44.9 hours, with a 
resulting Ao of 0.856, an increase of 8.5%. Conversely, elimination of DS was 
detrimental to reliability with a MDT of 335.1 hours, a standard deviation of 210.5 hours, 
and Ao of 0.559, decreasing the Ao by 21.1%.  
Cost analysis, based on a 20-year life cycle of HEL installed on 30 shipboard 
platforms, resulted in an estimate of $7M for the addition of a DSHEL component. Given 
30 HEL platforms, the integrated results from M&S have shown that DSHEL would 
begin to show a return on investment once 29 technical assistance requests have occurred. 
The conceptual DS framework was developed using a holistic systems 
engineering approach to provide the HEL with enterprise level support at a distance. This 
expanded level of support reduces MDT and lowers TOC when compared to systems 
without DS. Therefore, the capstone team recommends that the Navy adopt an integrated 
DS framework approach for providing maintenance support to the future HEL system. 
This would include using the team’s conceptual DS framework and incorporating real 
world data into the capstone’s M&S models and cost analysis to obtain a more accurate 
understanding of the framework and benefits of implementing DS. 
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I. INTRODUCTION AND PROJECT OVERVIEW 
This capstone report has been developed by a team of students at the Naval 
Postgraduate School (NPS) in the distance learning cohort 331-133O pursuing either a 
Master’s of Science in Systems Engineering (MSSE) or Master’s of Science in 
Engineering Systems (MSES). The team, all employees of Naval Surface Warfare Center, 
Port Hueneme Division (NSWC PHD), executed sound system engineering (SE) 
techniques with extreme prejudice and rigor. Over the course of nine months, the team 
performed research, analyzed previous contributions to the body of knowledge (BoK), 
developed a generic distance support (DS) framework, performed functional analysis and 
architecture design, and executed modeling and simulation (M&S) of DS processes 
which ultimately fed a cost and risk analysis. 
A. BACKGROUND 
This section provides an initial baseline of knowledge for the subject matter 
presented and relates its importance to in-service engineering in the sustainment phase of 
the HEL life cycle. 
1. Distance Support 
Currently, DS is performed by the United States Navy (USN) using the following 
conduits (Naval Surface Warfare Center, Port Hueneme Division 2013):  
• Non-Secure Internet Protocol Router Network (NIPRNET) chat 
• Secure Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET) chat 
• Email 
• Phone 
• Regional maintenance center (RMC) site visit 
• Engineer on-site technical assistance (Tech Assist)  
• DS websites (Sailor 2 Engineer, Sailor 2.0) 
When a system indicates a fault, sailors take action to correct the fault based on 
their training, and consulting automated tools for fault diagnostics. In a mature system, 
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the automated systems may provide valid solutions. The next step in diagnostics and 
troubleshooting is to consult technical manuals and drawings. As systems have become 
more complex throughout the USN, the ability to effectively read, interpret, and take 
action based on schematics has failed to keep up with demand. As onboard 
troubleshooting efforts are exhausted, the ship must contact outside shore support. RMCs 
provide the second tier of service and the in-service engineering agent (ISEA) the third. 
These latter two entities provide only as much remote support and guidance as can be 
gleaned from descriptions of problems from the ship or limited output from the system. 
When troubleshooting time or problem information provided ashore has been depleted, 
an engineer or technician must go aboard the ship to resolve the problem. The effort and 
expense of onboard support may be, in some cases, cost prohibitive. 
2. High Energy Laser Weapons System 
An example of a fiber solid state laser (SSL) prototype demonstrator developed 
by the USN is the Laser Weapon System (LaWS). The USN plans to install a LaWS 
system on the USS Ponce, a ship operating in the Persian Gulf as an interim afloat 
forward staging base, to conduct continued evaluation of shipboard lasers in an 
operational setting. The USN reportedly anticipates moving to a shipboard laser program 
of record in “the FY2018 time frame” and achieving an initial operational capability 
(IOC) with a shipboard laser in FY2020 or FY2021 (United States Congressional 
Research Service 2014). 
Lasers are being used in the commercial sector for a wide range of projects from 
eye corrective surgery to tattoo removal. As with any military product, the aspects of DS 
and maintenance are much more difficult and require more scrutiny and planning. The 
components of a basic laser must be considered for the purposes of DS planning.   
For the purposes of DS, it is necessary to consider the basic lowest replaceable 
unit (LRU) and parts of a laser that could potentially require attention or maintenance. 
All portions of a laser must be carefully balanced and maintained to allow for optimum 
efficiency and results. Under this assumption, it is important to distinguish the basic 
LRUs or simplest components of a laser.  
 2 
Since the HEL is still relatively new, the knowledge base and policies in place 
need time to mature. Lack of past experience and knowledge increases risk in designing a 
DS system, as there is less historical data to leverage. The LRUs of the laser need to be 
monitored in order to prepare for and mitigate problems that may arise from operational 
use and environmental factors. 
B. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
The USN has no current plan, component, service, or system that addresses all 
aspects of DS. This capstone report will explore a methodology and design of a DS 
framework for a HEL system. Additionally, a DS framework will be established for the 
HEL to address feasibility in terms of cost and risk to the USN. 
This effort affects multiple USN systems. When a system is produced and 
deployed, it is expected that a certain number of parts will break or require maintenance 
due to anticipated use and wear and tear, and unexpected casualties. This in turn will lead 
to the need to replace or repair components of the system. The DSHEL capstone team has 
developed a DS system that is applicable to the HEL, while still maintaining a generic 
architecture that is relevant to many systems including possible future iterations of 
different HEL weapon types. 
C. PROJECT OBJECTIVES AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This section describes the project goals and research questions. 
1. Project Goals 
The goal of this capstone report was to develop a DS framework and architecture 
for future shipboard HEL Systems. The team studied a “designed in” implementation of 
DS rather than a “bolted on after the fact” implementation. Using the USN’s Six Pillars 
of DS as a starting point, the team’s objectives were to explore, analyze, and propose 
methodologies, architectures, and technologies to efficiently effectuate the first four 
pillars of DS as applicable to surface USN HEL Systems. The Six Pillars are discussed in 
subsequent chapters. 
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2. Research Questions 
The following research questions were answered by this capstone report:  
• How will DS affect the overall cost and risk in HEL shipboard 
implementation? 
• What type of infrastructure is required to adequately perform DS for HEL? 
• Are there any existing DS frameworks that can be applied to DSHEL? 
• Of the HEL components, which information is the most important to collect? 
D. PROJECT ASSUMPTIONS AND CONSTRAINTS 
This capstone report was executed under the following assumptions and 
constraints as detailed in Table 1.  
Table 1. Assumptions and Constraints 
Type Assumption or Constraint Description 
Constraint This study is limited to the Solid State Fiber Laser as the HEL system 
being analyzed. This laser has already been used and installed on a USN 
ship.  
Constraint  This study is limited to the HEL system integrated onto afloat platforms. 
Afloat platforms were chosen due to stakeholder needs and requirements 
as detailed later. 
Constraint Of the Six Pillars of DS, this capstone will cover the first four pillars: 
Remote Technical Assistance, Remote Repair and Validation, Remote 
Diagnostics, and Remote Monitoring. The last two pillars of DS are 
outside the scope of this capstone report as the technology available is 
not yet mature enough to support ePrognostics or Self Repair and 
Healing. 
Constraint All data and information disclosed within this capstone report has been 
generalized to conform with Distribution A requirements for release to 
the public. 
Assumption Labor rates of support personnel are fully burdened at $60/hr. This value 
was chosen to keep consistent with other previous studies performed by 
PEO IWS.  
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Type Assumption or Constraint Description 
Assumption Travel costs: CONUS: $2,500 /wk., OCONUS: $5,000 /wk. This value 
is consistent with previous studies performed by PEO IWS. 
Assumption Data rates to/from the installed platform are bounded between 2Mbps to 
4 Mbps, given current satellite communication (SATCOM) bandwidth 
limitations. 
Assumption Multi-tiered technical support shall follow the existing USN hierarchy:  
Tier 1 – On-board Support 
Tier 2 – Regional Maintenance Center (RMC) 
Tier 3 – In-Service Engineering Agent (ISEA) 
Tier 4 – Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) 
Assumption The manufacturing base of key system parts, assemblies, subsystems, 
components, and LRUs are not stable and will diminish over time. 
 
E. ANALYSIS APPROACH 
This section describes the systems engineering and management approach. It 
elaborates on the design team structure, the stakeholder and project sponsors, as well as 
technical approach and methodology used for this capstone report. 
1. Design Team Structure 
The capstone team was comprised of six students from the Naval Surface Warfare 
Center, Port Hueneme Division (NSWC PHD). The team members had multidisciplinary 
backgrounds from land attack, littoral, and air defense combat and weapon systems, and 
educational backgrounds in applied mathematics, architecture, mechanical, computer, 
software, network, and electronic engineering with system life-cycle experience in 
acquisition, test and evaluation, modernization, ship installation, and in-service 
engineering.  Table 2 lists the individual’s names, roles, and responsibilities. The teams 
roles are indicated, delineating primary responsibility and lead effort of the capstone 




Table 2. Team Member Roles and Responsibilities 
Team 
Member Roles Responsibilities 
Matthew 
Sheehan 
Project CO Supervised and lead the overall project effort including: 
selection of the team member responsibilities, team 
conflict resolution, provided team weekly status and IPR 
briefings, coordinated external support, scheduled 
external meetings with capstone advisors and 
programmatic tasks as necessary. 
 Enterprise 
Architect 
Collaborated with stakeholders, leadership, and subject 
matter experts, to build, formulate, and align the project 
design in all aspects. These included, but were not limited 
to: strategy, process, information, technology, design, 
logistics, mission, and project vision. 
Socrates 
Frangis 
Project XO Served as a backup to the Project CO and ensured the 
team met CO expectations, scheduled internal team 
meetings, and managed risk. 
 Software 
Lead 
Ensured logical interface design of HEL DS requirements, 
captured necessary open architecture message types, 
proper software integration with HEL system, formatted 
for remote troubleshooting and off board transfer. 





Ensured overall documentation contained: relevant 
content, proper grammar, correct spelling, consistent flow 
and style, proper citations, and all other formatting 





Provided requirement analysis based on component 
engineering drawing designs, physical, mechanical, 
material, and weight considerations. 
 Secretary of 
Notes 






Generated the functional architecture for DSHEL, which 




M&S Lead Generated M&S effort of ISEA support processes (current 
HEL without DS vs HEL with DS). 
 
The capstone project team was supported by NPS advisors for guidance and 
review of the products prior to submission. Table 3 provides the advisor’s names, roles 
and responsibilities while Figure 1 characterizes the overall Team Organizational 
Structure. 
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Table 3. Advisor Roles and Responsibilities 
Team Member Roles Responsibilities 
Professor Green Project Advisor Provided oversight and involvement with: all major aspects of the project process, review of 
capstone proposal, the development of the 
project plan, advising project execution, 
participation of in-progress review rehearsals, 
and the review of all report outputs and products. 
Professor Nelson Project Advisor 
Professor Young Project Advisor 
 
 
 Team Organizational Structure Figure 1.
2. Stakeholder and Project Sponsors 
The capstone team solicited inputs from stakeholders regarding challenges and 
necessary capabilities critical to the in-service sustainment of HEL through the use of DS 
by means of: customer requirements, thresholds, objectives, and weighted importance for 
prioritization. Communication channels with the stakeholders were initially determined 
by local project advisors within the directed energy community. While all stakeholders’ 
inputs were important, some were active in the decision process and had direct input, 
whereas others were passive and dictated requirements and capabilities through means of 
naval instructions and enterprise objectives. Stakeholders did transition between the 
states of active and passive throughout the life cycle of the project; however, Table 4 
captures their predominant inputs. 
  
 7 
Table 4. Stakeholder Inputs 
Stakeholder Category 
Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) Active 
PMS 405 - Directed Energy and Electric Weapon Systems Program Office Active 
Office of Naval Research (ONR) Passive 
NSWC PHD - Office of Engineering and Technology (OET) Active 
NSWC PHD - Distance Support Advocacy Office Active 
Naval Network Operations Center (NOC) Passive 
Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) Active 
Warfighter, USN Active 
 
3. System Engineering Process 
The capstone team’s approach was based on the systems engineering “V” model. 
The V Model is a way of visually describing the fundamental portions of systems 
engineering. The use of the V gives a depiction of the flow of work in the SE model. The 
V is used to give a structured flow from defining requirements (system and performance) 
and moving into design before testing. This takes the project through a logical high level 
order that keeps in mind the need for the major milestones of defining the goal of the 
system, iteratively designing and testing it, and then planning for the practical use of the 
system. The V model reinforces the key areas of “verification and validation.”  Following 
the V forces a systems engineer to constantly and cyclically re-test and re-evaluate the 
system. 
The two major halves of the V model represent the initial portion of the design 
called “project definition” and “project test and integration.”  Both of these were used in 
the DSHEL capstone and are detailed in Figure 2. The first half of the V is where the 
system engineers/designers must clearly state the purpose and requirements of the 
system/project to be designed. The second half is where the testing, validation and 
verification, and integration take place. These two halves of the model are constantly 
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repeated and re-worked through the “verification and validation” portion of the V. In 
Chapter I, the concept of operations (CONOPS) and background of the DSHEL system 
are defined; this would fall in the beginning portion of the first half of the V model. 
Chapter II identifies stakeholder needs, develops a generic distance support framework, 
and includes the literature review. Chapter III captures applies the distance support 
framework created, as well as detailing the functional and performance requirements, 
KPPs, KSAs, MOEs and MOPs. Chapter IV brings the system through concept definition 
to architecture and interface design. Chapter V employs M&S techniques and uses the 
second half of the V model. Chapter VI analyzes cost and risk which further follows the 
second half of the V. The final chapter (VII) provides the project’s technical conclusions, 
recommendations and contributions to the SE BoK. 
 
 System Engineering V Model (from Eclipse Foundation 2014) Figure 2.
F. SUMMARY 
By applying consummate SE judgment and rigor, leveraging emerging 
technologies, and applying lessons learned from traditional DS practices, a proactive and 
robust solutions were found with DSHEL. The efforts detailed above show an increase in 
availability while decreasing the life-cycle cost of the system. 
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II. STAKEHOLDER NEEDS ANALYSIS 
A. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The following sections detail the various topics researched for further information 
in order to understand the existing BoK in scope and depth concerning DS. Figure 3 
shows the literature review methodology used while researching DS for the HEL. Due to 
DS being a very general and overarching topic, the literature review for DSHEL was 
divided into two additional focus areas. The material reviewed and research that could be 
attributed directly to the topic of DSHEL was categorized under the “Explicit Area.” This 
area is reserved for all things related to DS. The second division, “Implicit Area,” was 
reserved for all topics that were important factors contributing to DSHEL, but was not 
directly related to it. This was done to compensate for all the specific and unique policies, 
procedures, standards, and requirements levied on DOD programs by government 
organizations. The topics investigated were selected by their applicability to each 
research area. These topics were then analyzed for shortcomings, which validated the 
need for an integrated DS system as supported by a framework devoted to the USN’s 
unique needs.  
 
 Literature Review Methodology Figure 3.
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1. Explicit Areas 
The explicit areas (directly related) that were researched and reviewed for 
DSHEL analyzed the origins, definitions, key theories, concepts and ideas, and major 
issues, as well as the main questions and problems that have been addressed to date on 
this topic. 
a. Distance Support Beginnings 
The concept of DS dates back to advent of the industrial revolution (1760-1840). 
The creation of heavy manufacturing machinery created the need to have skilled 
repairmen make routine site visits due to the inability to transport broken machinery 
(Snider, 2011). As technology progressed, the term DS did as well. The invention of the 
telephone in 1876 would have a profound impact on how DS was executed. The ability to 
connect customers/users with service providers in real-time allowed for a greater 
exchange in knowledge and troubleshooting techniques resulting in reduced downtimes. 
The result of these reduced downtimes was an increase in customer satisfaction and 
loyalty which lead to increased profits (Qui and Lee, 2015). The 1960s saw the birth of 
the modern call center, a single point of contact for corporations to handle customer 
queries, complaints, and provide support services (Hegde, Sandeep, and Vasudeo 2012, 
58). Call centers, now known as help desks, proved to be a valuable tool to connect 
customer desires with service providers. Another major development in DS was AT&T’s 
creation of the 1–800 numbers in 1968 when a U.S. federal judge ordered Ford Motor 
Company to establish a free phone line to assist customers in the recall of a faulty car 
(Hegde, Sandeep, and Vasudeo 2012, 60). This allowed for companies to have a direct, 
dedicated line to provide support to their customers. With a single-point contact number 
to a service provider, corporations were now faced with the task of organizing and 
distributing different customer requests to the proper service expert. This issue was 
resolved with the creation of the phone menu and multi-tiered technical support. A phone 
menu is an automated menu that a customer dials to navigate down to the desired 
information on a particular topic. Figure 4 gives a simple pictorial of how phone menu 
number selection might be organized. A customer with an inquiry or issues calls the 
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appropriate service line. Companies tend to have one service number to cut down 
customer confusion on which number to contact concerning topic desire. The customer is 
then greeted by an automated menu selection. Referring to Figure 4, the customer is 
presented with three menu options as noted by the numbers “1,” “2,” and “3.” Each of 
these numbers would be linked to different product topic areas, lines, or business 
functions. For example, selecting number “1” may connect the customer to a general 
information line, where selecting number “2” may connect the customer to a billing and 
accounting department. For companies that have many product lines or business 
functions, a nested menu may be employed. Selecting number “3” would prompt the 
customer with another menu offering further choices from which to select, which in turn 
would connect the customer to the desired product line or business function. 
 
 Phone Menu with Nested Menu Example (Icons from Flaticon 2014) Figure 4.
The use of nested menus is important in reduced customer search times for 
connection to support. If a phone menu used a linear array menu system (all phone menu 
selections being sequential), a customer would be forced to sit and listen to each option 
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until hearing the selection needed. While this wait time may not seem very long, a user 
searching for a topic X among n selections will, on average, take O(n) time (where O(n) 
is big O notation that describes the limiting behavior of the linear function when n 
approaches a set value or infinity). The use of a nested menu, effectively altering the 
phone menu from a linear array to a tree, will shorten search time to O(log(n)) (where 
O(log(n)) is big O notation that describes the limiting behavior of the tree function when 
n approaches a set value or infinity). If it takes five seconds to listen to each phone menu 
option, a customer could be on the phone for quite some time before navigating to the 
desired product line or business function. Figure 5 shows average phone menu wait times 
as given by phone menu layout type and number of phone menu options. 
 
 Linear vs. Nested (Tree) Phone Menu Wait Times Figure 5.
Multi-tiered technical support is a system used to organize service support 
dependent on customer need, level of support required, or business function in order to 
provide the best possible service in the most efficient time. The higher the tier level, the 
greater the quality and specificity of the support information will be. Both of these 
developments, if deployed and executed correctly, lead to decreased customer service 
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wait times and increased service provider productivity. Typically, all customer service 
inquiries are routed to a low tier level for initial information gathering and high-level 
investigation as shown in Figure 6 and Figure 7. Low-level technical support, also known 
as tier zero or tier one, tends to possess broad organizational knowledge, but limited 
technical insight. This tier can usually only resolve basic customer service questions and 
relies heavily on scripted question/answer flowchart guides. The next level of technical 
support, also known as tier two, is directed customer service issues and questions that the 
lower tier is not equipped to resolve. At this level, support technicians have advanced 
skills such as troubleshooting and analysis. Customers who provide support for their 
users usually require this level of support. The highest level of support, commonly known 
as tier three, is connected to customers by lower levels of technical support for issues that 
require a subject matter expert. While many customer service issues and inquiries do not 
make it to this level, the ones that do are typically from customers who specialize in the 
research, development, or back-end operations of the product field. If customer issues 
cannot be resolved at this level of technical support, the company will usually work with 




 Multi-Tiered Technical Support Hierarchy Example Figure 6.
 
 Multi-Level Technical Support Information Flow (Icons from Flaticon Figure 7.
2014) 
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Most of the improvements to DS have been to the service provider side and not 
the platform side. The birth and adoption of the Internet and network connected devices 
changed this imbalance of improvement. Customers no longer have to call the OEM for 
support. Through social media and video sharing, customers can now search the Internet 
for technical solutions and workarounds for their products. With customers becoming 
more “self-sufficient” in providing their own means of support, drying up revenue 
streams from manufacture service support calls, product manufacturers focused on 
cutting product cost and improving product quality. The combination of the users being 
“self-sufficient” in providing their own technical support and improving product quality 
lead the manufacturing base into “hurting” its bottom line is sales figures. A solution was 
created that effectively killed DS for all “consumable” goods: planned obsolescence. 
Planned obsolescence is the practice of designing-in limited life use into a product. This 
forces the customer to purchase a new product after a predetermined life cycle in order to 
generate long term sales volume by shortening the amount of time for a customer to make 
repeated product purchases. Figure 8 shows a standard reliability-engineering graph 
known as the bathtub curve. The bathtub curve is used to show the failure rate of the 
hazard function. The three parts or phases of the hazard function are as follows: 
• Burn In—Shown to have a decreasing failure rate due to initial products 
failing early, typically due to manufacturing errors or poor material quality  
• Useful Life—Shown to have a constant failure rate due to random product 
population losses 
• Wear Out—Shown to have an increasing failure rate due to product 
degradation of use 
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 Standard Bathtub Curve (after National Institute of Standards and Figure 8.
Technology 2012) 
Planned obsolescence, as shown in Figure 9, artificially shifts the wear out phase 
earlier. This does not necessarily mean that the product itself is “worn out.” Artificial 
shifts of the wear out phase can also be completed by inhibiting or removing product 
capabilities and delaying product response times. 
 18 
 
 Bathtub Curve with Planned Obsolescence  Figure 9.
b. Modern Distance Support   
DS today varies between industries and within an industry sector, dependent on 
product cost and revenue source. In industries where the main form of revenue is a 
service, like that of Internet service providers (ISPs), DS is initiated and conducted 
through the customer or service user. This is due the nature of the business model, where 
the platform service provider owns the hardware that is on loan to the customer to 
facilitate the desired service. In industries where that main form of revenue is the product, 
like that of vehicle manufacturers and electronics, DS is a combination of customer 
inputs and product feedback. The degree and detail of product feedback designed into the 
product depends on the product’s and customer’s opportunity cost. In many cases, low 
value items are deemed to be “consumable” with a lifespan of only three to four years. 
These items are often replaced outright with no repair or internal product feedback, such 
as sensors, designed-in. High value items, such as aircraft engines, have multiple sensors 
designed into them to monitor the health of the product and help avoid costly repairs or 
expensive replacement. These products have a much longer life cycle than that of the 
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“consumable” genre. The widespread use of sensors in platform systems is predicted to 
transform the way DS is performed and lead to a “Third Industrial Revolution” (Gerard 
Meijer 2008, 6). With the use of sensorization (the act of adding sensors to a device), data 
can be collected readily and analyzed to provide a greater degree of DS in moving from 
the current reactive methods to that of proactive methods. It should be noted that this area 
of performing DS is in its infant stages. Prognostic and “expert systems” are still being 
research and formalized (IEEE 2014). The sensorization of products allows DS to be 
performed without user initiation and even limited user involvement. Examples include 
the OnStar™ service, Formula One racing, and space programs. These examples all have 
the ability to remotely monitor system symptoms and diagnose the issue at hand. 
c. USN Distance Support  
DS within the USN has historically lagged behind industry (Modigliani 2014). 
This is not because DS is not a priority, but because of the way in which the armed 
services acquired systems. Consumer devices tend to be small, assessable, low cost, 
replaceable, lightweight, network independent and non-mission critical. However, 
devices found in the Fleet are the opposite. These devices, such as a missile launcher, are 
often far away and unable to make port to conduct corrective maintenance. Additionally, 
naval systems have far longer useful service lives than consumer devices. A system may 
remain functional in the Fleet long after many subcomponents are no longer in 
production. They are also one-of-a-kind, and thus cannot be easily replaced or 
manufactured due to the lead times and proprietary designs used by contractors. This 
creates a unique capability gap when trying to find a viable solution to support the USN 
and its exclusive requirements. In addition to these unique requirements, the USN used to 
design and require systems to be certified according to their various standards and 
specifications. These were known as MIL-HDBK, MIL-SPEC, MIL-STD, MIL-PRF, and 
MIL-DTL. Each of these standards and specifications, nearly 45,500, had to be followed 
by any system acquired by the DOD. These stringent requirements, imposed upon 
systems, raised unit costs and impeded the adoption of cutting edge technology. To 
combat this, the Secretary of Defense William J. Perry issued a memorandum in 1994 
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that changed the DOD’s stance on using military standards and specifications to that in 
favor of using industry standards and increasing access to “commercial state-of-the-art 
technology” (Perry 1994). 
Since the adoption of the policy, the USN has seen an explosive growth in the 
fielding of commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) products. Many of the products have some 
limited sensor capability already designed-in which the USN is trying to take advantage 
of. The main roadblocks in using these additional COTS tools are the lack of frameworks, 
organizations, infrastructures in place, and integration costs or a combination of the 
aforementioned. 
A recent paper by Nicolas Guertin, PEO-IWS and Paul Bruhns, ManTech 
International Corp. “Comparing Acquisition Strategies: Maintenance Free Operating 
Period (MFOP) vs. Traditional Logistics Support” contained some interesting data about 
cost savings realized through the use of DS. In their discussion of implementing MFOP 
for existing systems in a stepwise manner, they state: 
The first step is to capture the value of distance support from ship to shore 
through a network connection that bridges between the operational system 
maintainers (O) to intermediate subject matter experts and tech assist (I) 
levels. This O-to-I Level Maintenance Bridge requires little product 
integration and will immediately generate cost savings. Table 5 highlights 
an example program that achieved a 15:1 cost savings ratio when 
employing distance support services over deploying tech assets:  
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Table 5. FLEET Technical Assist Data 
FLEET Technical Assist Data for Submarine Enterprise 
120 Fleet Technical Assist (FTA) Events Performed 
93 Local (Norfolk) 
27 Out-of-Area 
100% Distance Support (DS) Attempts (CFFC/Command Policy) 
16% Success Rate Overall on All FTA Events 
37% Success Rate on Out-of-Area Events 
Average Man Hours (MH) per Event 
19 MH via DS 
164 MH via On-Site Support 
Average Cost per Event (Based on $60.00 per Hour) 
$1,140.00 for DS 
$9,840.00 Labor and $5,500.00 Travel for On-Site ($15,390.00) 
 
These methods generated faster response time for solving the system 
problem, as well as lowering labor and travel costs (from Guertin and 
Bruhns 2011). 
The DS for the HEL capstone project is an in depth SE analysis and M&S of a DS 
system designed for a generic HEL weapons system. After the initial procurement of the 
HEL, the USN must provide operation and support (O&S) funds, at approximately 60–
80% of the total life cycle of the system (Defense Acquisition University 2011). This 
capstone explored the theory that providing DS will lead to a lower total ownership cost 
of the HEL system. Through M&S the goal of the project was to prove this. The project 
considered pre-existing work on DS, such as the Six Pillars of DS. The Six Pillars of DS, 
as depicted in Figure 10, consist of: Remote Tech Assist, Remote Diagnostics, Remote 
Repair/Validation, Remote Monitoring, ePrognostics, and Self-Repair/Healing. Using SE 
methodologies, the team looked at a subset of the Six Pillars, focusing on: Remote Tech 
Assist, Remote Diagnostics, Remote Monitoring and Remote Repair/Validation.  
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 Distance Support Functional Capabilities Figure 10.
According to the Navy Distance Support policy written and signed out in March 
of 2007,  
Distance support is a Navy Enterprise effort that combines people (e.g., 
subject matter experts), processes (e.g., remote equipment monitoring, 
tele-medicine, interactive detailing, etc.), and technology (e.g., data 
compression and replication) into a collaborative infrastructure without 
regard to geographic location. Distance support, at a minimum, includes 
the functional area of logistics; maintenance and modernization; 
Manpower, Personnel, Training, and Education (MPT&E); and medical 
support. Distance support remotely projects reactive, proactive, and 
predictive support to Sailors across these functional areas, in order to 
achieve the right readiness at the right time, at the right cost. Effective and 
reliable information transfer is a key prerequisite to enable Distance 
Support capabilities and processes. (Chief of Naval Operations 2007, 2) 
This is a very broad concept spanning multiple disciplines and practices within 
the USN enterprise. The capstone was specifically interested in how certain DS concepts 
can be applied to the HEL weapons system and, possibly, combat systems in general for 
the USN. By narrowing the scope of DS in this manner the discussion can focus on the 
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concept of providing a DS capability for the HEL system. Providing a capability refers to 
the ability of the ISEA to provide remote technical assistance to the system. Specifically, 
DS encompasses the ability to resolve issues without travel, monitor issues remotely, 
troubleshoot and repair remotely, and the ability to anticipate and predict issues before 
occurrence. It is for this reason that the USN has developed the concept of Six Pillars. 
These pillars span between reactive and proactive methods of DS technical assistance. 
The benefits and limitations of each of these areas were covered in depth. 
(1) Reactive Methods 
Reactive DS is defined as “after the occurrence response” (Naval Surface Warfare 
Center, Port Hueneme Division 2013). The following methods fall into this category: 
Remote Technical Assistance, Remote Diagnostics, and Remote Repair and Validation. 
All of these methods were implementable to date with current COTS technologies. 
(a) Remote Technical Assistance 
Remote Technical Assistance is the ability to resolve maintenance support issues 
without travel using tools such as Sailor to Engineer, Sailor 2.0, email, chat and phone 
(Naval Surface Warfare Center, Port Hueneme Division 2013). Most of the technical 
assistance provided to the USN still comes in this from. The benefit to this form of 
technical assistance is that it is low cost, pervasive, and well understood. Email is 
common within the USN, and the sailors have a direct line of communication to the 
engineer in many cases. Additionally, in many critical weapons systems, the ISEA 
participates in group chat with the ships to provide assistance as needed. websites have 
been created to help provide readily available technical information to the sailor as well 
as forum support to resolve issues that come up. All of these tools are in use today in the 
USN. 
One of the big issues with Remote Technical Assistance methods explained above 
is that they are temporal. As time progresses, information becomes stale and less relevant. 
Two examples to demonstrate this principle as it occurs today in the USN are discussed. 
First is the concept of email; while email is cheap to set up and relatively well 
understood, it is difficult to use as a tool for capturing technical information. Limitations 
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to email include: overall file size and communication transmission delay. Limited file 
size inhibits the amount of information that can be provided to the sailor to resolve an 
issue. Communication transmission delay can span weeks to months as the accumulated 
time between email transmissions grows. This is because email is time dependent. If the 
ship receiving support is in a different time zone than the shore based site, the time to 
answer email becomes longer. Additionally, the bandwidth on ships for email is 
constrained, especially when the ship is underway. Once the engineer has successfully 
provided support to the ship, the solution may be logged to use in future support events. 
Unfortunately, these solutions are not being stored in a central location to facilitate 
knowledge management and sharing between technical support groups. 
The next example concerns the use of websites within the USN for support. There 
exist a plethora of support websites that have been created for use by the Fleet. Each 
website is created and populated with information to help the sailors better execute their 
duties and resolve issues with their system in a timely manner. The problem with 
websites is that while they are cheap to create; they are costly to maintain and require 
constant updates to information. Also, on-line technical support resources are poorly 
advertised.  
Both of these examples paint a challenging view of the remote technical 
assistance methods of DS. These examples illustrate that while email, websites, and chat 
programs are prevalent and widespread in terms of use, they are limited as a means of 
resolving issues within weapons systems. 
(b) Remote Diagnostics 
Remote Diagnostics is the ability to establish remote connectivity to observe, and 
diagnose system performance in a manner similar to the engineer being on-site (Naval 
Surface Warfare Center, Port Hueneme Division 2013). This method of DS is not as 
pervasive in the USN ecosystem because to tap into this method of DS, the system 
onboard the ship must have a passive connection to shore via the Global Information Grid 
(GIG). Typically, weapons systems do not have a direct connection to the GIG as this 
would change the cybersecurity posture of the system. However, aboard ships there are 
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certain systems that are tactical in nature, but are critical enough to warrant remote 
diagnostics. One such example of this is the AEGIS weapons system. Due to the critical 
nature of this weapons system, the system itself has a subsystem known as the 
Operational Readiness Test System (ORTS). This system is responsible for performing a 
variety of diagnostics on the AEGIS combat system to determine its overall readiness. 
Due to the mission criticality of test results produced by ORTS, Naval Surface Warfare 
Center, Port Hueneme Division (NSWC PHD) developed a ship based system call the 
Operational Readiness Test Systems Technical Assistance Remote Support 
(ORTSTARS). ORTSTARS has been successful in allowing engineers to log into the 
AEGIS combat system on a ship and diagnose problems from shore. All of this is done 
using a secure connection. This capability offers the ability to: 
• assist with fault detection 
• isolate faults 
• perform intermediate maintenance 
• correct faults 
This method of DS does not suffer from the same time delay issues that are seen 
with traditional technical assistance via email. However, Remote Diagnostics is not 
without its faults. One of the issues is that the information gathered has to be done 
manually, which is time intensive. Some ORTSTARS sessions with ships can be as long 
as eight hours depending on the speed of the connection and the location of the ship. The 
connection may drop unexpectedly causing the session to be reestablished. 
ORTSTARS does not control the pipe to which they connect off of ship. This 
means that close coordination must be maintained with Space and Naval Warfare 
Systems Command (SPAWAR) through the use of a memorandum of agreement (MOA). 
These MOAs allow bidirectional flow of information on/off ship and allow connections 
through the shipboard firewalls. Despite these shortcomings, Remote Diagnostics is an 
improvement on the traditional technical assistance methods of email and chat. 
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(c) Remote Repair and Validation 
Remote Repair and Validation refers to the ability to remotely re-configure a 
system to correct problems (Naval Surface Warfare Center, Port Hueneme Division 
2013). This method of DS requires not only a direct connection to the system, but it also 
requires active coordination of ship’s force. Unlike Remote Diagnostics, where the 
connection to the shipboard system is passive in nature, Remote Repair and Validation is 
an active form of DS. The engineer on shore has an active connection to the system on 
board ship. During this active connection, the user has the ability to make changes to the 
system to resolve and correct faults. This is done to provide corrective actions to well-
known and established faults that occur in the system which have an approved corrective 
action. This is a sensitive process when dealing with mission critical systems and requires 
the sailor to be actively monitoring the procedure that is being run remotely. This active 
supervision on the part of the sailor satisfies the “two person positive control” critical to 
the security of systems. The downside to this method of DS is that it is reactive in nature. 
Additionally, it requires coordination with several outside agencies to establish a secure 
and reliable inbound connection to the ship. There are several layers of security present in 
the GIG that must be changed in order to allow this type of connection to the system. 
(2) Proactive Methods 
Proactive DS is defined as “Remote continuous monitoring and corrective action 
without shipboard personnel interaction response” (Naval Surface Warfare Center, Port 
Hueneme Division 2013). The following methods fall into this category: Remote 
Monitoring, ePrognostics, and Self-Healing/Repair. These methods require more effort to 
fully implement and are not completely available with current COTS technologies. 
(a) Remote Monitoring 
Remote Monitoring is the first method of DS that takes a proactive approach to 
DS (Naval Surface Warfare Center, Port Hueneme Division 2013). In this approach 
systems are monitored from the shore to determine if there is a fault before the ship 
initiated a casualty report (CASREP). This method may employ the use of a monitoring 
system on the ship that captures simple network management protocol (SNMP) 
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information, error logs, and vulnerability scan data, which is then sent off ship to be 
analyzed from shore. Remote Monitoring assumes this data is being collected and piped 
off ship in near real-time. A typical example of this type of DS is the monitoring of the 
network traffic coming off ship by the network operations center (NOC) or the 
monitoring of radar transmit power. In both of these cases the information is sent to shore 
in a raw data format that the engineers analyze to determine whether the system is 
operating within prescribed tolerances. The benefit of this method is that the shore based 
engineer can look at the data and determine whether the system is operating correctly. 
Also, this does not require the participation of the sailor to perform this analysis. The 
downside is that this information may be more than what is required to determine the 
state of the system, additionally the cost (i.e., the network bandwidth overhead) of 
performing this type of DS methodology may be too high to implement on a platform that 
has an older network transport layer or a smaller platform that does not have a large pipe 
off the ship. Although this method is very useful for the shore, it may not be feasible for 
every system. 
(b) ePrognostics 
This method of DS expands on the previous method and uses the idea that for 
certain types of data (especially analog data) trends can be established. Various stochastic 
methods can be used to analyze the data for system performance and can then trend this 
data over time to establish a known “good baseline” for data. Predictive algorithms can 
be used to detect when a certain data set is trending outside of the known “good 
baseline.” This method of automated DS is still in its infancy for combat system 
elements, however, for many hull, mechanical, and electrical (HM&E) systems, 
prognostic condition based maintenance (CBM) is well established. 
(c) Self-Repair/Healing 
The last method of DS is analogous to what is known as an “expert system.” An 
expert system is a computer system that emulates the decision-making ability of a human 
expert (Jackson 1998, 2). The system is fully aware of its inner workings as well as its 
external interfaces and dependencies. Expert systems are systems that have little to no 
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need of human assistance in the event of failure or event execution. These systems have 
the ability to self-govern (redirect resources to maintain system performance during 
critical operations) and sometimes use artificial intelligence (AI) to “learn” from previous 
events. Expert systems have the distinct advantage in needing minimal human interaction 
to right functions, but these systems can be costly to implement and suffer from a lack of 
robust resources for knowledge acquisition in order to enable AI machine learning. 
d. Distance Support Frameworks 
Due to the USN’s unique set of environmental, security, programmatic, and 
organizational requirements, a “plug-n-play” DS framework does not exist. The 
following existing frameworks below were studied. 
(1) Information Technology Infrastructure Library  
Of the existing frameworks available, the Information Technology Infrastructure 
Library (ITIL) was the optimal candidate to study and glean best practices. ITIL provides 
a framework of best-practices for the service management of Information Technology 
(IT) products. Much like the purpose of DSHEL, IT services and data have become 
essential to business operations as well as strategic assets. The main purpose of ITIL is 
the continual measurement and improvement of the quality of IT services delivered, from 
both a business and a customer’s perspective (AXELOS Ltd. 2011, 14). If implemented 
and executed correctly, ITIL benefits include: 
• increased user and customer satisfaction with IT services 
• improved service availability, directly leading to increased business profits 
and revenue  
• financial savings from reduced rework or lost time and from improved 
resource management and usage 
• improved time to market for new products and services 
• improved decision-making and reduced risk 
The ITIL framework is broken down into five associated life-cycle phases: 
Service Strategy, Service Design, Service Transition, Service Operation, and Continual 
Service Improvement as described in Figure 11.  
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 ITIL Service Life cycle (from AXELOS Ltd. 2011, 7) Figure 11.
Figure 12 illustrates how each of these phases is made up of sequential steps and 
processes that govern and align each life-cycle stage with the business it is supporting. 
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 Integration Across the Service Life Cycle (from AXELOS Ltd. 2011, 9) Figure 12.
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Each of these phases will be detailed below. 
(a) Service Strategy  
The service strategy sits at the core of the ITIL framework. This is due to the 
service strategy being the key plan in providing a solution to the business problem at 
hand. The service strategy is developed with many parties in order to ensure it meets the 
needs of the customers and users of the business problem. These needs and requirements 
are the foundation in which the service strategy is built. This phase also builds 
understanding among stakeholders in answering: (AXELOS Ltd. 2011, 13) 
• What is a service? 
• What services should be offered? 
• To whom the services should be offered? 
• How will service performance be measured? 
• What is service value (utility and warranty)? 
• What are the service provider types? 
• Are there critical success factors? 
• How will the services be delivered? 
• Who plays what role and how? 
(b) Service Design 
Service design is the first step into turning the service strategy into a tangible 
product. Service design involves balancing functionality requirements (service utility), 
performance requirements (service warranty), resources availability and timescales 
(AXELOS Ltd. 2011, 22). As these areas are balanced, normally with the use of cost and 
risk analysis, a holistic solution providing end-to-end quality should emerge. An 
important part of this phase is the creation of service level agreements (SLAs). A SLA is 
an agreement between a service provider and an end user (customer). The SLA typically 
will detail the service, service level targets, quality of service (QoS), and the 
responsibilities of each party involved (AXELOS Ltd. 2011, 25). In contrast to the USN 
DS methods, ITIL has differing definitions for reactive and proactive activities. 
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• Reactive activities are monitoring, measuring, analysis and management of 
events, incidents and problems involving service unavailability (AXELOS 
Ltd. 2011, 26) 
• Proactive activities are proactive planning, design, recommendation and 
improvement of availability (AXELOS Ltd. 2011, 26) 
In addition to SLAs being created in this phase, information security management 
(ISM) is also considered. The USN’s cybersecurity requirements are more stringent than 
ITIL, but both do share a set of common terminology and service management activities 
that were applied. 
• Availability means that information is available and usable when required 
(AXELOS Ltd. 2011, 28). 
• Confidentiality means that information is observed by or disclosed to only 
those who have a right to know (AXELOS Ltd. 2011, 28). 
• Integrity means that information is complete, accurate and protected against 
unauthorized modification (AXELOS Ltd. 2011, 28). 
• Authenticity and Non-repudiation means that business transactions, as well as 
information exchanges, can be trusted (AXELOS Ltd. 2011, 28). 
(c) Service Transition 
Service transition ensures new, modified, legacy, or retiring services meet the 
expected or required levels of capability to the business and customer as the service 
design is implemented throughout the enterprise. As new systems come online and older 
systems are taken offline, change and configuration management become important 
supporting processes to ensure service quality.  
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 Scope of Change and Release Management for Services (from ITIL 2011, Figure 13.
34) 
Another important part in this phase is the execution of service validation and 
testing. Once the new/old systems have been put/taken on/off line, the whole service is 
put through verification and validation testing to ensure that no degradation to service 
quality has occurred. Figure 13 shows the interactions and interfaces required between 
the parties as changes are made at differing levels. 
(d) Service Operation 
This phase is the execution of the service design and transition phases. The 
service is delivered to business and customer as detailed by the SLAs created in the 
service design phase. This phase not only provides and delivers the service, but also 
controls events, incidents, requests, problems, access, and other common service 
operation activities.  
(e) Continual Service Improvement 
The continual service improvement phase, as shown in Figure 14, is the feedback 
loop into the first phase of the ITIL framework, service strategy. As is with any superior 
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service, the current model must always be scrutinized for flaws, inefficiencies, gains, 
technological improvements, and added capability in order to continually strive to 
provide higher service quality. 
 
 The Continual Service Improvement Approach (from ITIL 2011, 51) Figure 14.
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 Seven-Step Improvement Process (from ITIL 2011, 52) Figure 15.
 36 
Figure 15 shows the Seven-Step Improvement Process. This phase is also where 
service measurement and reporting play a part in improving future service. Monitoring 
and measuring aid in this phase by (ITIL 2011, 55): 
• Validating previous decisions that have been made. 
• Direct activities in order to meet set targets. 
• Justify that a course of action is required, with factual evidence or proof. 
• Intervene at the appropriate point and take corrective action. 
Technology, process, and service metrics also aid in shedding light on the areas 
above. Metrics are only useful if an established baseline has been created beforehand.  
(2) International Organization for Standards (ISO)/International 
Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) 20000 
The ISO/IEC 20000 is a Service Management System (SMS) standard. This 
standard is a combination of, and allows for the ITIL, Microsoft Operations Framework, 
and Control Objectives for Information and Related Technology’s (both explained further 
below) IT service management frameworks. ISO/IEC 20000 consists of five parts, as 
shown in Figure 16, and can be used by (ISO) and the International Electrotechnical 
Commission (IEC) 2014): 
• an organization seeking services from service providers and requiring 
assurance that their service requirements will be fulfilled 
• an organization that requires a consistent approach by all its service providers, 
including those in a supply chain 
• a service provider that intends to demonstrate its capability for the design, 
transition, delivery and improvement of services that fulfill service 
requirements 
• a service provider to monitor, measure and review its service management 
processes and services 
• a service provider to improve the design, transition, delivery and improvement 
of services through the effective implementation and operation of the SMS 
• an assessor or auditor as the criteria for a conformity assessment of a service 
provider’s SMS to the requirements in ISO/IEC 20000-1:2011 
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 Service Management System (from International Organization for Standardization (ISO) and the International Figure 16.
Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) 2014) 
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The ISO/IEC 20000 standard has a lot of overlap with the other frameworks 
investigated, but was useful in understanding how specific requirements for the service 
provider fulfill agreed service requirements. 
(3) Microsoft Operations Framework 
The Microsoft Operations Framework (MOF) 4.0 has many similarities to the 
ITIL and ISO/IEC 20000 standard with the exception that it has a slightly different life-
cycle foundation layer and a total of three phases. These phases are: plan phase, deliver 
phase, and the operate phase included within a manage layer. 
 
 Structure of MOF 4.0 (from Alexander 2008) Figure 17.
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Figure 17 gives a more detailed view into the MOF 4.0 layer and its phases. 
While this framework can be readily applied to other software vendor products, the MOF 
4.0 framework is mainly geared towards Microsoft products and services. While this 
framework has the same similarities of the other frameworks mentioned in this report, the 
MOF is unique in breaking apart the framework into sections that are serviced by 
products. In analyzing the different Microsoft products that provide these services, 
DSHEL was able to mirror a similar delineation of system functions. 
(4) Control Objectives for Information and Related Technology 
The Control Objectives for Information and Related Technology (COBIT) 
framework, like ITIL, ISO/IEC 20000, and MOF 4.0 is also used for IT management and 
governance. COBIT is different from the previous frameworks in that it is centered on a 
number of principles, areas and processes, model and levels, and process attributes. The 
particular pieces of information to note from COBIT are listed below. 
(a) Principles of Control Objectives for Information and Related Technology 
There are five key principles for IT management and governance that COBIT 
follows. They are (ISACA 2013): 
1. meeting stakeholder needs 
2. covering the enterprise end-to-end 
3. applying a single integrated framework 
4. enabling a holistic approach 
5. separating governance from management 
(b) Process Capability Model and Levels 
COBIT uses a level rank system in defining the overall maturity of process 
capabilities. This level rank system is of particular note due to its applicability throughout 
this capstone in establishing baseline maturity levels for process capability models. The 
capability model and level explanations are detailed in Table 6. 
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Table 6. Process Capability Model and Levels (from ISACA 2013) 
 
 
e. Platform of Interest—High Energy Laser 
In response to Section 251 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 
Year (FY) 2000, the DOD outlined its master plan to capitalize on the significant 
advances of HEL technology in support of emerging national security needs of the 21st 
century (Department of Defense 2000). The recommendations comprised a restructured 
perspective in developing HEL weapons. Developing revolutionary capabilities in HEL 
weapons required a coordinated and focused investment strategy under a new 
management structure, featuring a Joint Technology Office (JTO) with senior-level 
oversight provided by a technology council and board of directors. A better balance could 
be achieved by transitioning large demonstration projects to non-science and technology 
(S&T) accounts sooner than had been done in the past. As such, the DOD focus was put 
to three major HEL system types for S&T exploration: chemical lasers (CL), solid state 
lasers (SSL), and free electron lasers (FEL). While the focus of DSHEL is on the near 
realization of SSL, requirements, artifacts, architecture, methodologies, and analysis were 
decoupled such that it could be reused on FEL or CL. 
Maturity 
Level Meaning Description 
Level 0 Incomplete The process is not implemented or fails to 
achieve its purpose 
Level 1 Performed (Informed) The process is implemented and achieves its 
purpose 
Level 2 Managed (Planned and 
monitored) 
The process is managed and results are 
specified, controlled and maintained 
Level 3 Established (Well defined) A standard process is defined and used 
throughout the organization 
Level 4 Predictable 
(Quantitatively managed) 
The process is executed consistently within 
defined limits 
Level 5 Optimizing (Continuous 
improvement) 
The process is continuously improved to meet 
relevant current and projected business goals 
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There have already been discussions on how the DOD should address laser 
technology. Some of the key areas of concern that are discussed in “Report of the High 
Energy Laser Executive Review Panel, Department of Defense Laser Master Plan, March 
24, 2000,” include cost, the available talent pool, and the structured approach of how one 
might organize the developing laser technology in the DOD. This organizational plan 
cited in the aforementioned document, uses a tiered organizational structure. Technology 
Area Working Groups are comprised of members from “all DOD stakeholder 
organizations” for the HEL. This group in turn would report to and work with the Joint 
Technology Office (JTO), who receives oversight from a senior board of Directors and 
the Technology Council. Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) and 
Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO) are also included for collaboration. This 
allows for different perspectives and insights. While the large knowledge base would be 
beneficial, it may also cause difficulties as it could turn into a situation of having too 
many differing agendas and directions, with a level of oversight that limits productivity. 
As laser technology develops, it will be necessary to ensure that the policies 
develop as well. However, as with any newer technology, the knowledge base, policies in 
place and SME availability will need time to grow. This affects the manner in which DS 
can be applied. Lack of past experience and knowledge adds to the increased risk in 
designing for DS as there is less historical data to leverage. The components of the laser 
are directly related to the sensorization of LRUs, which were identified by the DHSEL 
team. The LRUs of the laser need to be monitored in order to prepare and mitigate 
problems arising from use and environmental factors (Paschotta 2014). 
The United States Government Accountability Office (GAO) released a status 
report in 2005 regarding the DOD implementation of the HEL Master plan (Department 
of Defense 2000). Overall, S&T had grown proportionally to the planned investments. 
Considerable advancements in technology were being achieved and the forces had 
increased applied research to the fielding of HEL weapon systems and overall the plan 
was being executed as designed. The Department of the Navy (DON) specifically had 
developed requirements to incorporate technologies based on electric ships, submarines, 
and aircraft in the areas of FEL and SSL for the maritime environment.  
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By 2014 the Office of Naval Research (ONR) had begun the stages of test bed 
demonstration in the Pre-Milestone A phase of the acquisition life cycle known as the 
quick reaction capability (QRC). While not currently at the stage of transitioning from 
S&T to a program of record, the technology advancement has so far proven successful 
and reached the point where lasers capable of countering certain surface and air targets at 
ranges of about a mile could be made ready for installation on USN surface ships over the 
next few years. The USN reportedly anticipates moving to a shipboard laser program of 
record in “the FY2018 time frame” and achieving an initial operational capability (IOC) 
with a shipboard laser in FY2020 or FY2021 (O’Rourke 2014). 
However, there exists a recommendation from the original laser HEL Master Plan 
which still holds true,  
The Department will not be able to field HEL weapons if the supplier base 
continues to decline or if universities do not produce enough graduates 
with the skills or motivation to work in this area. A few well-directed 
program initiatives could stimulate development of promising new 
technologies and at the same time create a demand for essential skills. 
(Department of Defense 2000) 
The resource base of SMEs is limited to the point where there was risk in the 
ability to even field a HEL system. While the SME base has grown to the point where 
fielding a system became possible, this recommendation was focused solely on fielding a 
system. To successfully sustain the system throughout the life cycle, DOD is faced with 
the challenge of connecting the limited group of HEL SMEs to a massive number of 
fielded laser weapon systems installed on ships throughout the Fleet. A support capability 
to enable communication of the “few to many” must be evaluated. DSHEL is the 
proposed capability to fill this gap. 
2. Implicit Areas 
The implicit areas (indirectly related) that were researched and reviewed for 
DSHEL analyzed the impact and importance of government and military policies, open 
architecture requirements, cybersecurity requirements, Internet of Things (IoT) 
characteristics, platform, and infrastructure considerations. 
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a. Cybersecurity 
The purpose of this section is to identify DOD mandated requirements for 
cybersecurity, special considerations regarding implementation and management, as well 
as the effects it has on the systems engineering process in the life cycle of DSHEL. 
Distance support enables interfaces to the GIG, which must be properly designed and 
managed for a successful secure implementation. 
(1) Programmatic Guidance 
Traditionally in DOD, this respective subject matter has been known widely as 
information assurance (IA), formally defined as information operations that protect and 
defend information and information systems by ensuring their availability, integrity, 
authentication, confidentiality, and non-repudiation (Department of Defense Chief 
Information Officer 2006). This includes providing for the restoration of information 
systems by incorporating protection, detection, and reaction capabilities. It has a general 
broadening focus which includes the protection of digital and non-digital information 
assets, such as paper records. While these methodologies at a high level are still 
applicable today, much information has been digitized and exists solely in an information 
system environment. As such, the processes, rules, and regulations, which treated data on 
a computer in the same sense as a physical record, did not translate well, resulting in a 
vague, difficult, and inefficient process to properly manage modern systems in the DOD. 
Due to this, information systems security (cybersecurity) is now the focus. Seen as a 
subset of information assurance, cybersecurity focuses more on the technical prevention 
and defense of information systems, which includes computers, networks, programs, and 
data. Risk management is a core competency of this paradigm and was decomposed 
further in the risk management section of this capstone report. As of FY2014, the DOD 
has issued new mandates on guidance in the risk management framework (RMF) 
regarding the implementation of cybersecurity in all system acquisition spanning from 
the milestone decision authority, research, developmental, test and evaluation, and 
sustainment efforts. The information presented here forth is common to all systems, the 
POI (HEL), and the proposed distance support component implementation of DSHEL.  
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A core difference in the newest guidance is the concept of cybersecurity 
reciprocity. The implementation of best practices and type accreditation can benefit all 
and have a greater, more positive outcome for the DOD. Applied appropriately, 
reciprocity reduces redundant testing, assessing and documentation, and the associated 
costs in time and resources. In order to facilitate reciprocity, the following concepts and 
practices are assumed to occur during systems development: acceptance of existing cyber 
test and assessment results and authorization documentation. IS and PIT systems have 
only a single valid authorization. Multiple authorizations indicate multiple systems under 
separate ownership and configuration control. Deploying systems with valid 
authorizations are to be accepted into receiving organizations without adversely affecting 
the authorizations of either the deployed system or the receiving enclave or site. An 
authorization decision for a system cannot be made without completing the required 
assessments and analysis, as recorded in the security authorization package. Deploying 
organizations must provide the complete security authorization package to receiving 
organizations. Overarching organizations and higher-level systems, such as shipboard 
network infrastructures, should provide core defenses to strengthen cybersecurity and 
those controls be inherited by the smaller sub-systems. Reciprocity insists that developers 
will design and accredit their systems with the foresight of maximal re-use by other 
organizations, and in return, developers can interoperate and reuse other existing systems. 
This saves the DOD resources in redundant paperwork and delayed accreditation time 
frames for systems, which are already authorized for use elsewhere. 
With these core concepts, the programmatic cybersecurity requirements for a 
given system help to define the acquisition roadmap, tailoring of systems engineering 
methodologies, and sustainment of a system throughout the life cycle. However, a core 
concept of systems realization with cybersecurity includes the training and certification 
of people throughout the acquisition life cycle. Prior to development taking place, the 
developer must have the appropriate personnel to perform certain tasking. Qualified 
cybersecurity personnel must be identified and integrated into all phases of the system 
development life cycle. The necessary training for the given roles and responsibilities, 
ensures that acquisition community personnel with IT development responsibilities are 
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qualified in accordance with DOD 8570.10-M. To design, plan, implement, and manage 
the cybersecurity of systems, special cybersecurity workforce (CSWF) certifications are 
required. 
Along with these updated requirements is a modification to the acquisition 
roadmap, sometimes known as the defense acquisition “Horse Blanket.” Previous 
information assurance methodologies only required authority to operate (ATO) 
certification by the IOC of a systems maturity near Milestone C, with appropriate interim 
authorities to test (IATT) during development. Now, cybersecurity mandates specific 
entrance criteria to milestone decisions and development phases as can be seen in the 
modified acquisition roadmap of Figure 18. These steps are required for HEL regardless 
of how the DHSEL subsystem is implemented.  
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 Alignment of RMF and DOD Acquisition System Activities (from Department of Defense 2014) Figure 18.
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The above process of RMF steps aligns with the risk management process for 
cybersecurity. Regarding specific milestones to defense acquisition, the follow 
requirements are now mandatory for all systems throughout the life cycle. During the 
Materiel Solution Analysis, Pre Milestone A, the program’s information assurance 
manager (IAM) shall develop an IA strategy. This plan documents the roadmap for 
accreditation through development and sustainment of a system, alongside the proposed 
categorization (PIT & IS), as well as the conceptual processes, architecture, and 
organizations for meeting cybersecurity requirements. This strategy is required to be 
updated subsequently at every milestone decision as the system enters the next stage of 
development.  
At step two, the security controls from the NIST 800–53 “Recommended Security 
Controls for Federal Information Systems and Organizations” are selected and made part 
of the system baseline. They are added to the Joint Capabilities Integration and 
Development System (JCIDS), which is what DOD uses to designate acquisition 
requirements and evaluation criteria for defense programs. This translates to a developer 
that cybersecurity requirements are equally as important as functional requirements, e.g., 
the security posture of a laser system matters as much as its beam propagation, in terms 
of defense acquisition.  
Program initiation at Milestone B requires the Preliminary Design Review (PDR) 
to cover and receive programmatic approval for the security design and planning thus far. 
If it is sufficient and the program proceeds to Engineering and Manufacturing 
Development (EMD), the appropriate security engineers then take the higher level 
controls and translate them into technical design. Typically, Defense Information System 
Agency (DISA) provided Security Technical Implementation Guides (STIGs) are used to 
“lock down” the system to the point where required functionality and other system key 
performance parameters are not affected. This ensures that security is designed in up 
front and can co-exist with functional parameters. This is also a critical stage in 
development, as the technology matures, the test and evaluation (T&E) teams are 
preparing the test and evaluation master plan (TEMP) aligned with step four of RMF. 
New cybersecurity requirements now mandate that security controls go through equal 
 48 
amounts of test and evaluation and are described at high level in the RMF instruction and 
in great detail throughout DODM-7994 “Procedures for Operational Test and Evaluation 
of Cybersecurity in Acquisition Programs.” The high level RMF describes penetration 
testing, where certified independent teams of ethical hackers are brought in to test the 
security posture of the system. These test results are reviewed and at a minimum meet the 
measures of effectiveness thresholds described in DODM-7994. Evaluation of 
cybersecurity during an acquisition T&E event must include independent threat 
representative penetration, exploitation testing, and evaluation of the complete system 
cyberspace defenses. This also includes the controls and protections provided by 
computer network defense service providers. Penetration and exploitation testing must be 
planned and resourced as part of the DT&E and OT&E via the appropriate program test 
documentation. 
An IATT is a required certification for any developmental test event and must be 
acquired prior to the beginning of DT for execution of the TEMP during step four. 
Developmental testing is exceptionally important for cybersecurity, as it will identify 
controls and technical implementations which may impact system functional 
performance. These findings are refined if possible, and are managed risks between the 
program and designation officials. The end goal being to predict the operational baseline 
and obtain ATO by Milestone C for initial operational test and evaluation (IOT&E) at 
RMF step five. 
Once the system is operational at step six, continuous monitoring and cyber risk 
management occurs throughout the life cycle until system deactivation and disposal. This 
requires periodic system configuration scanning on a monthly basis and re-accreditation 
every four years. Fiscal requirements of the program office thus require programmatic 
objective memorandum (POM) funding to allocate funding to sustain the system, 
including resourcing for certified CSWF personnel to provide system patches and 
upgrades keeping the system secure throughout the life cycle. Even if a system still meets 
functional requirements and has no high priority user reported items from the Fleet, it is 
mandated by the accreditation authority that the core operating system software of any 
system receive security patches on a periodic basis. The periodicity depends on the 
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tactical vs non-tactical use of a system as well as how high of a priority existing security 
threats present. 
Above all, when considering the certification process, it is important to focus on 
how the system accreditation boundaries are drawn for DSHEL to ensure the system is 
sustainable. While the DSHEL is proposed as a DS subsystem of HEL, making it 
physically part of the system, the systems IA boundaries must be decomposed into the 
parts, which are functionally partitioned. A weapon is typically accredited as a PIT 
System, where more risk is accepted to freeze the software baseline up to four years. This 
means information assurance vulnerability alert (IAVA) patches are typically not 
installed unless a high priority issue affecting safety is discovered. To account for the fact 
that weapons have an entirely separate certification process through the Weapon System 
Explosive Safety Review Board (WSERB), extensive integration and shipboard test 
events are required to certify and lock down a weapon system baseline by the Naval 
Systems Engineering Directorate (NAVSEA 05), and rolls up into a larger combat system 
certification. If a weapon were patched on a monthly basis, the cost would be 
unsustainable for the necessary rigor to ensure the system is still safe, which is why this 
risk is typically accepted. By partitioning DSHEL from HEL within the cyber security 
accreditation boundary, the HEL weapon system can maintain its PIT System 
accreditation whereas the DSHEL would designate as an IS, accredited by ATO. The 
system is broken into what the functional laser weapon would be by design and its 
distance support counterpart, permitted to interface by a PIT and an IS interconnect 
agreement. This in turn allows HEL to have a frozen baseline where the DSHEL, which 
is the only part communicating with the GIG, can receive periodic IAVA patches to 
ensure the risk can be managed appropriately without invalidating the NAVSEA05 
certification of the laser. Pending the future design of the PoR HEL, it may even be 
possible to fully accredit the HEL system as PIT, with DHSEL defined as a PIT 
Interconnect (PITI) if the transfer of data is fully enough defined. This consideration must 
be fully evaluated at the time of realization with the designated approving authority 
(DAA). Design considerations are addressed in the Technical Implementation section. 
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(2) Technical Implementation 
The high-level requirements, technical considerations, and security controls of 
RMF must be rigorously addressed. While full technical design cannot facilitate without 
proper system functional requirements, the following best practices are used to minimize 
effort and maximize reuse of existing applications. 
By partitioning the HEL and DSHEL accreditation boundaries, a balance can be 
achieved which does not impose changes to an already rigorously tested and certified 
HEL weapon system while still providing a secure connection to enable distance support. 
An interconnect agreement between the DSHEL (Information System) and the HEL 
(Platform IT) still requires that the interface be managed and secured. This is best 
achieved at a minimum through the use of a firewall and an approved set of ports, 
protocols, and services, which are permitted between DSHEL and HEL. The 
aforementioned is typically referred to as a “white list,” where certain data is identified as 
permitted and all other formats, ports, and connections are denied. This implementation 
must be applied to all external interfaces of DSHEL, going to HEL as well as to the 
shipboard network. In turn, this creates a security wrapper around the information system 
where only approved ports, protocols, and services will be allowed. DSHEL would then 
not only be secure by technical design, but can also receive periodic IAVA patches to its 
operating system (OS) to minimize risk and maintain ATO certification. 
The core underlying effort of most cybersecurity is applied to the OS of the 
computer asset. An OS is software that manages the computer hardware and software 
resources and provides common services for computer programs. It is an essential 
component of any system and OS’s exists on network switches, to personal computers, to 
servers. DISA provided STIG’s guide a security engineer on how to configure a systems 
OS in order to meet necessary security controls and exist for almost every major COTS 
software systems: e.g., Microsoft Windows, Red Hat Enterprise Linux (RHEL), CISCO 
IOS. The application of STIGs takes considerable effort in person hours to accomplish, 
which is why DISA provides baseline images for free as a download from their site, 
incorporating a majority of these security controls which do not impact performance, 
leaving the remaining work to be complete by the program’s security engineer. While the 
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DISA image is provided for free, it is still the obligation of the Program Sponsor to pay 
any required licensing fees of the COTS OS manufacturer, a sunk cost considering it 
must be licensed either way. Given the amount of time it takes to “lock down” a system 
as well as to maintain the security of a system, up front consideration must be made on 
COTS selection given the required functionality. It must be noted that DISA images are 
basically locked down to a point where they are almost not functional, which allows the 
security engineering to open required services up and provide any addition STIG 
configurations necessary. The entire process is managing risk, in that how much tradeoff 
between cybersecurity and functional capability can be accepted as reasonable risk. 
Leveraging the secured images is a key asset in development, where some programs may 
make the pitfall of using other OS’s not supported by DISA, such as CentOS or Ubuntu, 
thus, applying the STIG from a fresh install of Windows or RHEL. This results in a 
duplication of effort which has already been completed by another government 
organization. 
Alongside the core OS is the defense-in-depth architecture granting least privilege 
to a user. Legacy systems base their design around being completely open. This induces 
security risks and maintenance costs to sustain system accreditation. Locking down the 
system to only the required ports, protocols, and services mitigates much of this risk. In 
addition, defensive cyber security products (e.g., firewalls, file integrity checkers, virus 
scanners, intrusion detection systems, anti‐malware software) should be included if 
possible and operate in a GIG connected manner to enhance the exchange of data and 
shared security policies. Overall, fundamental system requirements for functionality are 
required to delve further into technical application and were developed by the DSHEL 
team in the following requirements section; the takeaway is that many options exist for a 
program to implement secure systems, and they must be investigated early in systems 
development. 
The aforementioned division of HEL from DSHEL accommodates the current “as 
is” network infrastructure that exists in the Fleet. While current RMF concepts of 
reciprocity would dictate otherwise to minimize rework of cyber controls, this in turn 
requires each system to bring aboard their cyber solution and accredit as such. Future 
 52 
shipboard network architectures leverage infrastructure level firewalls, host based 
security systems, antivirus, and other shared cyber resources, which could be leveraged 
by the HEL. While it would not fully satisfy all cyber requirements imposed on HEL, 
many of the controls would reciprocate and be inherited to secure the DHSEL sub-
system. As a baseline effort, these requirements were identified in this report and for 
legacy host platforms must be designed-in to HEL. Future architectures in the 
developmental stages of the life cycle would then require the HEL developer to perform a 
requirements analysis to determine which controls were already satisfied by the 
shipboard infrastructure. If the boundary defense is sufficient in implementation, the 
DSHEL can avoid being partitioned out as an IS, thus remaining part of the HEL weapon 
system accreditation, and achieve functional transfer of data off ship by leveraging the 
infrastructure as a service (IaaS) DS gateway. Potential future implementations of 
shipboard infrastructure are beyond the scope of this report to go into sufficient detail; 
however, they were identified as an area of future research in the summary section. 
By following the recommended procedures, artifact creation, and technical 
implementation through the systems engineering process, DSHEL can be realized into a 
secure functional capability of HEL. 
b. Open Systems Architecture 
To leverage the abundance of free open source software (FOSS) and COTS 
applications, which exist to enable DS of HEL, open standards and protocols must be 
leveraged. The DOD preferred approach for implementation of open systems, previously 
called modular open systems approach (MOSA), is now called open systems architecture 
(OSA). Per the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, 
Technology evolution and lessons learned have led to DOD guidance 
suggesting the move away from MIL-STD proprietary interfaces, both 
physical and logical, to the use of industry standard open interfaces such 
that system modules are decoupled. The use of industry OSA is both a 
business and technical strategy for developing a new system or 
modernizing an existing one. OSA enables acquisition and engineering 
communities to design for affordable change, employ evolutionary 
acquisition development, spiral development, and develop an integrated 
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roadmap for system design and development. Basing design strategies on 
widely supported open standards increases the chance that future changes 
to the system will be integrated in a cost-effective manner. Open systems 
employ modular design, use widely supported and consensus-based 
standards for their key interfaces, and have been subjected to successful 
validation and verification tests to ensure the openness of their key 
interfaces. (United States Department of Defense 2015) 
The open systems architecture contract guidebook was released in May 2013, 
providing passive DOD stakeholder requirements, checklists, and contractual 
specifications to enable the fundamental principles of OSA as stated in the guidebook 
(United States Department of Defense, 2013): 
1. Modular designs based on standards, with loose coupling and high 
cohesion, that allow for independent acquisition of system components 
2. Enterprise investment strategies, based on collaboration and trust, that 
maximize reuse of proven hardware system designs and ensure we spend 
the least to get the best 
3. Transformation of the life-cycle sustainment strategies for software 
intensive systems through proven technology insertion and software 
product upgrade techniques 
4. Dramatically lower development risk through transparency of system 
designs, continuous design disclosure, and government, academia, and 
industry peer reviews 
5. Strategic use of data rights to ensure a level competitive playing field 
and access to alternative solutions and sources, across the life cycle 
A mandate of OSA is that technical requirements be based to the maximum extent 
practicable on open standards. Where there are no standards, the OSA methodology 
creates them. At a minimum, technical standards and related specifications, requirements, 
source code, metadata, interface control documents (ICDs), and any other 
implementation and design artifacts that are necessary for a qualified contractor to 
successfully perform development or maintenance work for the government are made 
available throughout the life cycle (United States Department of Defense 2013). 
Due to this mandate, there are a number of boilerplate requirements, which were 
to be leveraged for the implementation of DSHEL. This begins with the need for the 
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developer to submit to the government an open system management plan as set forth in 
the contract data requirements list (CDRL). This begins with the technical approach and 
decomposes in to design disclosure for technical data rights such that the customer can 
accept, maintain, and sustain the system with COTS refresh items as acceptable 
replacements due to the use of OSA standards. This enforces the justification of vendor 
specific proprietary interfaces when open ones cannot be leveraged. 
Early and often technical disclosure is a recent mandate. Submitting plans, which 
describe the information disclosure methodology, computer resources necessary, are 
required to enable collaboration and a common knowledge base for all those involved. 
This technical data also can not have any restrictive markings prohibiting the re-use of 
source material for the customer. Moreover, the use of FOSS is encouraged as technical 
data to permit reuse of open standard interfaces among COTS software. The OSA guide 
not only mandates the use of OSA, but also a sense of fiscal responsibility, which will not 
inhibit the DOD from life-cycle management of the system.  
c. Infrastructure  
In order to properly execute DS for the HEL, it is necessary to maintain a reliable 
ship to shore connection. To accomplish this, it was necessary for this research to capture 
the requirements and capabilities necessary for effective ship to shore communication. 
Although data integrity and security of the GIG is of the utmost importance, this section 
will focus on the performance requirements of the transport layer.  
Any connection made from the shore to the ship happens through one of several 
NOC around the world. In order for a USN shore facility to gain access to the ship 
through the NOC, a firewall service request (FSR) must be submitted to the NOC 
indicating the require subnet address space as well as the ports protocols and services 
(PPS) that will be transmitted through the NOC firewall. Once this has been completed, 
the NOC firewall will be modified to allow connection to the designated ship. 
In the case of the guided missile destroyer (DDG) platform, the inbound 
connection for TCP/IP happens through the shipboard super high frequency (SHF). Once 
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the radio frequency (RF) signal is received by the SHF antenna, the signal will be 
decrypted and then passed to the Main Shipboard Routing System for the ship known as 
the Automated Digital Network System (ADNS). From ADNS, the information will pass 
to the Integrated Shipboard Network System (ISNS), which acts as the main transport 
layer for the ship. Since the HEL System is being developed as a ship self-defense 
weapon system, the data needs to move from the ISNS domain of the ship into the 
combat systems domain of the ship. The combat systems network on the DDG platform 
is the Aegis LAN Interconnect System (ALIS). Typically, ALIS does not maintain a 
persistent connection to ISNS. For the DSHEL system, a persistent connection between 
ALIS and ISNS would be required. To help provide a layer of security between these two 
ship domains, the DSHEL system shall employ a boundary firewall to maintain the 
security of the information and ensure protection of each domain. Once inside the ALIS 
network, the information would get to the DSHEL system and then to the HEL system 
itself.  
In the case of the LCS platform, the path to the ship is completely the same until 
the signal hits the ADNS routers. Once the signal passes the ADNS routers, it enters the 
Total Ship Computing Environment (TSCE). This environment acts as the transport layer 
for the ship, combining the previous ISNS and ALIS networks into a single backbone. 
From the TSCE, the signal will travel through the TSCE firewall into the combat virtual 
local area network (VLAN) and then to the DSHEL system. Figure 19 shows this 
connection path. 
In each of the cases, the total data throughput off the ship through the ADNS 
routers is allocated to be 2Mbps. Additionally, the SHF is not Line of Sight (LoS); rather 
it is via satellite communications (SATCOM) over the horizon, which can add an 
additional 800 ms round trip delay ship to shore. This delay causes significant overhead 
due to the fact that many TCP/IP packets could potentially exceed the minimum transmit 
unit (MTU) time provided. These can be dropped in the transmission process. Given the 
constrained bandwidth environment, it was necessary to have a requirement for the 
DSHEL system that all data transmitted off ship would have to be analyzed for criticality 
discarding non-essential data and then compressed prior to transmitting off ship. 
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d. Big Data and Data Science 
Big data is a term that defines extremely large, complex data sets that are 
challenging to collect, verify, validate, process, analyze, store, search, transport, share, 
and secure. Data science is the analysis of, and extraction of knowledge from big data. 
These terms are very general due to there being no standard definition. This paper will 
use the ONR and RAND definition of big data by the analysis of its characteristics. Big 
data is defined by four characteristics (Porsche, Wilson, Johnson, Tierney, and Saltzman 
2014): 
• volume of data 
• variety of formats, sources, and types 
• velocity of searches and data retrieval 
• veracity of conclusions based on data 
The reason big data is defined by the characteristics and properties above is due to 
it being a moving target. The amount of data and the speed at which it is processed is 
relative to the progression of technology. Even with these relative benchmarks, one fact 
remains certain: the USN arguably faces one of the most complex big data challenges in 
the Information Age. 
With the growth of the Internet of Things (IoT), interconnected and networked 
devices have found their way into all aspects of life. From coffee makers to aircraft 
engines, sensorization of these devices has captured information that can be used to 
increase product maintainability, availability, and increase capability. In acquiring COTS 
products, the USN now has access to these data recording and reporting tools that are 
built into these systems. While these tools bring the promise of the benefits of the product 
increases listed above, they will also bring about some major challenges. 
A typical Boeing 737 engine generates 10 terabytes of data every 30 minutes in 
flight (Mathai 2011). While this amount of data may seem substantial, all of the 
information housed in the Library of Congress totals to only be 200 terabytes (Porsche, 
Wilson, Johnson, Tierney, and Saltzman 2014). A USN Arleigh Burke Class Guided 
Missile Destroyer has four gas turbine engines. With a typical deployment lasting six 
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months, this means the data generated by the gas turbine engines alone would total to be 
87,658 terabytes or 87 petabytes. If this amount of data was to be burned to compact 
discs (CDs), 125 million CDs would be needed. Stacking each of these CDs on top of one 
another would result in a tower of CDs reaching 93 miles into the sky. This is 438 times 
more data than that of the entirety of the Library of Congress. In fact, a single destroyer 
on deployment would generate the equivalent of a Library of Congress’ worth of data in 
about ten hours. This amount of data only accounts for the gas turbine engines alone and 
does not include the rest of the systems on board of the ship (such as radar, 
communication, weapons, mechanical, network). When the complete data picture of USN 
is put together (logistics, support structures, administrative services, surface, subsurface, 
air, land, and space), the sheer amount of data becomes mind-boggling, as shown in 
Figure 19.  
 
 Exponential Increase of Data Generated as USN Acquires New Sensors Figure 19.
(from Porche et al. 2011, 5) 
It was important for DSHEL to understand the big data challenge because as the 
current trends show, the amount of data is only increasing and the main information 
needed to provide support to a system is data.  
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3. Summary 
Throughout DSHEL’s literature review, it became apparent that a knowledge gap 
existed in multiple areas creating a need for a system that DSHEL would fill. The current 
state of DS is fractured. There lies a functional and communication gap in between the 
systems and the service provider organizations. In order to provide adequate DS to the 
HEL, an integrated DS framework must first be created. This solution must be flexible, 
modular, efficient, maintainable, as well as adhere to all the unique policies and 
regulations of the USN. 
B. DISTANCE SUPPORT FRAMEWORK 
At its highest level, DS is a concept that is delivered as a service to a platform 
through hardware, software, or a combination of both. To execute DS, three basic 
elements are required: platform service provider (PSP), platform of interest (POI), and 
the enabling/supporting infrastructure (ESI). Each of these elements work together 
through a series of level agreements with the goal to provide high quality DS. 
1. Product vs. Service 
DS is a very general topic and has several meanings depending on the audience. 
In order to classify DS as a product or a service, these terms must first be defined. 
• Product—tangible and discernible items or assets that are produced or 
manufactured by an organization 
• Service—production of significant intangible benefit that satisfies a 
requirement, need, condition, obligation, or prerequisite 
While these definitions are distinct, most products and services come together 
bundled as one and execute upon each other to deliver an enhanced capability, function, 
or quality. Figure 20 details how the concept of DS can rapidly bounce back and forth 
between being defined as a service and as a product. This transformation occurs as the 
concept of DS matures and grows. The Y-axis of the figure is related to concept maturity. 
A concept new in its life cycle starts off at a very basic level (i.e., limited knowledge base 
and no discipline experts). As the concept field grows and expands, a predefined service 
shifts to become a product through a technological or process enhancement. This 
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enhancement brings added knowledge and capability to the concept field and thus 
matures the concept discipline. It can be expected for a concept to shift between being a 
product or service as the concept matures. Once a concept has reached its full maturity, if 
possible, the concept product and service become one in the same. This would be 
equivalent to having a system become what is known as an “expert system.” This system 
has the ability not only to emulate the decision-making ability of a human concept 
discipline expert, but it also has the ability to perform self-repair and even component 
replacement. While an expert system like this is many years away, the ability for a DS 
expert system run by artificial intelligence with part fabrication and replacement abilities 
via three dimensional printing may be possible in the future. 
 
 DS Product and Service Comparison Figure 20.
2. Legacy and Future Platforms  
DS can be applied to all platforms, regardless of current life-cycle phase. While it 
is true that there will be shortcomings in the quality and detail of the information 
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generated by the DS product from legacy platforms, it still may be useful to the DS 
provider. 
 
 Legacy Platform Service Interaction Figure 21.
In platforms that do not have a concept component “designed-in” but rather 
“bolted-on,” also known as a legacy platform, the interaction between the concept and 
platform must be facilitated by a service link between the two (illustrated in Figure 21) in 
order to deliver the concept to the platform. There is a stark difference between the 
legacy platform construct and the future platform construct. In the legacy platform 
interaction, the service provided by the concept to the platform is: 
• Rigid - With a “bolted-on” concept, providing a services to a platform after 
the platform design has been completed, concept service requirements no 
longer become a factor and must adhere to platform characteristic 
requirements (interface, security, power, form factor). 
• Fractured - With a “bolted-on” concept providing services to a platform, 
system boundary lines are very distinct. This is good in the sense that system 
ownership is clean, clear, and delineated, but offers interface, integration, 
security, and potential ancillary system issues. 
• Limited - With a “bolted-on” concept providing services to a platform after 
the platform design has been completed, the level of service is fixed in that it 
can only provide a level consistent with what the platform can provide as is, at 
maximum. 
In future platforms, the concept is “designed-in.” This allows the concept and the 
platform to have shared requirements and be fully integrated into one another, as denoted 




 Future Platform Service Interaction Figure 22.
In future platform interaction, the service is no longer provided by the concept to 
the platform. The concept service is executed on the platform, this means future platform 
interaction is: 
• Flexible - With a “designed-in” concept, level and quality of concept service 
metrics can be tailored to a setting or threshold consistent with platform 
service provider / user requirements. 
• Seamless - With a “designed-in” concept, the boundary line between the 
concept, service, and platform is shared. This allows for greater 
communication between the two and can often lead to better security, 
interface, and product requirements. 
• Enhanced - With a “designed-in” concept, level and quality of concept service 
being executed on the platform is greater due to being able to gain access to, 
gather, process, and analyze important service metrics and information. 
It should be noted that another significant difference between these 
concept/platform interactions is that the legacy platforms tend to be more dependent on 
the customer initiating and executing the support for the platform. While future platforms 
will still include the customer where needed, they will be less labor intensive.  
3. Distance Support Elements 
In analyzing the current organization of the USN, along with the roles and 
responsibilities of these subsequent support organizations, it was determined that a simple 
 62 
three-element framework should be created to take advantage of this organizational 
structure. The USN’s support organizations are funded for providing a capability or 
service, hence the use of service level and operational level agreements were exploited by 
this framework. For completeness, each basic element was covered, but the focus of this 
framework is the breakdown of the POI. 
 
 DS Application Context Diagram Figure 23.
Figure 23 describes the application context of DS with internal factors, enterprise 
ecosystems entities, and global environment externalities that may interact with providing 
quality DS. Starting from the innermost encompassed item on the DS Application 
Context Diagram, each item is explained below. 
• Quality Distance Support: Goal of the DS framework, the quality provided via 
product or service delivery should meet or exceed that of the customer service 
requirements or needs. 
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• Information Integration and Data Fusion (I2DF): Evidence passed, generated, 
and shared that the PSP, POI, and ESI collect, verify, record, validate, store, 
process, filter, log, compress, and analyze to produce quality DS. 
• Platform Service Provider (PSP): Organization or agent that provides service, 
maintenance, and technical support to the POI, its customers, and users. 
• Platform of Interest (POI): System that has a need for service. 
• Enabling / Supporting Infrastructure (ESI): Facilities, materials, and services 
necessary to store, transmit, or receive the critical information needed to 
execute / assist a function. 
o Enable—give someone or something the authority or means to do 
something 
o Support—give assistance to, help or aid 
• Service Level Agreement (SLA): An external agreement between the POI and 
PSP, POI and ESI, and PSP and ESI, stipulating client service requirements 
and provider service delivery. 
• People, Process, Technology: Three elements that make up successful PSPs, 
ESIs, and POIs. 
• Operational Level Agreement (OLA): An internal agreement detailing how 
various functions and groups within an element plan to deliver a service or 
package of services. 
• Enterprise Ecosystem: Entities separate from the DS products and services 
that may need to be considered or adhered to. 
• Global Environment: Externalities removed from the Enterprise Ecosystem 
that may influence and dictate changes to DS products and services. 
 
Figure 24 shows, in a simplified fashion, how these basic elements interact with 
one another. Typically, DS between the PSP and the POI is facilitated by the ESI. It 
should be noted that in rare cases, DS can be facilitated between the PSP and the POI 
without the use of an ESI. This is usually found on the POI side where the ESI fails to 
meet PSP requirements or the data provided from the POI is non-mission critical. 
Examples of this include a POI where the data being generated is too great for the ESI to 
transmit in a timely fashion or the data from the POI is not time critical and can be 
analyzed “stale.”  
In general, the POI is the product that the customer is using to perform a given 
task. As this POI is executing the desired task, data is generated that is then sent back to 
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the PSP via the ESI. The ESI’s main function in performing DS is ensuring end-to-end 
communication between the PSP and POI.  
 
 The Three Basic Elements of Distance Support (Icons from Flaticon 2014) Figure 24.
Each of these elements has ownership of their respective domain. That is, no 
element may cross into another element’s domain without proper authorization. The 
concurrence that allows cross-domain transits are known as service level agreements 
(SLAs). SLAs are contracts between elements that detail the level of service expected 
from a provider. In this case, there would be several SLAs: 
• PSP to POI: The PSP would have a SLA with the POI that would detail the 
quality of service (support).  
• ESI to PSP: The ESI would have a SLA with the PSP that would detail the 
quality of service (bandwidth throughput, link availability). 
• ESI to POI: In many cases the ESI to PSP SLA would cover this case, but 
there are times when the two can be separated and thus require another SLA 
between the two elements. 
A good example of SLAs in action is residential Internet access with subscription 
video streaming services. Typically the customer has a SLA with the ISP (i.e., Comcast / 
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Time Warner) that details the expected speed and service availability of the network 
connection. The customer also has a separate SLA with a subscription video streaming 
service (Netflix/Hulu) that details how many shows he can watch or how often they can 
watch episodes. In addition to these SLAs, separate SLAs are struck between the ISP and 
subscription video streaming services that can detail geographic service delivery or total 
service bandwidth. 
 
 Service Level Agreements between the Three Elements of Distance Figure 25.
Support (Icons from Flaticon 2014) 
In Figure 25, the green arrows stipulate client service requirements, while the blue 
arrows stipulate provider service delivery. These SLAs can be renegotiated after the 
previous service contract has expired. It is important to negotiate an SLA frequently; 
technology and capability needs often outpace the constraints of an SLA before the SLA 
expires. A separate SLA with each entity is not always required. Blanket SLAs can be 
authored to cover more than one element if deemed practical. The most crucial SLA is 
the one that ties the PSP to the POI. Without this SLA, support (distance or not) does not 
exist. 
A complete SLA should have the following sections listed in Table 7. 
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Table 7. SLA and OLA Elements 
Section Name Purpose 
Agreement Overview Details the agreement in general. States its validity as 
well as endorsement by the stakeholders. 
Goals and Objectives States the purpose of the agreement as well as the goal. 
Typical objectives include: (1) Provide clear reference 
to service ownership, accountability, roles and / or 
responsibilities. (2) Present a clear, concise and 
measurable description of service provision to the 
customer. (3) Match perceptions of expected service 
provision with actual service support and delivery. 
Stakeholders List all parties that enter into the agreement. Delineate 
between the service provider and the customer. 
Periodic Review Agreements should state the effective date, the 
business relationship manager (“document owner”), 
review cycle (6-12 months), previous review date, and 
the next future review date. 
Service Scope List of services that will be offered to the customer. 
Customer Requirements Customer responsibilities and / or requirements. 
Service Provider 
Requirements 
Service Provider responsibilities and / or requirements. 
Service Assumptions Assumptions related to in-scope services. 
Service Management Management, maintenance, and support of service. 
Service Availability Service availability parameters. 
Service Requests Details how service request from the customer will be 
handles and the associated priority they will be 
assigned. 
Service Performance Volume and Speed metrics. 
Service Measurement Definitions on how metrics will be collected and 
calculated. 
Service Penalty Addresses ramifications if service provider / customer 
violate SLA terms. 
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Within each element’s domain there exists another agreement called an 
operational level agreement (OLA) as shown in Figure 26. An OLA is a contract that 
details how various functions and groups within an element plan to deliver a service or 
package of services. Each basic element typically has at least one OLA. The simplest 
form of an OLA in action is when a business sets priorities. By setting a priority, the 
business has dictated how its functions will operate with one another concerning topics. 
OLA structure mirrors that of an SLA, with the exception that it has a greater focus on 
change requests, incident management, maintenance changes / requests, and reporting. 
 
 Operational Level Agreements internal to Platform Service Provider Figure 26.
(Icons from Flaticon 2014) 
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 Platform Service Provider DS Walkthrough (Icons from Flaticon 2014) Figure 27.
Figure 27 shows an example of how a PSP and POI interact by highlighting the 
data and service contract path. The steps have been numbered and listed in Table 8 for 
ease of comprehension.  
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Table 8. Data and Service Contract Paths for PSP 
Location 
Point 
Next Move Action 
Bottom right 
of figure 1 
The Distance Support X, (DSX) detects a fault in the X 
system that cannot be resolved. 
1 2 An event flag is triggered and the DSX decides that DS should be sought for a solution.  
2 
3 The fault message is prepared to be sent through the ESI to the PSP. 
27 
The fault message data passes through the ESI SLA, but 
the SLA with the PSP is used to perform the service 
contract action. 
3 4 Using the SLA between the POI and the ESI, the fault message enters the ESI domain. 
4 5 The fault message is transported through the ESI. 
5 6 Using the SLA between the ESI and the PSP, the fault message enters the PSP domain. 
6 7 The fault message is routed to the PSP’s “helpdesk.” 
7 8 The fault message is entered in the system and assigned a tracking number and reclassified as a “help ticket.” 
8 9 
Following the guidelines in the OLA, the “helpdesk” 
sends the “help ticket” to the multi-tiered technical 
support group starting at tier one. 
9 10 The “help ticket” is received by the tier one technical support staff and research for a solution. 
10 
11 The tier one technical support staff research provided a solution. 
12 
The tier one technical support staff research was unable 
to provide a solution. The “help ticket” is elevated to tier 
two technical support following the guidelines in the 
OLA. 




Next Move Action 
better knowledge database. 
12 13 The “help ticket” is received by the tier two technical support staff and research for a solution. 
13 
14 
The tier two technical support staff research was unable 
to provide a solution. The “help ticket” is elevated to tier 
three technical support following the guidelines in the 
OLA. 
18 
The technical solution found is updated and recorded in 
the DS Knowledge Management Library to help build a 
better knowledge database. 
14 15 The “help ticket” is received by the tier three technical support staff and research for a solution. 
15 
16 
The tier three technical support staff research was 
unable to provide a solution. The “help ticket” is 
elevated to tier four / OEM technical support following 
the guidelines in the OLA. 
18 
The technical solution found is updated and recorded in 
the DS Knowledge Management Library to help build a 
better knowledge database. 
16 17 
The tier four / OEM technical support staff research was 
able to provide a solution. Otherwise the OEM will 
ensure the product is fixed upon new version release. 
17 
18 
The technical solution found is updated and recorded in 
the DS Knowledge Management Library to help build a 
better knowledge database. 
20 The tier four / OEM technical support prepare for site visit due to the technical complexity of the issue. 
18 19 The “help ticket” is closed out with the status and outcome of the support inquiry. 
19 22 The technical solution is routed from the “help desk” through the PSP. 




Next Move Action 
due to the technical complexity of the issue. 
21 COMPLETE Technical solution resolved. 
22 
23 The technical solution is routed through the PSP. 
28 
The technical solution passes through the ESI SLA, but 
the SLA with the PSP is used to perform the service 
contract delivery. 
23 24 Using the SLA between the PSP and the ESI, the fault message enters the ESI domain. 
24 25 The technical solution is routed through the ESI. 
25 26 Using the SLA between the ESI and the POI, the fault message enters the POI domain. 
26 21 The technical solution is validated and verified.  
27 6 
The fault message data passes through the ESI SLA, but 
the SLA with the PSP is used to perform the service 
contract action. 
28 26 
The technical solution passes through the ESI SLA, but 
the SLA with the PSP is used to perform the service 
contract delivery. 
 
In the previous walkthrough, the original message fault was routed to a 
“helpdesk” and then routed to the multi-tiered technical support group. In the previous 
chapter, wait times were compared with each other to show how effective phone tree 
menus could be constructed. While the multi-tiered technical support group is not a 
phone tree, the same principles apply. As illustrated in Figure 28, Figure 29, and Figure 
30, there are five main types of waiting lines, or in this case, phone menu systems in use: 
(1) single-server, single-phase, (2) single-server, multiphase, (3) multi-server, single-line, 
single-phase, (4) multi-server, multiline, single-phase, and (5) multi-server, multi-phase. 
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 Waiting Line Examples (Icons from Flaticon 2014)  Figure 28.
Single-server waiting line models can be used to gain valuable metrics about 
service organization and efficiency. When modeling single-server waiting line models, 
the following is assumed (Unknown 2010): 
• Customers arrive by a Poisson distribution with a mean arrival rate of 𝜆𝜆 
• Time between additional customer arrivals follows an exponential distribution 
with an average of 1/𝜆𝜆 
• Customer service rate also follows a Poisson distribution with a mean service 
rate of 𝜇𝜇 
• Service time for one customer follows an exponential distribution with an 
average of 1/𝜇𝜇 
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 Waiting Line Examples Continued (Icons from Flaticon 2014) Figure 29.
Using the accepted givens above, the following waiting line system characteristics 
can be calculated as follows (Unknown 2010): 
• 𝜌𝜌 = 𝜆𝜆
𝜇𝜇
 = average utilization of the system 
• 𝐿𝐿 = 𝜆𝜆
𝜇𝜇−𝜆𝜆
 = average number of customers in the service system 
• 𝐿𝐿𝑄𝑄 = 𝜌𝜌𝐿𝐿 = average number of customers waiting in line 
• 𝑊𝑊 = 1
𝜇𝜇−𝜆𝜆
 = average time spent waiting in the system, including service 
• 𝑊𝑊𝑄𝑄 = 𝜌𝜌𝑊𝑊= average time spent waiting in line 
• 𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛 =  (1 − 𝜌𝜌)𝜌𝜌𝑛𝑛 = probability that n customers are in the service system at a 
given time 
The service rate must be greater than the arrival rate, 𝜇𝜇 > 𝜆𝜆. 
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 Waiting Line Examples Continued (Icons from Flaticon 2014) Figure 30.
Multi-Server waiting line models can also be modeled using the same given 
assumptions that were used for the single server waiting line models. Using the accepted 
givens above, the following waiting line system characteristics can be calculated as 
follows (Unknown 2010): 
• s = the number of servers in the system 
• 𝑝𝑝 = 𝜆𝜆
𝑠𝑠𝜇𝜇
 = average utilization of the system 
• 𝑃𝑃0 = �∑ (𝜆𝜆/𝜇𝜇)𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛! + (𝜆𝜆/𝜇𝜇)𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠! � 11−𝑝𝑝�𝑠𝑠=1𝑛𝑛=0 �−1 = the probability that no customers are in 
the system 
• 𝐿𝐿𝑄𝑄 = 𝑃𝑃𝑜𝑜(𝜆𝜆/𝜇𝜇)𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑠!(1−𝑝𝑝)2  = average number of customers waiting in line 
• 𝑊𝑊𝑄𝑄 = 𝐿𝐿𝑄𝑄𝜆𝜆  = average time spent waiting in line 
• 𝑊𝑊 = 𝑊𝑊𝑄𝑄 + 1𝜇𝜇 = average time spent in the system, including service 
• 𝐿𝐿 = 𝜆𝜆𝑊𝑊= average number of customers in the service system 
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• 𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛 = �(𝜆𝜆/𝜇𝜇)𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛!  𝑃𝑃0 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝑛𝑛 ≤ 𝑠𝑠(𝜆𝜆/𝜇𝜇)𝑛𝑛
𝑠𝑠!𝑠𝑠𝑛𝑛−𝑠𝑠  𝑃𝑃0 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝑛𝑛 > 𝑠𝑠= probability the n customers are in the system at a 
given time 
The service rate must be greater than the arrival rate, 𝑠𝑠𝜇𝜇 > 𝜆𝜆.  
 
 Enabling/Supporting Infrastructure DS Walkthrough (Icons from Flaticon Figure 31.
2014) 
Figure 31 shows an example of how the ESI interacts with the other DS elements 
by highlighting the data and service contract path. The steps have been numbered and 
listed in Table 9 for ease of comprehension. 
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Table 9. Data and Service Contract Paths for ESI 
Location 
Point 
Next Move Action 
Bottom right 
of figure 
1 The Distance Support X, DSX detects a fault in the X 
system that cannot be resolved. 
1 2 An event flag is triggered and the DSX decides that DS 
should be sought for a solution.  
3 The fault message data passes through the ESI SLA, but 
the SLA with the PSP is used to perform the service 
contract action. 
2 5 Using the SLA between the POI and the ESI, the fault 
message enters the ESI domain. 
3 4 The fault message data passes through the ESI SLA, but 
the SLA with the PSP is used to perform the service 
contract action. 
4 17 The PSP researches the POI inquiry. 
5 6 The fault message is routed through the ESI’s edge 
network connections in guidance with the OLA. 
6 7 The fault message is routed through the ESI’s DMZ and 
to its LAN in guidance with the OLA. 
7 8 The fault message is routed through the ESI’s LAN and 
to its NAP in guidance with the OLA. 
8 9 The fault message is routed through the ESI’s NAP and 
to its NOC in guidance with the OLA. 
9 10 The fault message is routed through the ESI’s NOC in 
guidance with the OLA. 
10 11 The fault message is routed through the ESI’s NOC and 
to its NAP in guidance with the OLA. 
11 12 The fault message is routed through the ESI’s NAP and 
to its LAN in guidance with the OLA. 
12 13 The fault message is routed through the ESI’s LAN and 




Next Move Action 
13 14 The fault message is routed through the ESI’s edge 
network connections in guidance with the OLA. 
14 15 Using the SLA between the ESI and the PSP, the fault 
message enters the PSP domain. 
15 17 The PSP researches the POI inquiry.  
16 19 The technical solution data passes through the ESI SLA, 
but the SLA with the PSP is used to perform the service 
contract action. 
17 18 A technical solution is found and is sent back to the POI. 
18 16 The technical solution data passes through the ESI SLA, 
but the SLA with the PSP is used to perform the service 
contract action. 
20 Using the SLA between the ESI and the PSP, the 
technical solution prepares to enter the PSP domain. 
19 32 The technical solution data passes through the ESI SLA, 
but the SLA with the PSP is used to perform the service 
contract action. 
20 21 Using the SLA between the ESI and the PSP, the 
technical solution enters the PSP domain. 
21 22 The technical solution is routed through the ESI’s edge 
network connections in guidance with the OLA. 
22 23 The technical solution is routed through the ESI’s DMZ 
and to its LAN in guidance with the OLA. 
23 24 The technical solution is routed through the ESI’s LAN 
and to its NAP in guidance with the OLA. 
24 25 The technical solution is routed through the ESI’s NAP 
and to its NOC in guidance with the OLA. 
25 26 The technical solution is routed through the ESI’s NOC 
in guidance with the OLA. 




Next Move Action 
and to its NAP in guidance with the OLA. 
27 28 The technical solution is routed through the ESI’s NAP 
and to its LAN in guidance with the OLA. 
28 29 The technical solution is routed through the ESI’s LAN 
and to its DMZ in guidance with the OLA. 
29 30 The technical solution is routed through the ESI’s edge 
network connections in guidance with the OLA. 
30 31 Using the SLA between the POI and the ESI, the fault 
message enters the POI domain. 
31 32 The technical solution passes through the POI. 
32 COMPLETE Technical solution resolved. 
 
 
 Platform of Interest DS Walkthrough (Icons from Flaticon 2014) Figure 32.
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Following the same methodology from the previous two walkthrough figures, 
Figure 32 conveys the same concept showing the connections and interactions between 
the three basic elements of DS. The main difference with this walkthrough example is the 
attention to detail in explaining how the POI can be classified as an independent platform 
vs. guest platform contained within a host platform. The POI had to be delineated and 
subdivided to account for POI that resides within another platform. If the POI is not 
subject to control by other platforms, it does not require or rely on supporting platforms 
and has complete ownership of its “hotel services.” The POI is simply the independent 
platform itself. If the POI has incomplete data rights, relies on a support structure for 
“hotel services,” has a SLA with a host platform, resides in a subsystem hierarchy, or 
provides a function to a higher order system, the POI is classified as a guest platform 
contained within a host platform. 
 
 Platform of Interest Guest and Host Interaction DS Walkthrough (Icons Figure 33.
from Flaticon 2014) 
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Figure 33 shows the different types of host and guest platform interactions. The 
prominent aspect of the interaction diagram is the creation of a new SLA between the 
guest and host platforms. Since the guest platform is dependent on the host platform for 
“hotel services,” as well as for network connectivity to reach the PSP via the ESI, the 
guest platform must develop two SLAs, one for the support services and another for 
access to the host platform’s ESI. 
Figure 33 also sheds light on the various ways DSX (Distance Support X, where 
X is the system name) can be configured. This is detailed in the next section.  
4. DSX for the POI 
DSX configuration depends on the POI, its interactions, support systems, life-
cycle phase, as well as the technologies available. The main DSX configurations 
recommended are as follows: 
• Integrated—DSX is designed into the system, single-point all inclusive 
• Encompassing—DSX is designed to fit around an existing system (usually 
used for legacy systems), single-point semi inclusive 
• Distributed—DSX has a central node where distributed DSX nodes report, 
multipoint all/semi inclusive 
 
 DSX Configurations in terms of Cost, Capability, Scalability, and Figure 34.
Complexity 
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When the DSX configurations are compared to each other in terms of cost, 
capability, scalability, and complexity, the tradeoffs become clear. In Figure 34, the four 
DSX configurations were plotted for a fictional system. A “Minimum Data Picture 
Completeness Threshold” line was then plotted across the chart. This line represents the 
minimum amount of data that needs to be collected either from multiple sources or a 
single source to provide meaningful information integration and data fusion (I2DF) so 
that a quality DS product or service can be delivered. This line and the DSX 
configurations will differ from system to system. 
 
 Types of Sensor Collection Networks Figure 35.
Before the first function of the DSX can be assessed, the POI must be analyzed to 
decide which DSX configuration fits best, as well as the sensor network topology to use. 
Each network topology (wired or wireless), like each DSX configuration, has advantages 
and disadvantages. These differences should be weighed against the types of sensors that 
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will be used within the sensor network. Some of these are illustrated in Figure 35 and 
discussed below (CISCO Inc.): 
• Bus Network: A bus network benefits from being easy to connect and requires 
little cable. Problems arise if the main bus backbone is damaged as it will shut 
the network down and is difficult to troubleshoot if the network is vast. 
• Ring Network: A ring network benefits from being predictable in terms of 
data path and the independent connections make the network simple to 
troubleshoot. Problems arise as the network grows in size due to 
communications delays being proportional to the number of nodes in the 
network and shared bandwidth resources. 
• Fully Connected Network: A fully connected network benefits from multiple 
link redundancy and the ability to keep network traffic at a minimum. 
Problems arise when the number of network nodes grow due to the amount of 
cable needed to link all of the nodes and the sheer amount of connections 
needed (the number of connections grows quadratically with 𝑐𝑐 = (𝑛𝑛(𝑛𝑛 −1))/2). 
• Overlay Network: An overlay network benefits in that the network itself can 
be defined by the user or data preference through virtual or logical links. 
Problems arise when complicated preferences distribute resources and load 
balance network traffic by priority making lower priority services unusable. 
• Star Network: A star network benefits from centralization of the center hub 
and increased network performance. The centralization of the hub allows for 
network inspection of traffic and usually has a high utilization rate allowing 
for the hub nodes to limit the number of connections to them. Problems arise 
from the lack of a robust center hub causing slow throughput speeds. The 
center hub is a single-point of failure. 
• Mesh Network: A mesh network benefits from being a flexible network that 
can grow and shrink over time. Problems arise when these flexible networks 
are changed without proper network mapping, leaving parts of the mesh 
network unconnected or overburdened.  
• Tree Network: A tree network benefits from being scalable as well as having 
fairly fast troubleshooting isolation times. Problems arise when maintenance 
or failure of a main backbone occurs, leaving the network severely degraded 
until it is repaired. 
• Linear Network: A linear network benefits from being simple to set up as well 
as low cost. Problems arise if any link between two nodes fail or when the size 
of the network grows do to communication delays from one side of the 
network to the other. 
After the proper POI has been identified, classified as an Independent Platform or 
a Guest Platform contained within a Host Platform, DSX configuration chosen, and 
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sensor network topology selected, the POI is ready to begin sensor type selection. The 
PSP SMEs who have a great understanding of the POI system and the 
capabilities/limitations of PSP resources should carry out sensor selection. 
Figure 36 gives different types of materials that are used to build sensors based on 
their monitoring environment. Sensors should be chosen to meet the environmental 
constraints and characteristics to ensure quality data collection. 
 
 Sensor Materials (Meijer 2008, 6) Figure 36.
Figure 37 shows common parameters that define sensor functionality as sorted by 
type. The number and type of sensors chosen should be consistent with the DSX 
configuration, sensor network topology, sensor environment, and meet or exceed the 
minimum data picture completeness threshold.  
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 Sensor Parameters (from Meijer 2008, 7) Figure 37.
Sensor sampling frequency is dependent on the parameter being monitored, its 
volatility, along with its criticality to function. The monitoring of safety systems will 
require a higher than average sampling frequency due to the impact of a hazard that may 
result between sample extractions from a continuous signal. Per the Nyquist-Shannon 
sampling theorem (Nyquist and Shannon 2012), a sensor should sample a signal at twice 
its maximum frequency within the bandlimited signal. If a function 𝑥𝑥(𝑡𝑡) contains no 
frequencies higher than 𝐵𝐵 hertz, it is completely resolved by giving its ordinates at a 




If monitoring at the Nyquist rate (2𝐵𝐵) or the Nyquist frequency  1
2𝐵𝐵
 is not possible, 
other signal sampling techniques exists. One such technique is known as compressive 
sampling or compressive sensing. Compressive sampling theory states that signals can be 
recovered and potentially acquired with far fewer samples than traditional methods, like 
that of the Nyquist-Shannon sampling theorem (Candes and Wakin 2008). Compressive 
sampling relies on two key themes: sparsity and incoherence. Sparsity deals with the fact 
that a continuous time signal is much less than its bandwidth or a discrete-time signal’s 
number of degrees of freedom is much smaller than its length (Candes and Wakin 2008). 
Incoherence shows the degree of correlation between the objects having a sparse 
representation in the domain they are acquired between time and frequency (Candes and 
Wakin 2008). If a signal meets these two conditions, it may be a candidate for 
compressive sampling. Compressive sampling has shown to reduce the number of 
samples needed to be a 4-to-1 ratio, one needs four incoherent samples per unknown 
nonzero term (Candes and Wakin 2008).  
Attention to sensor signal noise needs to be taken into account as well. Common 
methods to reduce signal noise include the following: 
• Reject DC common-mode voltage (National Instruments 2008) 
• Reject AC common-mode voltage (National Instruments 2008) 
• Break ground loops (National Instruments 2008) 
• Use 4–20 mA current loops (National Instruments 2008) 
• Use 24 V digital logic (National Instruments 2008) 
• Low-pass frequency response filter 
• High-pass frequency response filter 
• Band-pass frequency response filter 
• Band-stop frequency response filter 
• Notch frequency response filter 
• Comb frequency response filter 
• All-pass frequency response filter 
• Cutoff frequency response filter 
• Roll-off frequency response filter 
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• Transition frequency response filter 
• Ripple frequency response filter 
• Butterworth filter 
• Chebyshev filter (Type I and II) 
• Bessel filter 
• Elliptic filter 
• Optimum “L” filter 
• Gaussian filter 
• Hourglass filter 
• Raised-cosine filter 
• Constant k filter 
• M-derived filter 
• Infinite impulse response filter 




 Generic DS Functional Allocation Example (Icons from Flaticon 2014) Figure 38.
The DSX module itself, independent or guest platform, will consist of the same 
functions. The functions and their definitions, are shown in Figure 38 and listed below. 
• Collect—the POI will have the ability to collect the data of interest as decided 
by the PSP and User by means of self-test, built-in test (BIT), or component 
sensorization  
• Verify—the data collected will be verified to ensure it is being collected 
correctly 
• Record—data is stored in a short term memory to guard against corruption 
before data validation 
• Validate—data is checked for correctness and meaningfulness  
• Store— data is then written to long term storage and backed up 
• Process—data is analyzed for trends, flags, or other useful information for the 
PSP and User  
• Filter*—the results from the process step are filtered for content relevance 
and importance 
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• Log*—data from the filtered step is logged to create a record of 
communication in which an event has happened or triggered over a set period 
of time 
• Compress*—important data and logs are encoded and reduced in size to be 
transported to the PSP 
• Action—results from the process data step are used to send commands, 
actions, or triggers to the User/Customer or PSP for execution 
In the steps above, the steps with an (*) beside them denote actions required for 
transportation of data through the ESI to the PSP only. Another important object of note 
is the SLA with user/customer inset. The user/customer is typically always a part of the 
support process and is usually the first line of defense. Figure 39 thru Figure 47 detail 
each function of the DSX modules 
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 DSX Sensor Network Decision Flow Figure 39.
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 DSX Collect Data Decision Flow Figure 40.
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 DSX Verify Data Decision Flow Figure 41.
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 DSX Record Data Decision Flow Figure 42.
 
 DSX Validate Data Decision Flow Figure 43.
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 DSX Process Data Decision Flow Figure 44.
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 DSX Filter Data Decision Flow Figure 45.
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 DSX Log Data Decision Flow Figure 46.
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 DSX Compress Data Decision Flow Figure 47.
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C. STAKEHOLDER ANALYSIS 
Stakeholders for this capstone were interviewed and categorized under the three 
basic elements of DS: PSP, ESI, and POI as indicated in Table 10. While the Naval 
Postgraduate School (NPS) has an interest in using this capstone to inform instruction 
and guide follow-on research to enhance the skills of the total workforce, it did not fall 
into one of the three basic elements of DS and thus was categorized as “administrative.” 
Table 10. Stakeholder Categories 
Stakeholder Category 
Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) Administrative 
PMS 405 - Directed Energy and Electric Weapon Systems 
Program Office 
POI 
Office of Naval Research (ONR) ESI 
NSWC PHD - Office of Engineering and Technology (OET) PSP 
NSWC PHD - Distance Support Advocacy Office PSP 
Naval Network Operations Center (NOC) ESI 
Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) PSP 
Warfighter, USN PSP 
 
1. Administrative 
The only stakeholder that did not fall into one of the three basic DS elements was 
NPS. NPS was an important stakeholder in guiding the capstone for system engineering 
and subject matter expertise. 
2. Platform Service Provider 
The PSPs, along with the POI, were the team’s most active stakeholder. 
Noteworthy, due to the greater number of support organizations classified as a PSP 
versus the number of organizations classified as POI. This meant that the team was 
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dealing with a complex, multifaceted PSP that was distributed by function, geographic 
location, funding lines, and responsibility. 
The team first met with the NSWC PHD - Distance Support Advocacy Office. 
The office provided continual project guidance as well as existing DS documentation, 
studies, and technology roadmaps. NSWC PHD has been developing DS for some time, 
but is still grappling with issues such as: (1) sensor and data collection mechanisms, (2) 
ship on-board data storage and processing mechanisms, (3) prognostics health 
management, (4) ship-to-shore data transfer mechanisms, (5) shore-side data 
warehousing, (6) mission-based modeling and readiness assessments, and (7) ship system 
product life-cycle analysis (Naval Surface Warfare Center, Port Hueneme Division, Air 
Dominance Department 2013). 
NSWC PHD began to take an in depth technical implementation of providing DS 
beyond email, chat, and fly-away teams with the initiation of the AEGIS Wholeness 
program. The purpose of this program was to assist AEGIS ships in achieving higher 
readiness and availability metrics (Naval Surface Warfare Center, Port Hueneme 
Division, Air Dominance Department 2013). 
While this program helped to highlight and bring attention to performance issues 
through in depth analysis, it became apparent that the effort was very labor intensive and 
burdensome. NSWC PHD - Office of Engineering and Technology began to accept 




 Distance Support Shipboard Server Concept (from Air Dominance Figure 48.
Department 2013, 9)  
Of the proposals submitted, the DS shipboard server (DS3) concept was a relevant 
model to emulate with subtle changes. The DS3 concept, as shown in Figure 48, is of 
interest due to its unique characteristic of being located outside of the AEGIS Weapon 
Systems (AWS) certification boundary (dotted square on the left-hand side of the figure). 
Part of the issue NSWC PHD has with trying to monitor or sensorize the AWS is that any 
modification to the AWS requires a complete combat system re-certification. This re-
certification is very time consuming and costly. With the DS3 being located outside the 
AWS boundary, no re-certification is needed as the system has a separate accreditation 
boundary around itself. This is also particularly useful in that the DS3 can execute 
programs that are not certified for the combat system, as well as keep them updated with 
patches as needed. 
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 Future Vision of Readiness (from Air Dominance Department 2013, 11) Figure 49.
NSWC PHD has future visions of being able to monitor the entire ship and 
transform the ship into an expert system. Figure 49 gives the next stage of monitoring in 
terms of the detect-to-engage chain to create readiness models based on mission 
capability. This will tie real-time system information into decision making for warfare 
area resource assignments.  
In reviewing the stakeholder needs, the team determined that the PSPs did not 
need a shore infrastructure or a DS center but rather a framework and designed-in DS 
module as part of future systems to help better facilitate DS from the PSPs. Figure 50 was 




 NSWC PHD Next Generation Readiness (from Naval Surface Warfare Figure 50.
Center, Port Hueneme Division 2003) 
3. Enabling/Supporting Infrastructure  
The stakeholders that were categorized as ESI were mainly passive, information 
sources for the team. This was due to the nature of relationship and business contract 
management through the use of SLAs. One particular stakeholder was kept on the team’s 
watchlist for technical risk. This was the Office of Naval Research (ONR). ONR in 
conjunction with Space and Naval Warfare System Command (SPAWAR) are in the 
process of developing a capability known as Naval Tactical Cloud (NTC). NTC’s 
purpose, as depicted in Figure 51, is to improve warfighting effectiveness while operating 
inside adversary kill chains. This was an important development to watch closely as the 
requirements set forth by the NTC could have had an impact on the amount, type, or even 
classification of data being transmitted.  
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 Naval “Data Space” (from Office of Naval Research 2014, 9) Figure 51.
The last technical risk the team had to watch ONR for was the potential for all 
data to change from existing classification domains, as shown in Figure 52, to a single 
classified domain. This was unlikely to happen in the near future, but it did provide a 
thought provoking design consideration when analyzing the POI and what to monitor and 
how the data should be treated. 
 
 Future Security Domains (from Porsche, et al. 2014, 21) Figure 52.
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4. Platform of Interest 
The POI for this capstone was selected to be the HEL. The team met with 
stakeholders from PMS 405 - Directed Energy and Electric Weapon Systems Program 
Office to gather information about the HEL and issues concerning support. These issues 
ranged from frequent component failure to environmental degradation. The team first 
took on the approach of analyzing the HEL currently being installed on the USS PONCE 
(Office of Naval Research 2014), but was later guided by NPS advisors to take a more 
general HEL analysis so that the conclusions would not be centered on one particular 
make and model. The information about the make-up of the HEL was provided by NPS, 
while the information about the host platform was provided by NSWC PHD. The host 
platform for this capstone was chosen to be the AEGIS and LCS class ships. Information 
about the host platforms was limited to the “hotel services” provided and the internal 
network connectivity of the platform. 
D. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS 
This CONOPS describes the POI capabilities required to allow the PSP to 
accomplish DS as determined by the appropriate SLAs and OLAs. In addition, this 
CONOPS will explore how the PSP will support the POI to provide the best level of 
service. 
• Operating Concept: The DSHEL will operate within AEGIS and LCS class 
ships while maintaining connection to the complex net-centric architecture of 
the USN. The overall POI is the HEL. The HEL is a guest platform being 
supported on the host platforms AEGIS and LCS class ships. Important data is 
collected and analyzed from the HEL via the DSHEL module and then routed 
through ships network off board to the NOC. From the NOC, the data will be 
routed to Navy 311 and then down the USN’s multi-tiered technical support 
infrastructure to the proper PSP. 
• Operating Schedule: The DSHEL will be able to operate continuously as 
needed 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. This operating schedule can be 
autonomous or manually controlled. DSHEL will have the ability to suspend 
diagnostics or other resource impacting functions while maintaining HEL 
passive sensor recording. The amount of data transmitted from DSHEL to the 
NOC will be consistent with the internal data storage. This function can also 
be suspended in times of link traffic prioritization. 
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• Mission Support Description:  The overall mission support of the DSHEL will 
be the responsibility of the HEL or the ISEA to which it is assigned. As the 
HEL is owned by PMS 405, the responsibility will fall to them to fund the 
proper ISEA who maintains ownership of the combat system (NSWC PHD). 
The ESI will be maintained by SPAWAR who will provide the proper SLA. 
• Personnel:  All individuals conducting support will need knowledge of the 
DSHEL. The DSHEL will not be serviced or maintained by ship’s crew. The 
ISEA will maintain the DSHEL as it will be an extension of the HEL. 
• Training:  DSHEL training will be accomplished through individual On the 
Job Training (OJT) with special attention given to sensorization, network 
administration, and HEL characteristics. Shore support personnel will receive 
sustainment training and data analysis training that is focused programming, 
scripting, and modeling and simulation.  
• Equipment:  The DSHEL equipment will be designed and built to meet 
common open architecture standards and to minimize life-cycle costs. The 
equipment will use the same baseline system equipment that other programs 
of record currently procure to keep logistical footprints small. The equipment 
will have maintenance cards detailing all information necessary to provide 
support. 
• Support:  Preventative maintenance and non-major repairs will typically be 
conducted during scheduled maintenance windows in-port or underway. 
Critical repairs will be conducted with the help of the Integrated Logistics 
Support (ILS) team. Preventive maintenance will be limited to the sensors and 
other functions of DSHEL that accrue wear. The hardware and processing 
functions of DSHEL will follow the standard ship class hardware life-cycle 
replacement.  
• Supply:  Onboard sparing will be limited to components that have required 
preventative maintenance. DSHEL hardware and processing spares will be 
kept shore side at the appropriate PSP provider for storage. One DSHEL unit 
will be installed for use at the land based test site for directed energy.  
• Infrastructure:  Infrastructure cost will not include the PSP or the ESI. 
Infrastructure costs for the DSHEL will be limited to the hardware, software, 
processing, and data collection devices used. Hotel services from the host 
platform will be required to operate DSHEL. 
• Information:  Information concerning the DSHEL will be documented 
electronically and stored within the requirements of NSDSA. Information 
generated and transmitted by DSHEL will undergo analysis and archived for 
long-term storage. This data will be used for trending as well as for future 
support endeavors like expert system creation and prognostics.  
• Operating Environment:  The DSHEL will operate in the standard computing 
enclosure as dictated by the host platform ship class. This environment should 
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mirror that of an enclosed server rack with proper temperature, power, shock 
and vibration management. The data collection devices on DSHEL will vary 
greatly depending on the POI and the stage at which DSHEL is installed. For 
future systems, data collection devices will be integrated and selected by the 
design team with PSP input.  
• Missions:  DSHEL is a key element in supporting the HEL by maintaining a 
picture of the HEL’s health. The DSHEL will meet this challenge through the 
employment of multiple data collection devices at key interfaces, critical 
components, and signals of interest. DSHEL will verify and validate that all 
data collected is correct and meaningful. DSHEL will store and process data 
for action, event reconstruction, transit, trending, and other future 
developments. 
• Interoperability with Other Elements:  DSHEL will operate with all host 
platform “hotel services” such as power, water, heating, ventilation, air 
conditioning (HVAC), and network connectivity. The ESI and the POI will 
agree upon specified levels of service through the use of SLAs. Proper OLAs 
will be authored within the PSP to ensure support for the HEL via DSHEL is 
complete. If DSHEL is installed on a legacy guest platform, DSHEL will 
report relevant data actions to the user as specified with the user through a 
SLA. 
• Users and Other Stakeholders:  The core users of DSHEL will be the PSP. 
Other users within the main PSP will be secondary users as established by 
various OLAs. If DSHEL is installed on a legacy guest platform, DSHEL will 
report relevant data actions to the user as specified with the user through a 
SLA. 
• Potential Impacts:  DSHEL has the potential to impact network traffic 
depending on the degree of data collection and visibility required by the PSP. 
Careful attention to data processing, filtering, and compression will be given 
to ensure that this does not become an issue. Other workarounds include large 
on-board data storage and dynamic information throttling when network 
resources are taxed.  
E. DESIGN REFERENCE MISSION 
The design reference mission that was developed for the DSHEL system is 
depicted with the OV-1 diagram for DSHEL.  
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 DSHEL OV-1 Diagram Figure 53.
Figure 53 shows the types of DS methods that the DSHEL system will support. 
Additionally, it shows the platforms the DSHEL system will be implemented on, as well 
as the shore-based facilities where the information will be used by Fleet support 
personnel. 
The DSHEL system will not be operated or maintained by the sailor in any way. 
Information shall be collected in a passive and active manner by the shore-based support 
sites (ISEA, RMC, and Navy 311) and used to provide support for the HEL weapons 
system. The information will be disseminated in accordance with the Joint Fleet Forces 
Maintenance Manual (JFFM). Specifically, when the ship has an issue with the HEL 
system, the sailors will submit a ticket with Navy 311. The ticket will then be routed to 
the Regional Maintenance Center (RMC) for assistance. The RMC will have the ability to 
gather diagnostic information from DSHEL to provide direction on parts that may have 
failed or further troubleshooting that may need to take place. If the RMC is unable to 
resolve the ticket within 90 days of submission (Navy 2013), the ticket will be forwarded 
to the ISEA for resolution. The ISEA will have privileged capability with the DSHEL 
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system, allowing remote connectivity to the system. Privileged capabilities refer to an 
extended and enhanced set of functions for the ISEA which aren’t typically available to 
the RMC support staff. When parts fail, the DSHEL system will immediately report the 
information back to shore in advance of any ticket being generated by the crew. This will 
allow the shore support infrastructure to take a more proactive role in the support of the 
HEL system.  
F. SUMMARY 
From the stakeholder analysis and literature review, it was determined that the 
focus of the capstone should be on the creation of a DS framework and its application to 
the HEL. The DS framework in this chapter was kept high level and generic due to the 
overall concept of the framework being flexible and modular enough to fit within the 
rigid organizational structure of the USN. Chapter III shows how the DS framework was 
applied to the USN’s current organizational structure as well as the POI, HEL. The 




III. REQUIREMENTS ANALYSIS 
In this chapter, the DS framework is applied to the USN’s organizational structure 
and to the POI, the HEL. From this application and subsequent breakdown, requirement 
areas were identified and noted as operational, functional, and performance. While the 
team cannot generate requirements that a platform service provider (PSP), 
enabling/supporting infrastructure (ESI), and platform of interest (POI) must adhere to, 
these specific areas should be scrutinized for requirements as they have a great effect on 
DS. 
A. PRIME DIRECTIVE 
Any system that is composed of multiple parts will have parts that wear out, or 
require special conditions to work properly. There are no perpetual motion machines or 
perfect systems which never degrade. As a result, it is necessary to be able to support 
these systems by a combination of anticipating and addressing their needs. This 
multifaceted type of maintenance is called DS. DS allows for information about a system 
to be analyzed and issues corrected without having engineers or technicians on-site with 
the system. DS has three main phases. First would be obtaining the necessary 
information, second the analysis of this information, and finally reacting to the analysis. 
DS incorporates all three of these phases in order to monitor and address issues within a 
system without being physically present on the examined system. DSHEL’s goal is to 
provide secure, remote maintenance and support services to the HEL system when 
fielded by the USN. 
B. SYSTEM DEFINITION 
In this section, each element of the DS framework in reference to the DSHEL 
Application Context Diagram (Figure 54) was assigned to the proper USN organization 
and the subsequent POI. This capstone’s focus was the POI and thus, the PSP, ESI, and 
the agreements between them (SLAs and OLAs) were not detailed. 
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 DSHEL Application Context Diagram Figure 54.
1. Platform Service Provider 
The PSP for the USN is highly dependent on the POI. Different support 
organizations are in charge of different platforms based on platform capability and type 
of support needed. This section will focus on the USN support organizations that provide 
expertise to combat system elements and weapons installed on AEGIS and LCS surface 
combatants.  
Figure 55 illustrates the typical flow of information from the POI to the PSP 
within the USN. In this setup, any ESI involvement is not visible to the parties and 
appears to be seamless. When an issue arises from a system (POI) on the ship, the sailor 
takes action to remedy the issue. Due to this action, the sailor is often considered a Tier 1 
technical support member. This means the sailor has not only an OLA with the ship but 
also an SLA with the POI. SLAs and OLAs on board a ship are different. A SLA is an 
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action the sailor completes to keep the POI operational (execution of a maintenance 
requirement card (MRC)). An OLA on board a ship for a sailor may be an action, such as 
performing assigned duties or operating system equipment. The SLA dividing the sailor 
from the Help Desk represents the SLA between the POI and PSP. The POI is owned by 
an organization different from the organization providing the support services. Many 
SLAs and OLAs are not shown within the graphic in order to simplify the process.  
If a sailor, also considered Tier 1 technical support, cannot remedy the issue on 
the POI, he contacts the USN Help Desk, also known as Navy 311. Different programs 
and platform have distinct ways in which they contact shore support. For AEGIS 
systems, the sailor contacts Navy 311 directly to initiate support. For LCS systems, the 
sailor uses a system called maintenance figure of merit (MFOM) automated work 
notification (AWN) to initiate support and then contacts Navy 311 to file a service ticket 
for record keeping purposes. Once these systems have been contacted and the support 
request initiated, they begin their travel through the multi-tiered technical support group 
as defined by the Joint Fleet Maintenance Manual (JFFM) and private industry support 
organizations managed with OLAs and SLAs. Tier 2 technical support is managed by the 
regional maintenance centers (RMC). They are a dock-side organization that can handle 
most technical issues not involving combat system specific hardware and software. 
RMCs also provide standardized maintenance and modernizations to ship systems. These 
include the Southwest RMC, Southeast RMC, Puget Sound Naval Shipyard and 
Intermediate Maintenance Facility, Norfolk Ship Support Activity, U.S. Naval Ship 
Repair Facility and Japan RMC, Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard and Intermediate 
Maintenance Facility, as well as the Commander, USN RMC. 
If the RMC is unable to resolve the issue, it is routed to the appropriate Tier 3 in-
service engineering agent (ISEA). The ISEA is responsible for support on systems 
installed on the ship. Their functions include installation, certification, training and 
qualification of system users, logistical support, and test and evaluation. Most issues are 
solved at this level of technical support. 
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 USN Platform Service Provider Flow (Icons from Flaticon 2014)  Figure 55.
The last and final support tier, Tier 4, is the original equipment manufacturer 
(OEM). The OEM will vary from system to system based on the particular design agent. 
This level of technical support is reserved for issues that are the most complex and 
typically require design changes/solutions to the hardware or software. 
2. Enabling/Supporting Infrastructure 
The ESI for the USN in terms of tactical communication is an organization named 
Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command (SPAWAR). SPAWAR is the technical 
authority and acquisition command for Command, Control, Communications, Computers, 
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems. They also develop, 
deliver, and sustain communication and information capabilities for the Fleet. Figure 56 




 USN Enabling/Supporting Infrastructure Flow (Icons from Flaticon 2014) Figure 56.
All communications between the ship and the shore must go through SPAWAR. 
When the sailor contacts the PSP for support, a communication circuit must be 
established with a satellite link using the SHF band. AEGIS and LCS ships both use this 
link structure. The inbound communication link from the ship is received by a satellite 
antenna shore center which routes the information to the nearest NOC. Due to the USN’s 
global presence, NOCs are established all over the world. From the NOC, the support 
request is routed through SPAWAR’s WAN/LAN to the appropriate network boundary 
firewall to be forwarded to the shore support installation. 
3. Platform of Interest 
With the installation of the solid state laser - quick reaction capability (SSL-QRC) 
AN/SEQ-3 (XN-1) Laser Weapon Systems (LaWS) on the USS PONCE, it is apparent 
that the POI is a guest platform contained within a host platform. This capstone used a 
more generic approach in analyzing the HEL; the host platform analysis was done from 
the standpoint of AEGIS and LCS surface combatants. Due to weapon systems being 
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installed on ships, this inherently makes those weapons systems categorically guest 
platforms contained within host platforms. 
a. Host Platform 
The host platform plays an import role in providing for the POI. As illustrated in 
Figure 57, for HEL, the host platform would be in charge of: 
• Hotel services 
o Ship form factor space 
 Above deck—Provide location and space for the HEL and its required 
infrastructure such as an enclosure. 
 Below deck—Provide location and space for the HEL system sub-
components. The HEL system sub-components will most likely be 
distributed throughout the ship to meet survivability requirements. 
o Conditioned power—Provide stable and clean power from the ship at the 
proper utility frequency and phase. 
o Chilled water—Provide cooled water from the ship’s plant. This water can 
be chilled seawater, fresh water, or deionized water and has variable flow 
rates. 
o Electronic dry air—Provide air conditioning for specific humidity levels to 
cool electronic devices without harm. 
• Support services  
o HM&E support—Provide technician level support for all components of 
the HEL system that fall into mechanic level maintenance such as 
hydraulic lines, pumps, voids, and tanks.  
o Tier 1 technical support—Provide sailor support in the form of Planned 
Maintenance Systems (PMS) and execution of MRCs. 
o Meteorological and oceanographic (METOC) data—Provide information 
describing, characterizing, and detailing the current environment external 
to the ship. 
• Command and control systems 
o Detect to engage (DTE) kill chain command—Provide kill chain actions 
and events that take place when an engagement is deemed necessary. The 
DTE kill chain is made up of the following steps: 
 Detect—Responsible for the planning, detection, entry, tracking, and 
identification of targets. 
 114 
 Control—Responsible for the threat evaluation and weapons pairing 
step for the combat system including fine/rough course track, gimbal 
pointing, and sensor detection. 
 Engage—Responsible for the engagement and engagement evaluation 
of the target. 
o Network communications—Provide network backbone within the ship 
that allows all communication between system, operators, and command 
centers 
o Display systems—Provide control and maintenance displays of the HEL 
will be located throughout the ship. 
o Operator control console—Provide physical HEL weapon console will be 
located with the ships combat information center (CIC). This console can 
be unique to the particular system or can be a service that any console can 
operate as in the defined sub mode. 
 
 Host Platform and Guest Platform Interaction  Figure 57.
The host platform will be analyzed in a later section for important data needed to 
construct the minimum data picture threshold in order to perform DS on the HEL. 
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b. Guest Platform 
The guest platform and POI is the HEL. An in depth analysis of the SSL-QRC 
AN/SEQ-3 (XN-1) LaWS on the USS PONCE would be limited to the program itself, 
thus the HEL under analysis will be a generic version (SSL and FEL) so that the results 
from this capstone can be applied to future HEL designs.  
 
 Basic Laser Cross Section (from Harney 2013, 85) Figure 58.
Figure 58 shows a simple schematic diagram of a simple laser model. The basics 
of laser operation involve the following components: an energy source (also known as a 
“pump”), laser medium (also known as a gain medium), and two reflectors (also known 
as the laser cavity/optical resonator). There are many types of lasers available, these 
include: gas lasers, chemical lasers, dye lasers, metal-vapor lasers, solid-state lasers, 
semiconductor lasers, free electron lasers, gas dynamic lasers, Samarium lasers, Raman 
lasers, and nuclear pumped lasers.  
The team determined that of the lasers available, the solid state and free electron 
lasers would be analyzed as they proved to be the most viable options for installation and 
fielding due to current USN requirements. The basic elements for all lasers and similar 
with the exceptions coming from laser excitation mechanism (pumping) used to generate 
population inversion inside the laser medium and the laser medium itself. 
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Most SSL implement three common forms of optical pumping to achieve a 
population inversion. These three common optical pumping methods are known as 
flashlamps, diode lasers, and other lasers (Harney 2012). Figure 59 gives some possible 
advantages and disadvantages in SSL pumping mechanisms and shows the geometries 
used in pumping the laser rod. 
 
 Diode Laser Pumping Characteristics and Geometries (from Harney 2012) Figure 59.
Figure 60 gives some possible advantages and disadvantages in flashlamp 
pumping mechanisms and shows the geometries used in pumping the laser rod. 
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 Flashlamp Pumping Characteristics and Geometries (after Harney 2012)  Figure 60.
Free electron lasers (FELs) use considerably more power and have a much larger 
infrastructure footprint due to how they produce stimulated emission. Instead of pumping 
a medium to produce stimulated emission, FELs use a relativistic beam from a particle 
accelerator to “fire” electrons through a series of strong magnetic fields which alternate 
directions causing the electrons to emit radiation (Harney 2012). The emitted radiation 
then propagates in the lasing cavity until it exits. Figure 61 shows a schematic diagram of 
a FEL. The FEL is still in its development stages and suffers from extremely complex 
hardware as well as radiation issues.  
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 Free Electron Laser Diagram (from Harney 2012, 216) Figure 61.
The HEL system itself has many internal systems that need to be analyzed. These 
systems include, but are not limited to: 
• Laser 
o Energy source—power generation and storage for the HEL system 
o Laser cavity and gain medium—cavity where the gain medium is pumped 
to reach proper population inversion levels 
o Diode pump—pumps the laser rod (gain material) 
o Phase adjuster and control electronics—beam and phase control 
equipment for the pump diodes/fibers 
o Master oscillator, power amplifier (MOPA)—scalable approach to 
achieving higher power with the combination of lower power lasers; 
master oscillator seeds other laser amplifiers 
o Thermal management systems—cooling equipment for excess waste heat 
created by the HEL 
o Safety systems—fire, personnel, operation, and system interlocks to meet 
safety requirements 
o Control systems—systems needed to control the HEL in terms of 
mechanics, operation, communication, health, predictive avoidance, and 
maintenance 
o Magnetic array (FEL only)—large magnets used to oscillate the electron 
beam. 
o Particle accelerator (FEL only)—relativistic beam used to accelerate 
electrons 
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o Electron beam transport (FEL only) —strong magnets used to direct the 
electron beam to and from the magnetic array 
• Beam control 
o Wavefront sensors—sensors that sample beam quality to ensure operation 
at expected levels 
o Reflectors 
 Deformable—adjustable surfaces to shape and direct beam as desired 
 Segmented—series of mirrors used to combine smaller beams into one 
 Fast Steering—high performance two dimensional directing mirror 
 Corner Cube—three mirror or prism used to redirect the beam 
 Piezoelectric—high speed, solid state mirror 
 Primary, secondary, tertiary – reflectors located in the telescope 
o Optics 
 Collimating lenses—optic used to narrow out beams. 
 Diffractive or spectral combiner—optics used to combine beams. 
 Adaptive—optics used to improve performance by reducing wavefront 
distortion at the point of interest 
o Beam window—glass cover that protects the HEL from the outside 
elements 
• Atmospheric, tracking, and pointing (ATP) 
o Illuminator—system used to highlight target before engaging  
o Fine and coarse tracker—tracking system used to track target object in 
differing wavelengths depending on operation mode 
o Gimbal and stabilization—equipment used to point the HEL in different 
directions and stabilize optics for use 
o Enclosure—above deck cover for equipment  
 
Figure 62 shows the basic elements of a HEL. The basic elements of any HEL can 
be categorized into one of the three following groups: laser, beam control, or ATP. Figure 
63 shows the breakdown of a potential SSL laser element. Figure 64 is the breakdown as 





 HEL Basic Elements Figure 62.
 
 HEL - SSL Laser Element Interactions and Makeup Figure 63.
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 HEL - FEL Laser Element Interactions and Makeup Figure 64.
 
 HEL Beam Control Element Interactions and Makeup Figure 65.
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The beam control configurations, as illustrated in Figure 65 and Figure 66, can 
also vary due to requirements, space form factor, capability, and environment. In general, 
the beam control elements look to maintain beam stability and quality.  
 
 HEL ATP Element Interactions and Makeup Figure 66.
Similar to the beam control element, the ATP element also varies from 
requirements, space form factor, capability, and environment. There are many different 
telescope configurations.  
4. DSX to DSHEL 
In following the DS framework, the DSX configuration chosen was the 
Distributed - Multipoint, All Inclusive. This configuration was chosen due to the multiple 
data sources that need to be sensorized from the host platform. This configuration was 
also chosen due to surface combatant requirements to have the HEL system distributed 
throughout the ship to meet survivability requirements.   
The sensor collection network configuration chosen, as indicated in Figure 67, 
will be a combination of a star and mesh topology. The star methodology will be used 
 123 
with major HEL system elements as well as hardware cabinets. This will allow two main 
nodes (for redundancy) with each local network to report out the sensor status of the 
internal nodes to the main DSHEL controller. The mesh topology will govern the star 
main nodes. This allows a fault tolerant network to be created when sharing control 
information and status requests from the DSHEL controller.  
 
 DSHEL Sensor Collection Network Figure 67.
The sensor collection network will monitor and report the following parameters as 
categorized by host platform and POI: 
• Hotel services 
o Ship form factor space 
 Above deck—temperature, pressure, wind speed, wind direction, 
humidity, precipitation rate, visibility, cloud height, shock, vibration, 
and cloud coverage 
 Below deck—Temperature and humidity 
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o Conditioned power—Voltage, current, phase, surge, and ground signal 
o Chilled water—flow rate, temperature, purity, and pH level 
o Electronic dry air—temperature, humidity, and flow rate 
• Support services 
o HM&E support—hydraulic pressure 
o Tier 1 technical support—maintenance actions and events 
o Meteorological and oceanographic (METOC) data – see hotel services – 
above deck, sea state, and ship motion. 
• Command and control systems 
o Detect to engage (DTE) kill chain command – connectivity with DTE and 
commands sent 
o Network communications – link  utilization, hop count, speed, packet loss, 
latency, path reliability, path bandwidth, throughput, load, and maximum 
transmission unit 
o Display systems—signals sent and received 
o Operator control console—signals sent and received 
• Laser, beam control, and atmospheric, tracking, and pointing (ATP) 
o Total intensity over time (Harney 2012, 401) 
o Total energy in pulse (Harney 2012, 401) 
o Spectral content (Harney 2012, 401) 
o Degree of polarization (Harney 2012, 401) 
o Angular divergence (Harney 2012, 401) 
o Intensity profile (Harney 2012, 401) 
o Shock and vibration 
o Temperature (optics, mirrors) 
o Hardware utilization 
o Software execution (running on hardware) 
o Usage modes and associated time 
o Aperture radius 
o Cavity loss coefficient 
o Magnetic field (FEL only) 
o Beam quality 
o Wavelength, phase 
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o Greenwood frequency 
o Gain 
o Decay rate 
o Irradiance 
o Wiggler vector potential (FEL only) 
o Cavity length 
o Wiggler period (FEL only) 
o Number of wiggler periods (FEL only) 
o Isoplanatic angle (if available) 
o Fried coherence length 
o Object distance 
o Dwell time 
o Laser spot size 
While many of the items listed above cannot be measured via sensorization 
because they are inherent characteristics of the system, the parameters above are 
important in determining behavior profiles of the HEL.  
C. REQUIREMENTS SYNOPSIS 
Requirements were elicited from multiple viewpoints, topic areas, and 
stakeholders. These were key for the documentation of physical and functional needs of 
the DSHEL product, processes, and services. The DSHEL structure and characteristics of 
the requirements generated are laid out below. 
1. Structure 
The language of requirements can be very confusing, especially when terms like 
“shall,” “will,” and “must” all have similar meanings. To avoid confusion, requirements 
for DSHEL followed the structured language format below: 
• “Shall,” the emphatic form of the verb, shall is used throughout sections the 
specification whenever a requirement is intended to express a provision that is 
binding (Department of Defense 2014, 11).  
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• “Will” is used to express a declaration of purpose on the part of the 
Government.  “Will” is also used in cases where simple futurity is required 
(Department of Defense 2014, 11).  
• “Should” is used to express non-mandatory provisions (Department of 
Defense 2014, 11).  
• “May” is used to express non-mandatory provisions (Department of Defense 
2014, 11).  
• “Must” is used to express mandatory provisions.  “Shall” is used instead 
(Department of Defense 2014, 11).  
• Indefinite terms, such as “and/or,” “suitable,” “adequate,” “first rate,” “best 
possible,” “and others,” and “the like” are not used. The use of “e.g.,” “etc.,” 
and “i.e.,” are avoided (Department of Defense 2014, 12). 
• Ambiguous Adverbs and Adjectives, such as “almost always,” “significant,” 
“minimal,” “timely,” “real‐time,” “precisely,” “appropriately,” 
“approximately,” “various,” “multiple,” “many,” 
• “Few,” “limited,” and “accordingly” are avoided (International Council On 
Systems Engineering 2010, 79).  
• Open-Ended, Non-Verifiable Terms, such as “provide support,” “but not 
limited to,” and “as a minimum” are avoided (International Council On 
Systems Engineering 2010, 79). 
• Comparative Phrases, such as “better than” and “higher quality” are avoided 
(International Council On Systems Engineering 2010, 79).  
• Loopholes, such as “if possible,” “as appropriate,” and “as applicable” are 
avoided (International Council On Systems Engineering 2010, 79).  
• Other Indefinites, such as “etc.,” “and so on,” “to be determined (TBD),” “to 
be reviewed (TBR),” and “to be supplied (TBS).” are avoided (International 
Council On Systems Engineering 2010, 79). 
2. Characteristics 
Requirement characteristics of DSHEL had the following: 
• Necessary—Authoring or levying additional requirements that add no 
capability or performance to the system are of no value. Additional “useless” 
requirements come in two varieties: (1) unnecessary specification of design, 
which should be left to the discretion of the designer, and (2) a redundant 
requirement covered in some other combination of requirements (International 
Council On Systems Engineering 2010, 76).  
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• Implementation Independent—Requirements were created and applied by 
dictating what was to be performed by the system, not how the system was to 
perform the task (International Council On Systems Engineering 2010, 76).  
• Clear and Concise—Requirements were exact, used clear language, and 
detailed enough to rule out any and all other interpretations (International 
Council On Systems Engineering 2010, 76).  
• Complete—Requirements stood on their own, measurable and not in need of 
further investigation to provide capabilities and characteristics (International 
Council On Systems Engineering 2010, 76).  
• Consistent—Requirements were not in disagreement with each other. 
Adhesion to similar/like standards, units, conversion values, interfaces, and 
specifications was best ((International Council On Systems Engineering 2010, 
77).  
• Achievable—Requirements had the ability of being attained and securable. 
Requirement achievability is directly related to the ability to measure and rate 
the effectiveness of data collected about a particular requirement 
(International Council On Systems Engineering 2010, 77).  
• Traceable—Requirements flowed from higher level specifications down to 
lower levels. Complex, non-obvious requirements were made up of multiple, 
lower level, simple requirements (International Council On Systems 
Engineering 2010, 77).  
• Verifiable—Requirements were verified and validated by at least one of the 
following methods: inspection, analysis, demonstration, or test (International 
Council On Systems Engineering 2010, 77). 
3. Sources 
DSHEL requirement sources came from all environments and user interaction 
levels. The requirements were generated from customers, end users, organizations, 
support structures, environmental factors, geographic locations, policies, laws, and 
regulations. Below are the chosen pre-existing frameworks and methodologies that were 
analyzed for requirement generation. 
a. International Council on System Engineering 
The International Council on System Engineering (INCOSE) framework, Figure 
68, offered DSHEL detailed insight into the impact on requirements generation by 
external, organizational, and project environments.  
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 INCOSE Requirements Elicitation Areas (from INCOSE 2012, 75) Figure 68.
b. DOTMLPF-P 
DOTMLPF-P is a solution space framework used by the DOD that pertains to the 
eight possible non-materiel elements involved in solving warfighting capability gaps 
(Defense Acquisition University 2014). The eight non-materiel elements are as follows:  
• Doctrine: the way we fight (e.g., emphasizing maneuver warfare, combined 
air-ground campaigns).  
• Organization: how we organize to fight (e.g., divisions, air wings, Marine-Air 
Ground Task Forces).  
• Training: how we prepare to fight tactically (basic training to advanced 
individual training, unit training, joint exercises, etc).  
• Material: all the “stuff” necessary to equip our forces that DOES NOT require 
a new development effort (weapons, spares, test sets, etc that are “off the 
shelf” both commercially and within the government).  
• Leadership and education: how we prepare our leaders to lead the fight (squad 
leader to 4-star general/admiral - professional development).  
• Personnel: availability of qualified people for peacetime, wartime, and various 
contingency operations.  
• Facilities: real property, installations, and industrial facilities (e.g., 
government owned ammunition production facilities).  
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• Policy: DOD, interagency, or international policy that impacts the other seven 
non-materiel elements.  
c. Integrated Logistics Support Elements 
Integrated logistics support (ILS) elements are a set of 12 items that are used to 
enable system readiness and availability. The 12 ILS elements are shown in Figure 69. 
 
 ILS Elements (from Defense Acquisition University 2010)  Figure 69.
d. PESTO 
PESTO is an acronym that relates to measures of performance or readiness (Webb 
and Candreva 2006). The letters in PESTO are identified below (Department of Navy 
2015). 
• Personnel—Represents a detailed capture of individual skills that affect the 
ability of a unit to perform its mission 
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• Equipment—Represents the equipment material condition for performing 
each assigned capability 
• Supplies—Represents the availability of supplies necessary for performing 
each assigned capability 
• Training—Represents the performance and experience of the crew for 
performing each assigned capability 
• Ordnance—Represents the standardized distribution load allowances available 
for performing each capability 
D. FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS 
A functional requirement is distinguished from other requirements by its emphasis 
on what it is the system is “required to do” (Halligan 2014). It was important to consider 
how functional requirements would be incorporated into and become a part of DSHEL. In 
addition to this, functional flow diagrams depicted the main aspects and sub components 
of some of the key functional requirements and are shown throughout this section. 
Requirements must be worded in such a way that they are clear and to the point, not open 
to interpretation. Unclear requirement wording can end in an unsatisfactory final product 
and re-work. 
The DSHEL team did not write the requirements for the HEL system. Any 
requirements for the HEL system itself were not within the control of the DSHEL team 
due to the current developmental status of HEL. While it was not within the team’s 
jurisdiction to dictate DSHEL’s requirements, there are several areas that were 
recognized as being worthy of suggestion. It would have been possible for the team to 
branch out into other areas as well: security, equipment mean time between failures 
(MTBF), and logistical requirements could have been the focus. Data transfer and the 
platform of interest (HEL) were singled out because of their immense impact on the basic 
functions of a DS system. These were considered to be the monitoring of environmental 
and internal statuses of components of the system and the subsequent sharing (data 
transmission) of that information. 
Some examples of functional requirements the DSHEL team considered included 
the following: 
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• Distance support shall remotely monitor data, without any on-site assistance 
when operating at working conditions.  
• Distance support shall transport monitored data to off-site recipients. 
• Distance support shall transport data/information between off-site and on-site 
recipients. 
• Data transmitted for data support shall be in a pre-set format. 
The reason that data transfer, storage, and processing were focused on as major 
areas were due to the fact that resources were not infinite. The DSHEL team had to 
consider during the design process that there would be limitations. Considerations were 
how much data could be transferred, how much data could be stored, and how fast and 
frequently data could be transferred. 
In order to better express how data size and transmission capabilities were linked 
into the frequency with which data can be obtained, the following example was used to 
demonstrate the relationship between “pipe size,” or the data restriction a system is under 
to transport data, “data size,” or the amount of data trying to be transported, and their 
relationship to time. The combination of a small mode of transport and a large amount of 
data will cause the system to be slower in obtaining and transmitting data, just as the 
opposite combination would cause a faster transmission.  Figure 70, gives a visual of this 
idea using four common, standard link speeds. 
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 “Pipe Size,” Data Size, and Their Effect on Data Transfer Time Figure 70.
Each of the four lines in Figure 70 represented a different technology, which was 
in turn associated with a link speed in kbps. These link speeds were divided by a generic 
data size in KB, which were varied incrementally from one to one hundred KB and then 
divided by 3600 to convert these chosen link speeds to hours. The graph is, therefore, 
indicative of the difficulties of attempting to transfer large amounts of data over low link 
speeds as shown by the slope of each line. The steeper the slope, the more time it would 
take for data to be transmitted. For example for 10 KB, HF takes  0.0139  hours, or 0.834 
minutes, while the SHF/EHF takes 2.96*10-5 hours, or 0.0018 minutes.     As a result, the 
requirements were suggested to include: amount of data transferred, mode of data 
transfer, amount of “pipe” or transfer medium available, necessary frequency with which 
data needs to be obtained, and the form in which data shall be transmitted and received 
in. 
The importance and potentially severe impact of data is detailed in Figure 71: 
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 Sample Functional Flow for Data Figure 71.
After the above internal consideration of functional requirements, the DSHEL 
team consulted the Distance Support Handbook to consider what pre-existing 
requirements study had been done with regards to DS. From this handbook, 19 key 
requirements were obtained (Naval Surface Warfare Center, Port Hueneme Division 
2013): 
1. “The system architecture shall provide real-time communication. Real 
time communication includes chat, telephone, interactive video, etc., from 
shipboard to shore personnel and vice versa.” 
2. “The system architecture shall provide system status or health of the 
system. System status data will include indicators of whether a system or 
equipment is operational, off-line, degraded, or failed.” 
3. “The system architecture shall extract and record diagnostics data to a 
system attached or networked storage. Data includes information to 
remotely isolate failure to a single component at the Lowest Replaceable 
Unit (LRU) method from post analysis or specific BIT capabilities run at a 
periodic or aperiodic basis.” 
4. “The system architecture shall provide shore-based remote reconfiguration 
to correct hardware failures. It may require a realignment of a klystron, 
radar receiver, optical system, etc.” 
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5. “The system architecture shall collect information that is available for 
supporting immediate troubleshooting of a casualty and is typically not 
used for trend or historical analysis.” 
6. “The system architecture shall include periodic information regarding 
environmental conditions. Environmental monitoring data will be defined 
for each system’s architecture component. This includes information that 
is primarily used for trend analysis and CBM to provide overall indicators 
of system performance.” 
7. “The system architecture shall contain information that is available for 
supporting immediate troubleshooting of a casualty. This includes 
information that is driven by configuration changes to hardware, software, 
and firmware.” 
8. “The system architecture shall allow the shore-based Subject Matter 
Expert (SME) determine data that is pertinent for DS and defines the 
frequency in which the data is pulled from the ship. Data location can be 
viewed or captured by an inherent or external monitoring system.” 
9. “The system architecture shall provide shipboard data reduction capability 
to support reduced bandwidths or transmission of data for periodic or 
aperiodic data reports. This refers to the compression of data before 
periodic data transmission or storage.” 
10. “The network communication layer shall include a data transmission path 
from ship to shore; either directly from the shipboard system to the Global 
Information Grid (GIG) or indirectly via an interconnect proxy which is 
already connected to the GIG. This includes bandwidth requirements that 
will vary based on the type of DS being implemented and the data type. 
This also includes the fixed Minimum Transmission Unit (MTU) 
roundtrip delay time from ship to shore. The MTU for each DS tool 
implemented must be set to be greater than the fixed MTU from ship to 
shore.” 
11. “The shore-based infrastructure shall include common system/equipment 
reported data (e.g., health status, environment monitoring data, system 
faults, event data recording) repository located at a central shore-based 
site. This data repository differs from the Data Aggregation Center as it 
maintains raw system data before being reviewed/analyzed and aggregated 
with other data/metrics by a system SME.” 
12. “The shore-based infrastructure shall provide near-real-time collaboration. 
Near real time communication includes email, recorded video, etc., from 
shipboard to shore personnel and vice versa.” 
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13. “The DS infrastructure components shall have appropriate Defense 
Information Systems Agency (DISA) Security Technical Implementation 
Guide (STIG) controls applied.” 
14. “The shore-based infrastructure shall provide algorithms used by the shore 
data architecture (and supporting information systems) that incorporate 
operational, health, and readiness data to develop prognostic and 
predictive failure analyses prior to failure.” 
15. “The shore-based infrastructure shall provide shore-based personnel to 
have access to all technical documentation required to support the Fleet.” 
16. “The shore-based infrastructure shall provide access to data that provides 
on-board parts availability, estimated delivery dates or status, shore 
inventory, part location, condition/repair code, and ship requisition 
information.” 
17. “The shore-based infrastructure shall provide access to Hardware, 
Software, and Firmware configuration information that is installed in the 
shipboard system. Also includes configuration data on allowance parts list 
(APL) / allowance equipment list (AEL), technical bulletins, and technical 
manuals.” 
18. “The computing infrastructure shall define the ability of aggregating 
system data and to send that data via the system architecture for 
transmission on the internal network or external communication transport 
defined by the data transmission path. Network access for data assumes 
automated capability through system interfaces without shipboard 
personnel interface.” 
19. “The shore-based infrastructure shall provide current status of issues, 
historical record of what has been accomplished to resolve the issue, who 
is assigned to work problem, and priority or classification of issue. This 
information will be used for turn-over between SME or to/from ISEA to 
RMC.” 
The second key category that was focused on for requirements was the platform 
of interest, or HEL. Any system that is placed on a ship will be subjected to an extremely 
harsh environment. Equipment will be exposed to salt, temperature extremes, moisture, 
corrosion, thermal damage, as well as overall wear and tear from intended use. It was 
important to consider the basic components or lowest replaceable units (LRUs) of a laser 
system. Understanding the LRUs of the HEL allowed the team to consider what would be 
important to focus on for monitoring the HEL system for distance support.   
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The purpose of distance support is to collect information on the status of the 
system. For HEL, there are various areas that were key to effectively supporting the 
system. Requirements relating to the platform of interest include: 
• Temperature of various elements of HEL shall be monitored. These elements 
include but are not limited to: 
o Mirrors 
o Flashlamp/Diode/Fiber 
o Lasing medium 
o Chamber 
• System shall monitor the motion and positioning of all components 
• System shall monitor degradation and status of the lasing material  
These functional requirements combined into a flow diagram would be as 
illustrated in Figure 72. 
 
 Sample Functional Flow for HEL Monitoring Figure 72.
E. PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS 
Performance requirements reflected the functional requirements in terms of 
subject. However, the difference between the two types of requirements is that while a 
functional requirement states what the system will do, a performance requirement is 
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concerned with to what extent or “how well the system is to do what it is to do.” 
(Halligan 2014) 
As requirements considerations were developed, the concept of “ilities” or how a 
system would actually perform the aforementioned requirements were considered. 
Performance requirements were closely related to these “ilities.” In order for the 
requirements analysis to tie into the cost analysis portion of the capstone, the number of 
requirements would be necessary for calculations. However, as far as the “ilities” were 
concerned, no tally was necessary as the Level of Service Requirements assessment is 
performed differently. Instead the COSYSMO model, which is utilized in the cost 
estimation analysis, required levels of use. For example, COSYSMO used the terms 
“very high, high, medium, and low,” in place of a numerical tally. 
Performance requirements with regards to DSHEL, which were a continuation of 
the 19 functional requirements detailed above, should answer the following questions 
once a HEL PoR exists: 
• DSHEL shall transport data at X speed. 
• DSHEL shall monitor temperature of critical components. 
• DSHEL shall monitor alignment of all calibrated components. 
• DSHEL shall monitor the health status of all components. 
• DSHEL shall collect a X level of information to be available to SMEs. 
• DSHEL shall provide collect data at X intervals. 
• DSHEL shall transfer data at X rate to the host platform.  
• DSHEL shall monitor system vibration. 
Performance requirements were necessary to take the next step in product 
development. After the functional requirements had established the non-negotiable needs 
of the system design, the performance requirements added the quantitative values to each. 
F. SUMMARY 
As with the previous discussion of requirements language and their genesis, it is 
important to understand the origin of these concepts. However, it was the intent of the 
DSHEL team to apply these concepts to distance support, rather than to describe them 
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abstractly. KPPs, KSAs, MOEs, and MOPs were, therefore, suggested to be primarily 
focused in the same areas as the requirements discussed above, namely data transfer and 
the POI. A functional or performance requirement is an answer to a question that either 
focuses on what the system is to do, or the degree to which it is to do it. There were 
particular areas of interest for future requirements: data, its handling, processing and 
transfer, and the POI. Since a functional requirement is a statement about what the system 
is to do, the first step was to lay out simply what distance support’s functions were. DS 
involves obtaining, analyzing, and transmitting information and data. Functional 
requirements can be understood to be the qualitative analysis of a system. The functional 
requirements (19) came from the Distance Support Handbook and were then expanded 
upon in the performance requirements. Clearly, there would be more than 19 high level 
functional requirements if the latter two DS Pillars were included. For both performance 
and functional requirements, it was vital to the final integrity of the system to remember 
that requirements must be clear, not be open to interpretation. Clear, distinct requirements 
were the key to ensuring that the resultant DSHEL system was representative of the 
original idea for the system. Clarity that would affect not only the requirements written, 
but also the subsequent KPPs, KSAs, MOPs and MOEs which in turn define the true 
blueprint of the system and therefore the system itself. Requirements, KPPs, KSAs, 
MOEs, and MOPs were influenced heavily by the POI, DS requirements and needs, as 
well as security, resource management and usability concerns. 
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IV. CONCEPT DEFINITION AND DESIGN 
This chapter discusses the architectural approach that was employed in the 
development of DSHEL, as well as the design method and the actual artifact that came 
out of the application of the design process. In addition to this, a discussion of the method 
that would be used in order to test and evaluate the design as well as the validation and 
verification that the design satisfies the requirements discussed in the previous chapter. 
A. ARCHITECTURAL DESIGN APPROACH  
The approach for the architecture design was twofold in nature. First a framework 
was developed for the application of DS for maritime tactical weapon and sensor 
systems. Second this framework was applied to a specific use case for a HEL system, 
hereafter called the DSHEL system. Levis defined an analytical systems engineering 
process that begins with the system’s operational concept and includes the development 
of three separate architectures (functional, physical, and allocated) as part of the 
decomposition (Levis 1993). This section will provide an overview of these three 
architectures. 
1. Functional Architecture  
Before going into the approach that was used for developing the functional 
architecture, it was important to clarify terminology for functional architectures, as this 
was critical to establishing an understanding of the logical aspects of a system. 
a. Functional Architecture Terminology 
When considering the functional architecture of a system, it was necessary to 
distinguish between a system’s modes, states, and functions. A system mode was defined 
to be a distinct operating capability during which some or all of the system’s functions 
may be performed to a full or limited degree. These modes may be: the operational mode, 
a maintenance mode, or a particular failure mode. The DS framework that was developed 
for DSHEL was designed to be able to understand the nature of the operational mode of 
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the HEL system, detect when the HEL system had entered a particular failure mode and 
respond accordingly. 
A system state was defined as a static moment in time of the set of metrics or 
variables needed to describe in detail the system capabilities to perform the system’s 
functions. In general, the state of the system can be described by a list of state variables at 
a particular point in time (Buede 2009). The state variables do not change over time; 
however, the value of each of the state variables does change. The DSHEL system stored 
these state variables of the HEL system and performed analysis over time to determine 
whether the HEL system was staying within its operational mode.  
A system function was defined as a process that takes inputs and transforms them 
into outputs. A function was defined as a transformation and had the potential to change 
the state of the system. A function had a set of criteria under which it could be activated. 
The set of criteria included both the availability of physical resources and the arrival of a 
triggering input (Buede 2009). A function also had an exit criterion, which determined 
when the transformation of the input information into output information was complete. 
b. Functional Architecture Development 
The Integrated Definition for Functional Modeling (IDEF0) was chosen as an 
applicable model for DSHEL. IDEF0 is a graphical representation of the interactions of 
the functional and physical elements of a system. A function or activity was represented 
by a box and was described by a verb-noun phrase and numbered to provide context 
within the model. The inputs and outputs to and from the function are represented by 
arrows entering from the left and leaving from the right of each box. Additionally, 
controls or conditions under which the function may occur are shown by arrows entering 
the top of the box. Finally, mechanisms or the physical resource required to perform the 
function, are shown by arrows entering the box from the bottom (National Institute of 




 IDEF0 Syntax Figure 73.
The context diagram defines the inputs, controls, outputs, and mechanisms for a 
single, top-level function, labeled A0. The context page establishes the boundaries of the 
system or organization being modeled. Other pages of the model represent a 
decomposition of a function on a higher page following the same syntax. 
2. Physical Architecture  
The physical architecture of a system was the hierarchical description of the 
resources that comprise the system. This hierarchy began with the system and the 
system’s top-level components and progressed down to the configuration items that 
comprise each intermediate component. The physical architecture can be described either 
by a generic or instantiated physical architecture (National Institute of Standards and 
Technology 1993). DSHEL utilized a generic physical architecture as opposed to 
instantiated architecture due to the fact that the DSHEL system was theoretical. 
3. Allocated Architecture 
The allocated architecture provided a complete description of the system design 
including the functional architecture allocated to the physical architecture (National 
Institute of Standards and Technology 1993). For the DSHEL system this concept was 









mechanisms for each activity. Each physical component described in the physical 
architecture breakdown was described by a specific mechanism in the IDEF0 models. 
The IDEF0 architecture framework was chosen for the DSHEL due to the current 
emphasis on the methods of support, the Six Pillars, promulgated by the USN. 
Additionally, this provided a better mechanism to determine specific attributes that would 
be required in all aspects of the system. 
B. ARCHITECTURAL DESIGN 
This section details the applied application of the IDEF0 diagrams created. To 
assist the reader in understanding the IDEF0 diagrams, Table 11 is provided to identify 
the ICOM references as they apply to the diagrams presented in this section.  
Table 11. ICOM References 
Diagram Number ICOM Label Detailed ICOM Reference 
A0 I1 HEL System Information 
A0 I2 HEL System Casualty Report 
A0 I3 Ship Maintenance Action Form for HEL System 
A0 C1 System Faults Detected 
A0 C2 Technical Support Requested 
A0 O1 Closed Casualty Report 
A0 O2 Fleet Advisory Message Released 
A0 O3 Closed Ship Maintenance Action 
A0 O4 Tech Bulletin Released 
A0 O5 Parts Ordered 
A0 M1 DSHEL 
A1 I1 HEL System Casualty Report 
A1 I2 Ship Maintenance Action Form for HEL System 
A1 I3 System Baseline Faults 
A1 C1 Reported System Faults 
A1 C2 Technical Support Requested 
A1 O1 Closed Casualty Report 
A1 O2 Fleet Advisory Message Released 
A1 O3 Closed Ship Maintenance Action 
A1 O4 Tech Bulletin Released 
A1 O5 Parts Ordered 
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Diagram Number ICOM Label Detailed ICOM Reference 
A1 M1 Technical Assistance Interface Component 
A2 I1 HEL System Casualty Report 
A2 C1 Technical Support Requested 
A2 O1 Performance Data 
A2 O2 System Status Data 
A2 O3 Fault Data and Error Codes 
A2 M1 Remote Diagnostic Component 
A3 I1 Performance Data 
A3 I2 System Status Data 
A3 I3 Fault Data and Error Codes 
A3 I4 HEL System Information 
A3 C1 Technical Support Requested 
A3 C2 Troubleshooting Procedures 
A3 O1 System Baseline Faults 
A3 M1 Remote Connection Component 
A4 I1 HEL System Information 
A4 C1 System Faults Detected 
A4 O1 Reported System Faults 
A4 M1 Remote Monitoring Component 
 
This section also covered the proposed system/subsystem decomposition required 
by the physical architecture breakdown. The system level interface diagrams detail the 
major interfaces between the HEL system and DSHEL, as well as DSHEL and the 
shipboard network. 
1. Integrated Definition for Functional Modeling (IDEF0) 
First, the context diagram for the DSHEL system was developed, as shown in 
Figure 74. As described in the previous section, the context diagram provides the top-
level description of the system being discussed. The top-level function for the DSHEL 
system was to provide distance support services. In order to provide DS services for the 
HEL system, the DSHEL system required HEL system information. Additionally, since 
this system was studied as it applied for shipboard tactical systems, a HEL CASREP or a 
ship maintenance action form for the HEL system would also be required. These artifacts 
would provide useful information.  
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The controls that triggered the function of DS being provided were “System 
Faults Detected” and “Technical Support Requested.” The outputs for DS services 
included “Closed Casualty Report,” “Fleet Advisory Message (FAM) Released,” “Closed 
Ship Maintenance Action,” “Tech Bulletin Released,” or “Parts Ordered.” 
 
 Context Diagram Figure 74.
Once the context diagram was completed, the next diagram broke out the top level 
function into major sub functions. In the case of the DSHEL system, those major 
functions were each of the pillars of DS. This diagram is shown below in Figure 75. Per 
the design standards for IDEF0 diagram’s higher-level inputs, controls, outputs, and 
mechanisms (ICOMs) are shortened to I, C, O, and M respectively. The number assigned 
to each ICOM was determined by the position in the higher-level diagram from top to 
bottom or left to right. This diagram demonstrates that the inputs related to CASREPs 
(I2) and maintenance action forms (I3) were inputs into the first DS function “Provide 
Remote Technical Assistance” as well as the output from box 3 “System Baseline 
Faults.” The controls which activate the “Provide Remote Technical Assistance” function 
were “Technical Support Requested” (C2) or the output from function box 4 “Perform 
Remote Monitoring,” which were detected system faults.   
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All outputs from the context diagram came from the first function. Further 
analysis determined that this is due to organizational constraints within the USN. 
Currently, the policy for the USN is that all DS is initiated by the Fleet al.though from a 
shore perspective, it may be possible to reach into the system remotely to provide 
support. This is not possible without Fleet approval, and any information gained from 
these remote sessions is fed back via email. While this is the case currently, it can be 
inferred that at a later time this policy may change, and it would be possible to see the 
main outputs shift to the other functions of DS. The mechanism for box 1 was the 
technical assistance interface component. 
The second function was shown in box 2 “Perform Remote Diagnostics.” The 
input for this function was “HEL System Information” (I2). The control under which this 
function was activated was “System Faults Detected” (C2). This function produced 
several outputs; the first output from this function was “Performance Data,” which would 
be related to the performance of the HEL system. This information may include elements 
such as: the amount of beam jitter that exists, the power output of the battery storage 
system, the beam quality, and the cleanliness of the director mirrors. The second output 
of function 2 was “System Status Data.” This category could include the status of link 
data cables for the HEL system and whether all major subsystems were reporting 
operational. The last output from function 2 was “Fault Data and Error Codes” this may 
include application error codes being reported from the HEL system, or the results from 
BIT from the HEL system. The mechanism under which function 2 was completed was 
the “Remote Diagnostic Component.” 
The third function was shown in box 3 “Perform Remote Repair and Validation.” 
In addition to “HEL system information” (I1), this function took all the outputs from 
function 2. The controls for the activation of this function were both a “Request for 
Technical Assistance” and “Trouble Shooting Procedures.” Operationally speaking, when 
support is provided remotely to a system, every opportunity is made to obtain as much 
information from the system as possible before attempting a remote connection. This 
connection will be made in a bandwidth constrained environment, so it should be 
accompanied by troubleshooting procedures to minimize the duration of the remote 
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connection. The output from this function was the collection of “System Baseline Faults.” 
These “System Baseline Faults” could include a missing adaptation load or a network 
configuration setting that was out of an approved baseline. These baseline faults are 
reported back to the Fleet through email (indicated as an input to function 1). The 
mechanism under which function 3 was accomplished was the remote connection 
component. 
The last function was “Perform Remote Monitoring.” This was the proactive form 
of DS that was modeled. The input to this function was “HEL System Information.” The 
control under which this function was activated was “System Faults Being Detected.” 
What this implied was that remote monitoring of the HEL system was continuous in 
nature and that this function was actually the report out of system faults. This function 
was activated when a system fault was detected, which would result in the DSHEL 
system reporting out. This report was to be used as a way to initiate a remote tech assist, 
indicated by showing the output from function 4 as a control to function 1. The 




 Provide Distance Support Services Figure 75.
The next diagram, A1 shown in Figure 76, breaks out the “Provide Remote 
Technical Assistance” function into various sub-functions. This diagram shows three sub-
functions that make up the top-level function. Function 11 was “Provide Email Support.” 
All the outputs shown are derived from this function. This was operationally driven rather 
than system driven. The other outputs that should be noted from this function were the 
request for chat support or phone support, which served as controls for the other two 
functions in this diagram. The outputs from functions 12 and 13 are shown with tunneling 
arrows, which indicates that they are not shown on higher-level diagrams. This was 
allowed for simple functions under the IDEF0 specifications. This was used when the 
function output was simple and did not relate to any other system or function. The 
mechanisms that supported each of these functions were an email client, chat client, and 
Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) client. 
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 Provide Remote Technical Assistance Figure 76.
The next function that was broken out can be seen in A2 shown in Figure 77 
“Perform Remote Diagnostics.” These functions include “Observe System Performance,” 
“Observe System Status,” and “Observe System Faults” (21, 22, and 23 respectively). 
The aforementioned took “HEL System Information” as an input, and output “System 
Performance Data,” “System Status Data,” and “Fault Data and Error Codes.” The 
mechanism under which each of these functions was accomplished was the “Performance 
Monitoring Element,” “System Status Monitoring Element,” and the “Fault Detection 




 Perform Remote Diagnostics Figure 77.
The next decomposed function was A3, “Perform Remote Repair and Validation.” 
illustrated in Figure 78. The first sub function was 31 “Verify Adaptation Data Load.” 
This function took as an input the “HEL System Information” and provides as an output 
“System Baseline Faults.” The mechanism that would perform this function was the 
“Adaptation Data Checker.” The next function was 32 “Verify Baseline Configuration.” 
This function took as an input “HEL System Information” and provided as an output 
“System Baseline Faults.”  The mechanism that would perform this function was the 
“Configuration Baseline Manager.”  The next function was 33 “Run System Diagnostic 
Tests.”  This function took as an input “HEL System Information” as well as 
“Performance Data,” and “Fault Data and Error Codes.”  The mechanism under which 
this function was performed was the “System Diagnostic Tool.”  The output from this 
function was “System Baseline Faults.” The last function was 34 “View System Status 
Logs.” The inputs to this function are “HEL System Information,” and “System Status 
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Data.” The output from this function was “System Baseline Faults” and the mechanism 
under which this function was performed was the “Log Viewer.”  All of these functions 
would be performed when both a “Technical Assistance Request” was received from the 
Fleet and when “Troubleshooting Procedures” had been developed to perform the remote 
repair and validation. 
 
 Perform Remote Repair and Validation Figure 78.
The last major function decomposed was A4 “Perform Remote Monitoring” 
shown in Figure 79. This was the proactive type of DS which was modeled in this 
capstone. This function was made up of four sub-functions “Collect System Status 
Information,” “Collect Fault Information,” “Collect Logs,” and “Collect Performance 
Information.”  This function breakdown was very similar to the major function A2 
“Perform Remote Diagnostics.”  The difference between these two functions is that, in 
A4 the DSHEL system was continuously monitoring the HEL system and harvesting data 
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which was analyzed for discrepancies and sent back to shore for further analysis by the 
SME. All of these functions take in “HEL System Information” as the main input and 
output any “Reported System Faults.”  The control under which a system fault would be 
reported is “System Faults Are Detected.” Function 41 was performed by the “System 
Status Collection Tool.”  Function 42 was performed by the “Fault Analysis Collection 
Tool.”  Function 43 was performed by the “Log Collection Tool.”  Function 44 was 
performed by the “Performance Collection Tool.” 
 
 Perform Remote Monitoring Figure 79.
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2. Proposed DSHEL System/Subsystem 
This section introduces a notional DSHEL system sub-system design based on the 
IDEF0 diagram.  Figure 80 shows a physical breakdown hierarchy tree, which correlates 
to the IDEF0 diagrams discussed in the previous section.  
 
 
 Physical Architecture Figure 80.
It should be noted that, although the physical architecture depicted separate 





















































may be software based and covered under a single piece of software. To illustrate this 
point, a notional system design was developed to show both the physical hardware and 
software components as depicted in Figure 81. 
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 Notional DSHEL Hardware Architecture Figure 81.
The hardware architecture for the DSHEL system would consist of a high 
performance rack server that would be capable of hosting two separate virtual machine 
environments. Additionally, secure remote connection into the DSHEL system would 
occur through the use of an enterprise level KVM over IP switch. Local administration of 
the DSHEL system itself could occur through the use of the keyboard and monitor pull 
out tray. Data being stored on the system for trending and analysis, as well as backup of 
the virtual machine environments, would be satisfied through the use of an enterprise 
backup solution. It should be noted that many of the functions internal to the DSHEL 
system, such as backup and local administration, were not captured in the IDEF0 
functional analysis. The focus was on the distance support service framework and not 
necessarily the DSHEL system; therefore, this functionality was not included. If this 
design was to be moved forward, it would be advisable that the scope and analysis of the 
IDEF0 architecture be decomposed further to include the internal functionality of the 
DSHEL system. 
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The software architecture in Figure 82 illustrates a notional application of 
software to implement the various distance support services. Modern shipboard hotel 
services are provided using a Windows-based environment. Therefore, it was determined 
that the technical assistance function would best be accomplished by leveraging the 
existing shipboard infrastructure for email, chat, and VoIP services. Additionally, 
although not shown here, the DSHEL system would also inherit many of the information 
security features inherent in the shipboard network such as Firewalls, IDS/IPS, and host 
based security. The main applications providing the functionality for remote monitoring, 
diagnostics, repair and validation would be accomplished by the Red Hat Enterprise 
Linux operating environment hosting the various data processing applications. 
Leveraging a virtual infrastructure for this distance support operating environment allows 
for better redundancy and decoupled the hardware and software environments, which 
would enhance future supportability of the DSHEL system. 
 
 Notional Software Architecture Figure 82.
The hardware and software architecture for the DSHEL system are independent of 
the HEL system. This hardware could be used to monitor any tactical weapon or sensor 
system on a ship. It should be noted that although the hardware is shown as a separate 
rack of equipment, every attempt should be made to integrate this equipment into the host 
system that requires DS services. This would leverage the existing hardware and reduce 
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cost. The choice of software was based on existing best practices within the USN. In 
general Windows, Red Hat, and VMware have become the standard for the USN when it 
comes to OS and virtualization software. It was the assumption of the team that whenever 
possible, the choice of components should align to prescribed USN guidance. 
3. Notional DSHEL to HEL Interface 
This section discusses information that the DSHEL system might collect. Figure 
83 shows a notional architecture for the interface between the DSHEL system and the 
HEL system. 
 
 Notional DSHEL to HEL Interface Figure 83.
DSHEL will be collecting system performance data, as well as system faults as 
they occur. The basic HEL system and common system fault detection that would be 
onboard USN platforms was discussed next. This should in no way be interpreted as an 
exhaustive list of parameters that can be monitored in general; these parameters were 
developed given the assumptions at the time of DSHEL’s creation. This list would, in the 
future, require further refinement in the event the DSHEL system is implemented. 
A laser weapon damages a target by focusing a beam of light for a finite period of 
time on a specific aim point. The effectiveness of the weapon system depends critically 





























• the power P of the laser 
• the wavelength of light λ 
• the diameter of the primary mirror I 
• the range to the target R 
• the dwell time τD 
These are the main parameters that affect the performance of the laser; however, 
there are many other parameters which should be discussed that are of interest from a 
monitoring perspective. 
The irradiance, with typical units of watts per centimeter, represents the delivered 




Fluence, or energy per unit area, delivered by the HEL to the target represents the 
irradiance accumulated over the dwell time, and is defined as: 
𝐹𝐹 = 𝑃𝑃𝜏𝜏𝐷𝐷 � 𝜋𝜋𝐷𝐷24𝑅𝑅2𝜆𝜆2� 
The laser power, wavelength, and mirror diameter are parameter associated with 
the laser weapons system, whereas the range and dwell time depend on the engagement. 
Typically, these types of parameters are grouped separately: 
𝐹𝐹 = 𝐵𝐵 𝜏𝜏𝐷𝐷
𝑅𝑅2
 
Where the collection of source parameters is called the brightness: 
𝐵𝐵 = 𝑆𝑆 𝜋𝜋𝑃𝑃4(𝜆𝜆 𝐷𝐷⁄ )2 
The system Strehl (S) is the value less than unity representing many effects that 
might increase the effective spot size beyond the diffraction limit. When S=1, the 
maximum performance is achieved and the brightness is diffraction limited. Strehl is 
usually defined as the ratio of on-axis irradiance to the diffraction –limited on-axis 
irradiance: 
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𝑆𝑆 = 𝐼𝐼(𝑓𝑓 = 0)
𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝐿𝐿(𝑓𝑓 = 0) 
Many real-world effects are buried in the overall system Strehl, including jitter, 
atmospheric turbulence, thermal blooming, and adaptive optics effectiveness. The details 
of these phenomena are critical to the performance of most HEL weapon systems 
(Perram, Salvatore, Hengehold, and Fiorino 2010). 
In general, the DSHEL system collected information from the HEL system that 
could be used to determine the overall beam quality. This refers to monitoring the beam 
drift, jitter, scattering, absorption, turbulence, and thermal blooming. The beam control 
system attempts to maintain a small focused spot on a given aim point throughout an 
engagement. Beam control can be thought of as three separate categories of beam control, 
acquisition, and beam propagation. 
In all of these various parameters, the assumption was made that the HEL system 
was logging and monitoring all of the aforementioned parameters internal to the HEL 
system. Additionally, the assumption was made that the acquiring of this data by the 
DSHEL system can be made through simple interfaces either from standard RJ45 
Ethernet connections, RS-232/RS-422 serial connections, or USB connections. In certain 
cases it may be necessary to collect environmental data from the HEL system such as 
ambient temperature around the HEL system, or vibrational information from the 
adaptive optical sub-system. An additional assumption was made that this data was also 
being collected by the HEL system and could be acquired through standard interfaces, 
and that the data was transmitted through standard protocols such as UDP, TCP/IP, and 
SNMP.   
4. Notional DSHEL to Shipboard Network Interface 
In addition to the interface between the DSHEL system and the HEL weapons 
system, there also exists an interface between the DSHEL system and the rest of the 
shipboard network. Since the DSHEL system requires off ship connectivity, the typical 
path that the DSHEL system would take was considered. It was assumed that a typical 
shipboard environment with the necessary enclave security requirements in place such 
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that the DSHEL system could accept secure connections from off ship as well as 
transport data off ship in a secure manner. Figure 84 shows a typical shipboard 
architecture. 
 
 DSHEL to Shipboard Network Interface Figure 84.
Starting from the DSHEL system, the server would maintain a persistent 
connection to a shipboard edge transport switch. Protection at the transport layer for 
inbound/outbound connections internal to the network, as well as off ship, was provided 
through the employment of an IDS and an IPS. An IDS/IPS is a network security 
appliance that monitors network traffic for malicious activity. From the IDS/IPS, the data 
was passed to the shipboard core transport switch. Next, the signal must pass through the 
shipboard firewall. The function of the firewall in a shipboard environment is to establish 
a barrier between a trusted secure internal network (shipboard) and another network, in 
this case the SIPR/NIPR network.  
Once the data negotiates through the firewall, it would pass through the ADNS 
router, and priority would be assigned via a packet shaper. Finally, all traffic flowing off 
ship goes through a bulk network encryption device. It was assumed for the purpose of 
this capstone that the bandwidth off ship was constrained and that significant testing 
Firewallir ll
DSHELIDS/IPSI /I
ADNS Router t r Packet Shapert r
Shipboard Edge Transport Switchi r   r s rt it
Shipboard Core Transport Switchi r  r  r s rt it
Bulk Network Encryptorl  t r  r t r SHF Modem 
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would need to be accomplished in order to ensure that the level of distance support 
needed by the HEL system could be provided.  
The configuration and maintenance of this connection was critical to the ability to 
provide the DS capability. As such, it was determined that it would be necessary to 
develop a service level agreement (SLA) that would describe the connection 
configuration as well as the accepted level of performance in order to provide the DS 
capability for the HEL system. 
The entire design of the DSHEL system started with the internal functional 
analysis of the system describing the DS services which DSHEL provided and by 
utilizing the IDEF0 modeling framework. The section went on to describe the physical 
architecture of the DSHEL system, as well as notional hardware and software 
architectures. Finally, interface requirements were considered when developing the 
relationship between DSHEL and HEL, as well as between DSHEL and the shipboard 
environment. 
C. TEST AND EVALUATION 
The implementation of the DSHEL system would require significant testing to 
ensure requirements for DS are met. This section discusses the testing and evaluation that 
was scoped for DSHEL. In addition to the testing and evaluation methodology that was 
determined to be sufficient to meet the requirements for DSHEL, as well as each of the 
three phases of testing that should be pursued for implementation of the DSHEL system. 
These three phases of testing were shore-based testing, transport layer testing, and 
shipboard testing. 
1. Test and Evaluation Methodology 
Several types of test and evaluation are performed depending on the phase and 
effectiveness of the evaluation effort. These testing phases are broken into four types of 
testing. Type 1 testing would take place during the initial phase of detail design and 
covers the testing of system components for function and performance. This would 
include the testing of various operating and logistic support actions that are directly 
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comparable to tasks performed in a real operational situation. Type 2 testing is the point 
when preproduction prototype equipment, software, and formal procedures are available. 
Type 3 testing would cover the production model testing at designated test sites. Type 4 
testing would be conducted during operational utilization and support phase, measuring 
the system utilization rate to determine the total system effectiveness and on life-cycle 
costs (Blanchard and Fabrycky 2011). 
The goal of testing the DSHEL system is to provide assurance to all stakeholders 
that requirements and objectives are met. It is assumed that once the DSHEL system 
design had been formalized and executed, then the system would be tested in accordance 
with a formal test and evaluation master plan (TEMP) that was assumed to be part of the 
larger HEL acquisition program. An assumption was made that all testing related to the 
DSHEL system would align closely with the developmental and operational testing of the 
HEL system. Based on these assumptions, this section will cover in more detail the Type 
3 testing that would occur for the DSHEL system. More detail will be provided to outline 
a phased approach to testing during the initial operational test and evaluation (IOTE) 
phase of the HEL development. This will include a shore-based testing phase, transport 
layer testing phase, and shipboard testing phase. 
Testing is segregated in this fashion to separate the major interface testing from 
the integration testing. The shore based testing will be used to test the DSHEL system 
itself and the major interfaces between the DSHEL system and the HEL system. The 
transport layer testing will evaluate the major interfaces between the DSHEL system and 
the shipboard network in a land based facility excluding any connection with the HEL 
system itself. Finally, the shipboard end to end testing will cover full integration from 
HEL to DSHEL to shipboard network. 
2. Shore Based Testing 
The shore based testing includes the development and execution of system 
operational verification tests (SOVT) of the DSHEL system itself. This test ensures that 
both components, hardware and software, are operating as required. 
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The shore-based test also assesses all of the major interfaces between the DSHEL 
system and the HEL weapon system. This includes testing to ensure all formats of the 
data could be collected from the major subsystems of the HEL. The testing also evaluates 
how well the DSHEL system performs each of the major DS functions using approved 
measures of effectiveness (MOEs).  
3. Transport Layer Testing 
The transport layer testing demonstrates the connection between the DSHEL 
system and the shipboard transport layer. This also includes testing the connection 
between the ship and shore; it is used to validate the functionality of the DSHEL over a 
low bandwidth connection in a controlled environment and includes two tests. The first 
test covers the usability of the DSHEL system as a function of bandwidth. The second 
test covers the usability of the DSHEL system as a function of overall satellite delay. The 
bandwidth test would determine the lowest acceptable bandwidth in which the DSHEL 
system can operate while remaining fully functional. The satellite delay test would 
determine the longest delay time the DSHEL system can operate with before the 
connection was lost. 
4. Shipboard Testing 
The shipboard testing was the final phase in support of the DSHEL system 
integration. This testing consisted of an end-to-end test from shore to HEL. It is advisable 
that this testing be conducted in conjunction with the installation of the DSHEL system 
on a specific platform, which would usually coincide with a ship restricted availability 
(SRA). After installation of the DSHEL system on a particular ship platform, a SOVT 
was performed on the DSHEL system. This test included various internal components of 
the DSHEL system as well interfaces to the HEL system and the shipboard network. 
Following the end of the SRA period, an underway test needs to be conducted to ensure 
the DSHEL system is communicating to shore via satellite. 
Taking this phased approach to the testing and integration of the DSHEL system 
was very indicative of the ISEA process for testing used to bring a new installation onto a 
ship. This approach allows the ISEA and the OEM to determine at each phase of 
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development whether the design is mature enough and effectively identify any difficulties 
with the design prior to installation on ship. This would mitigate the overall risk to final 
installation and use of the DSHEL. 
D. VERIFICATION AND VALIDATION  
Verification and validation are procedures used together to check that the DSHEL 
system meets the requirements and specifications and that it fulfills its intended purpose. 
The Project Management Book of Knowledge (PMBOK) defines verification and 
validation as (Project Management Institute 2004): 
• Validation: the assurance that a product, service, or system meets the needs of 
the customer and other identified stakeholders. It often involves acceptance 
and suitability with external customers. 
• Verification: the evaluation of whether or not a product, service, or system 
complies with regulation, requirement, specification, or imposed condition. It 
is often an internal process.  
In general, verification is focused on determining whether the system meets the 
requirement of design. Validation is focused on whether the system meets the operational 
needs of the user. 
1. Verification and Validation Methodology 
The first step to understanding whether the requirements of a system have been 
met, is to understand which characteristics of the system require evaluation and 
assessment. Many systems in the field today lack the necessary feedback into true 
operation. It is for this reason that it is important to understand what factors need to be 
measured and what information is required to be monitored and recorded (Blanchard and 
Fabrycky 2011). Once the data requirements were defined, the next step was to design the 
DSHEL system to collect this information appropriately. Chapter II discussed the process 
by which the determination would be made for data that needed to be collected and 
monitored. Once this determination has been made, it is necessary to verify that the data 
was correct. If the determination is made that the data reveals issues with HEL, it is 
important to next consider how this information could be used to inform the program of 
design changes that might need to be made. 
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2. Verification and Validation Analysis 
The process for the Verification and Validation of the HEL System by DSHEL is 
shown in Figure 85 which was adapted from the System Evaluation and corrective action 
loop (Blanchard and Fabrycky 2011). This process included a feedback loop allowing the 
information collected from the HEL system onboard ship to provide the program office 
and stakeholder’s data which would eventually inform design decisions through 
sustainment. 
 
 Verification And Validation Feedback Loop  (after Blanchard and Figure 85.
Fabrycky 2012) 
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The process began under the assumption that most data would be collected during 
either test activities or general shipboard operation activities, (indicated by rectangular 
process blocks). The main entity for collection and processing of this information would 
be the DSHEL system (indicated by the trapezoid). Many of the collection points were 
discussed in the previous section covering the physical architecture and were therefore 
not discussed here. All raw HEL system data (indicated by the rhombus) was collected, 
formatted, and stored in the onboard DSHEL database (indicated by the three 
dimensional cylinder). Once the information was stored, through a combination of 
automated analysis tools and user analysis tools the HEL system data would be correlated 
with on shore sustainment databases (indicated by the two dimensional cylinder) and 
analyzed to collect higher level metrics on performance, system effectiveness, and 
logistic support capability (indicated by the rectangular sub process blocks with the lines 
on either side). 
These higher level metrics are to be forwarded to shore. In the event that a 
problem in the HEL system performance, effectiveness, or logistic support capability was 
detected, all relevant information related to the problem being detected is sent to shore. 
Once on shore, the problem is analyzed and correlated with historical information for the 
specific HEL baseline as well as other HEL baselines currently in operation within the 
Fleet. If historical information existed related to the observed problem, then it was used 
in conjunction with any corrective procedures that already existed to resolve the issue. 
These corrective procedures would, in many cases, fall under one of the major outputs 
from the previously described top level IDEF0 context diagram. 
In addition to the corrective action being taken to remedy the immediate problem 
being seen on the specific platform, an evaluation of whether the problem was systemic 
in nature should be accomplished. If a determination was made that the problem was 
systemic in nature, affecting the whole baseline, then an engineering change proposal 
(ECP) would be developed. 
This ECP includes an analysis of alternatives (AoA) and a long term cost analysis 
to enable the program office (PO) to make an informed decision on the HEL system 
design. Any changes that are proposed by the system engineer are to be traced back to 
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system requirements that are not being met as a result of the current design. If the ECP is 
approved, then a more formal ship change document (SCD) is initiated. An SCD is the 
only approved path for implementation of a change on a fleet ship. The SCD process will 
not be discussed here; however, if the reader wishes to understand this process further, 
the SCD process is governed under the Navy Modernization Process – Maintenance 
Operations Manual (NMP-MOM). An SCD is a living document that outlines all aspects 
of a system that might be affected by said change. This includes, not only a description of 
the changes, but an identification of all logistical impacts, distributed system impacts, a 
detailed cost benefit analysis, fielding plan, Applied Figure of Merit (AFOM), as well as 
identification of any testing that may be required for the system should this change be 
approved. 
Once the SCD had been initiated and approved by the Fleet for installation on 
hull, the information would be fed back to the DSHEL onboard ship. Updates to the 
analysis portion of the DSHEL system would inform the user of the long-term corrective 
actions in place. 
The verification and validation feedback loop for the DSHEL design provided a 
critical component to the sustainment of the HEL system that is lacking in many of the 
fielded systems today. Furthermore, the feedback loop aligns to existing USN procedures 
for configuration management (CM) and ship change processes. Any analysis done by 
the DSHEL system was not lost rather it allowed the HEL system design to mature over 
time causing the system to become more reliable. Ultimately, this would allow the 
stakeholders for the HEL system to realize a lower life-cycle total ownership cost. 
E. SUMMARY 
This chapter discussed several important factors related to the DSHEL system. 
Building on the stakeholder needs analysis and the requirements analysis that was 
discussed in Chapter II and III respectively, this chapter provided a concept definition 
and design. The chapter began with a discussion of the architectural design approach that 
was used by the team. This included a discussion of the functional physical and allocated 
architecture concepts. The chapter went into the actual architecture design for the 
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DSHEL system. Included in this effort, were the requirements which drove the 
development of the functional IDEF0 diagrams for the system, proposed system sub-
system diagrams, notional major interface diagrams between DSHEL and HEL, as well 
as the DSHEL and the shipboard network. The T&E methodology for the DSHEL 
system, as well as the verification and validation process for DSHEL, produced findings 
which would inform decisions made for the HEL throughout its life cycle. 
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V. MODELING AND SIMULATION 
The following sections detail the modeling and simulation (M&S) effort 
performed to analyze the models of DS: Status Quo Distance Support, Integrated 
Distance Support, and No Distance Support.  
The purpose of M&S is to quantify and gain insight into the effects of integrated 
DS implementation. The primary objective for M&S was to establish easy to understand, 
flexible models that can be used to make decisions on how to implement DS. A 
secondary objective was to enter unbiased, publically releasable values and distributions 
into the models to study the results. The final objective was to create a theoretical “No 
Support” model to show the effects of non-existent DS from future systems and 
platforms. 
A. MODELING AND SIMULATION METHODOLOGY 
Two complementary methods were utilized to create a complete picture of DS 
impact. A frequency model was created as a spreadsheet to assess system Ao in a format 
that is commonly reported. The second method utilized a modeling and simulation tool to 
go beyond a single number result and explore the time-based result of distance support 
implantation.  
1. Frequency Modeling 
The frequency model uses spreadsheet analysis, as is commonly performed in 
annual reviews for system effectiveness. The analysis seeks to determine HEL System 
Ao. This information was used conjunction with maintenance costs to make an effective 
AoA. Strong variation in administrative delay time and active maintenance time are 
expected between models. Benefits of this method include: common format currently 
presented to decision makers, only high-level average values are necessary for input, and 
simple calculations determine all results. The primary downside of this analysis is that a 
single value for Ao and maintenance times is produced. Larger data sets result in higher 
fidelity of decision making, whereas a single value is limiting. 
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2. Time Modeling 
The time model uses M&S tools to take basic values and answers to simple 
questions to determine time-based distributions. The analysis method also seeks to 
determine HEL Down Time, which is an input used to determining Ao.   
B. MODELING AND SIMULATION TOOLS 
Two software tools were utilized for the M&S effort: 
• Microsoft Excel 2010 
• Imagine That ExtendSim Version 9.1 
These two tools were utilized due to their familiarity and wide spread use in 
industry and USN academia. 
C. MODEL DESCRIPTION 
Three models were created for the M&S effort: Status Quo Distance Support, 
Integrated Distance Support, and No Distance Support. Below, each of these models is 
explained through in-depth analysis. 
1. Status Quo Distance Support 
The Status Quo Distance Support Model is based on level of repair analysis 
(LORA) currently implemented on most USN platforms. A basic depiction of the process 
can be seen in Figure 86 where many problems are encountered at the Organizational 
Level. Some are resolved and the rest are passed to the next level of repair, and so forth. 
The Status Quo Model depicts a multi-stage support model. There are four levels of 
support: Organizational Level Repair, Intermediate Level Repair, ISEA Level Repair, 
and Flyaway Repair. Figure 87 details the model logic and functional flow decision 
process which governs the simulation. In the model decision flow diagram, rectangles 
represent processes which cause time expenditures and diamonds represent decision 
points or path selection. 
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 Levels of Repair - Status Quo Figure 86.
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 DSHEL - Status Quo Model Decisional FlowFigure 87.
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The DSHEL – Status Quo Model Decisional Flow Diagram shows the decision 
path for system issue resolution in its current state. It represents a multi-tier level of 
support structure as described in DODD 4151.18 (United States Department of Defense 
2004): 
• Organizational-Level Maintenance. Maintenance normally performed by an 
operating unit on a day-to-day basis in support of its own operations. The 
organizational-level maintenance mission is to maintain assigned equipment 
in a full mission-capable status while continually improving the process. 
Organizational-level maintenance can be grouped under categories of 
“inspections,” “servicing,” “handling,” and “preventive maintenance.” 
• Intermediate-Level Maintenance. That materiel maintenance that is the 
responsibility of, and performed by, designated maintenance activities in 
support of using organizations. The intermediate-level maintenance mission is 
to enhance and sustain the combat readiness and mission capability of 
supported activities by providing quality and timely materiel support at the 
nearest location with the lowest practical resource expenditure. Intermediate-
level maintenance includes limited repair of commodity-orientated 
components and end items, job shop, bay, and production line operations for 
special mission requirements; repair of printed circuit boards, software 
maintenance, and fabrication or manufacture of repair parts; assemblies, 
components, and jigs and fixtures, when approved by higher levels. 
• Depot Maintenance. That materiel maintenance requiring major overhaul or a 
complete rebuilding of parts, assemblies, subassemblies, and end items, 
including the manufacture of parts, modifications, testing, and reclamation as 
required. Depot maintenance serves to support lower categories of 
maintenance by providing technical assistance and performing that 
maintenance beyond their responsibility. Depot maintenance provides stocks 
of serviceable equipment because it has available more extensive facilities for 
repair than are available in lower maintenance activities. Depot maintenance 
includes all aspects of software maintenance. 
In the decisional flow model, the sailor represents the Organizational-Level 
Maintenance. The sailor recognizes the failure and performs diagnostics on the system. If 
it is within the sailor’s ability, he will attempt repair of the system. If the sailor feels the 
problem is beyond their ability, the problem is immediately elevated to the RMC. If 
repair is attempted by the sailor, it is assessed if a part is needed. It will next be necessary 
to determine whether or not the part is available onboard. If not onboard, the part must be 
ordered through the supply system and delivered to the ship. If all required materials are 
present (a part is not needed, a part is needed but onboard, or a part is ordered and 
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received), then the repair attempt is made on the system and operationally tested. Upon 
completion of the operational test, the system is assessed as fixed or not fixed. If the 
problem is fixed, then the flow ends with a resolved issue. If the issue is assessed as not 
fixed, the sailor may or may not re-attempt repair of the issue. If re-attempt is decided, 
sailor diagnostics is repeated. If re-attempt is considered beyond the ability of the sailor, 
then the issue is elevated to the RMC. 
In the decisional flow model, the RMC represents the Intermediate-Level 
Maintenance as it relates to DODD 4151.18. The RMC receives failure notification and 
performs diagnostics on the system. If it is within the RMC’s resources and abilities, it 
will attempt to repair the system. If the RMC feels the problem is beyond its resources or 
abilities, the problem is immediately elevated to the ISEA. If repair is attempted by the 
RMC, it is assessed if a part is needed. It will next be necessary to determine whether or 
not the part is available onboard. If not onboard, the part must be ordered through the 
supply system and delivered to the ship. If all required materials are present (a part is not 
needed, a part is needed but onboard, or a part is ordered and received), then the repair 
attempt is made on the system and operationally tested. Upon completion of the 
operational test, the system is assessed as fixed or not fixed. If the problem is fixed then 
the flow ends with a resolved issue. If the issue is assessed as not fixed, the RMC may or 
may not re-attempt repair of the issue. If re-attempt is decided, RMC diagnostics is 
restarted. If re-attempt is considered beyond the ability of the RMC, then the issue is 
elevated to the ISEA. 
In the decisional flow model, the ISEA represents a second level of the 
Intermediate-Level Maintenance. The ISEA receives a failure notification and performs 
diagnostics on the system. If it is within the ISEA’s DS ability, it will attempt repair of 
the system. If the ISEA feels the problem is beyond repair through DS, the problem is 
immediately elevated to onboard support, referred to as a Flyaway Team. It consists of 
the same members as the ISEA but is specific to hands-on the system. If repair is 
attempted by the ISEA, it is assessed if a part is needed. It will next be necessary to 
determine whether or not the part is available onboard. If not onboard, the part must be 
ordered through the supply system or borrowed from resources available to the ISEA, 
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such as from test sites, borrowed from other assets not currently in need of them, such as 
those in refurbishment, high-value spares, or loaned from production material, and 
delivered to the ship. If all required materials are present (a part is not needed, a part is 
needed but onboard, or a part is ordered and received), then the repair attempt is made on 
the system and operationally tested. Upon completion of the operational test, the system 
is assessed as fixed or not fixed. If the problem is fixed then the flow ends with a 
resolved issue. If the issue is assessed as not fixed, the ISEA may or may not re-attempt 
repair of the issue remotely. If re-attempt is decided, ISEA remote diagnostics is begun 
again. If re-attempt is considered beyond the capability of affective DS, then the issue is 
elevated to the Flyaway Team. 
The Flyaway Team represents the third level of the Intermediate-Level 
Maintenance and the final level of current DS. Depot Maintenance is not present for 
corrective maintenance in most current systems. If information is needed from the 
manufacturer, it is the ISEA’s responsibility to acquire that information. For that reason, 
Depot Maintenance is not included in the Status Quo Distance Support flow chart. The 
flyaway team becomes aware of the problem through its own organization (the ISEA) 
and travels to the ship. The Flyaway Team performs diagnostics on the system. It is 
assessed if a part is needed. It will next be necessary to determine whether or not the part 
is available onboard. If not onboard, the part must be ordered through the supply system 
or borrowed from resources available to the ISEA and delivered to the ship. If all 
required materials are present (a part is not needed, a part is needed but onboard, or a part 
is ordered and received), then the repair attempt is made on the system and operationally 
tested. Upon completion of the operational test, the system is assessed as fixed or not 
fixed. If the problem is fixed then the flow ends with a resolved issue. If the issue is 
assessed as not fixed, the flyaway team must re-attempt repair until the issue is resolved. 
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 DSHEL—Status Quo ModelFigure 88.
 176 
a. Organizational Level Repair 
Organizational repair, as applied to USN DS and this model, refers to “Sailor” 
actions. The sailor is expected to follow a process to diagnose and attempt repair of the 
failed system to the best of his abilities. This procedure is the same for nearly every 
element of every combat system aboard ships. The sailor receives notification of the fault 
through automated monitoring of the system and daily operational tests. Diagnostics of 
the fault is then attempted using BIT and technical manuals. Depending on the training of 
the sailor, the severity of the apparent fault, and the resources available to attempt repair, 
the sailor can either attempt repair or defer the fault to the next level, which is the RMC. 
If repair is attempted at the organizational level, a part may or may not be needed; if it is 
needed, the part may or may not be onboard. If a part if needed and not onboard, it must 
be ordered through the supply system. After ordering, the part must be delivered to the 
ship. After receipt of the part, either through onboard spares or through the supply 
system, the part needs to be installed and operationally tested. After testing, the problem 
is either corrected or not. If the problem has not been corrected, the sailor may or may not 
re-attempt repair. If re-attempt is desired, re-diagnostics of the system is restarted. If re-
attempt of repair is not sought, the problem is deferred to the next level of support. 
b. Intermediate Level Repair 
Intermediate repair, as applied to USN DS and this model, refers to RMC actions. 
The RMC follows a process to diagnose and attempt repair of the failed system to the 
best of its abilities. This procedure is the same for nearly every element of every combat 
system aboard ships. The RMC receives notification of the fault from the sailor by 
traditional methods such as phone and email. Diagnostics of the fault is then attempted 
using data provided from the sailor and technical manuals as well as lessons learned from 
repairing systems on other platforms. Depending on the severity of the apparent fault, and 
the resources available to attempt repair, the RMC can either attempt repair or defer the 
fault to the next level, which is the ISEA. If repair is attempted at the Intermediate Level, 
a part may or may not be needed; if it is needed, the part may or may not be onboard. If a 
part if needed and not onboard, it must be ordered through the supply system. After 
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ordering, the part must be delivered to the ship. After receipt of the part, either through 
onboard spares or through the supply system, the part needs to be installed and 
operationally tested. After testing, the problem is either corrected or not. If the problem 
has not been corrected, the RMC may or may not re-attempt repair. If re-attempt is 
desired, re-diagnostics of the system is restarted. If re-attempt of repair is not sought, the 
problem is deferred to the next level of support. 
c. ISEA Level Repair 
ISEA Repair, as applied to USN DS and this model, refers to ISEA actions. 
Traditionally, depot maintenance is required after Intermediate Level Repair has failed or 
been deferred. However, because most ship systems cannot easily be removed and 
transported, the ISEA serves as the last two levels of repair for USN DS. In addition to 
having the maximum system documentation available for fault analysis, the ISEA has a 
direct relationship with the system manufacturer. The ISEA also witnesses and 
documents the most difficult system repairs across all platforms of which the system is 
installed. 
The ISEA follows a process to diagnose and attempt repair of the failed system to 
the best of its abilities. This procedure is the same for nearly every element of every 
combat system aboard ships. The ISEA receives notification of the fault from both the 
RMC and Sailor by traditional methods such as phone and email. Diagnostics of the fault 
is then attempted using data provided from the sailor and technical manuals as well as 
lessons learned from repairing systems on other platforms. Depending on the severity of 
the apparent fault, and the resources available to attempt repair, the ISEA can either 
attempt repair or defer the fault to the next level, which is Flyaway Support. The support 
is performed by the ISEA in both cases. However, if enough information cannot be 
gleaned by remote reporting means, engineers and technicians from the ISEA may elect 
to travel to the ship for repair. Remote repair is attempted first in all but the most extreme 
cases. If repair is attempted at the ISEA Level, a part may or may not be needed; if it is 
needed, the part may or may not be onboard. If a part if needed and not onboard, it must 
be ordered through the supply system. However, the ISEA has several resources that all 
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other entities do not. The ISEA, at its discretion, may scavenge parts from test systems or 
engineering models, loan parts from accumulated high-value spares, loan parts from 
future install allocations, and in extreme cases, borrow parts from the manufacturer. After 
ordering or scavenging,, the part must be delivered to the ship. The ISEA has at its 
discretion, overnight shipping. After receipt of the part, either through onboard spares or 
through the supply system, the part needs to be installed and operationally tested. After 
testing, the problem is either corrected or not. If the problem has not been corrected, the 
ISEA may or may not re-attempt repair by remote support. If re-attempt is desired, re-
diagnostics of the system is begun. If re-attempt of repair is not sought, the problem is 
deferred to the next level of support which is flyaway support by the ISEA. 
d. Flyaway Repair 
Flyaway Repair, as applied to USN DS and this model, refers to ISEA actions as 
performed aboard ship. Traditionally, depot maintenance is required as the last level of 
repair when prior repair has failed or been deferred. However, because most ship systems 
cannot easily be removed and transported, the ISEA serves as the last two levels of repair 
for USN DS. In addition to having the maximum system documentation available for 
fault analysis, the ISEA has a direct relationship with the system manufacturer. The ISEA 
also witnesses and documents the most difficult system repairs across all platforms of 
which the system is installed. The ISEA can perform diagnostics with greater ease, speed, 
and accuracy than guiding a sailor in the actions. The ISEA also has specialized tools 
available to make diagnostics and repairs.  
The ISEA flyaway team follows a process to diagnose and attempt repair of the 
failed system to the best of its abilities. This procedure is the same for nearly every 
element of every combat system aboard ships. The ISEA travels to the platform 
containing the system requiring repair. Diagnostics of the fault is then attempted using 
BIT and technical manuals as well as lessons learned from repairing systems on other 
platforms. All tests previously performed are re-run with new instrumentation. The ISEA 
must attempt repair and remain onboard until the problem is resolved. After diagnostics, 
a part may or may not be needed; if it is needed, the part may or may not be onboard. If a 
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part if needed and not onboard, it must be ordered through the supply system. However, 
the ISEA has several resources that all other entities do not. The ISEA, at its discretion, 
may scavenge parts from test systems or engineering models, loan parts from 
accumulated high-value spares, loan parts from future install allocations, and in extreme 
cases, borrow parts from the manufacturer. After ordering or scavenging, the part must be 
delivered to the ship. The ISEA has at its discretion, overnight shipping. After receipt of 
the part, either through onboard spares or through the supply system, the part needs to be 
installed and operationally tested. After testing, the problem is either corrected or not. If 
the problem has not been corrected, the ISEA re-attempts repair until the problem is 
resolved. 
2. Integrated Distance Support 
The Integrated Distance Support Model represents the model that is proposed in 
the CONOPS of this effort. The model depicts a two-stage support model involving 
distance support level repair and flyaway repair. Figure 89 details the model logic and 




 DSHEL - Integrated Distance Support Model Decisional FlowFigure 89.
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The DSHEL—Integrated Distance Support Model Decisional Flow Diagram 
shows the decision path for system issue resolution in a theoretical future state as 
proposed by this effort. It represents a two-tier level of support structure that is an 
integration and evolution of the levels of support described in DODD 4151.18 (United 
States Department of Defense 2004). A basic depiction of the process can be seen in 
Figure 89 where many problems are encountered at the distance support level repair. 
Most are resolved and the rest are passed to the flyaway repair  
In the decisional flow model, as compared to the Status Quo Model Decisional 
Flow Diagram, DS represents both the organizational-level maintenance and the first two 
levels of intermediate-level maintenance. The sailor recognizes the failure and connects 
with DS to perform diagnostics on the system. Remote diagnostics are conducted on the 
system and it is assessed if a part is needed. It will next be necessary to determine 
whether or not the part is available onboard. If not onboard, the part must be ordered 
through the supply system or borrowed from resources available to the ISEA and 
delivered to the ship. If all required materials are present (a part is not needed, a part is 
needed but onboard, or a part is ordered and received), then the repair attempt is made on 
the system and operationally tested. Upon completion of the operational test, the system 
is assessed as fixed or not fixed. If the problem is fixed then the flow ends with a 
resolved issue. If the issue is assessed as not fixed, the DS team may or may not re-
attempt repair of the issue. If re-attempt is decided, DS diagnostics are restarted. If re-
attempt is considered beyond the ability of DS, then the issue is elevated to the flyaway 
team. 
The flyaway team represents the second and the final level of integrated distance 
support. Depot maintenance is not present for corrective maintenance in most current 
systems. If information is needed from the manufacturer, it is the ISEA’s responsibility to 
acquire that information. For that reason, depot maintenance is not included in the Status 
Quo Distance Support flow chart. The flyaway team becomes aware of the problem 
though its own organization (the DS team) and travels to the ship. The flyaway team 
performs diagnostics on the system. It is assessed if a part is needed. It will next be 
necessary to determine whether or not the part is available onboard. If not onboard, the 
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part must be ordered through the supply system or borrowed from resources available to 
the ISEA and delivered to the ship. If all required materials are present (a part is not 
needed, a part is needed but onboard, or a part is ordered and received), then the repair 
attempt is made on the system and operationally tested. Upon completion of the 
operational test, the system is assessed as fixed or not fixed. If the problem is fixed then 
the flow ends with a resolved issue. If the issue is assessed as not fixed, the flyaway team 
must re-attempt repair until the issue is resolved. 
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 DSHEL - Integrated Distance Support ModelFigure 90.
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a. Distance Support Level Repair 
Distance Support Repair, as applied to USN DS and this model is referred to in 
terms of sailor, RMC, and ISEA actions performed concurrently. The DS elements follow 
a process to diagnose and attempt repair of the failed system to the best of its abilities. 
This procedure is theoretical but is designed for nearly every element of every combat 
system aboard ships. The ISEA receives notification of the fault by an automated system, 
soon after the fault is detected onboard. Details of the fault and self-tests, as well as 
historical system health becomes available on a secure server for analysis. Secure chat is 
established with the ship if the shore-side support is not notified that the fault is 
inadvertent, such as due to power loss or cycling the system. Assuming the fault detected 
is a true fault, diagnostics of the fault is then attempted using data provided from the 
system, sailor, automated fault lookup, and technical manuals as well as lessons learned 
from repairing systems on other platforms. The CONOPS for this methodology requires 
that remote support always be attempted before the only other level of support, which is 
flyaway support. Diagnostics are performed between all parties on the integrated support 
system. A part may or may not be needed; if it is needed, the part may or may not be 
onboard. If a part is needed and not onboard, it must be ordered through the supply 
system. However, the ISEA has several resources that all other entities do not. The ISEA, 
at its discretion, may scavenge parts from test systems or engineering models, loan parts 
from accumulated high-value spares, loan parts from future install allocations, and in 
extreme cases, borrow parts from the manufacturer. After ordering or scavenging, the 
part must be delivered to the ship. The ISEA has at its discretion, overnight shipping. 
After receipt of the part, either through onboard spares or through the supply system, the 
part needs to be installed and operationally tested. Testing is performed with the DS 
system reporting results back to the integrated support team, after testing the problem is 
either corrected or not. If the problem has not been corrected, re-attempt of repair by 
remote support will almost always be attempted. If re-attempt is desired, re-diagnostics of 
the system is restarted. If re-attempt of repair is not sought, the problem is deferred to the 
next level of support which is flyaway team support by the ISEA. 
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b. Flyaway Repair 
Flyaway Repair, as applied to USN DS and this model, refers to ISEA actions, as 
performed aboard ship. Traditionally, depot maintenance is required as the last level of 
repair if previous repair attempts have failed or been deferred. However, because most 
ship systems cannot easily be removed and transported, the ISEA serves as the last level 
of repair for USN DS. In addition to having the maximum system documentation 
available for fault analysis, the ISEA has a direct relationship with the system 
manufacturer. The ISEA also witnesses and documents the most difficult system repairs 
across all platforms that the system is installed on. The ISEA can perform diagnostics 
with greater ease, speed, and accuracy than guiding a sailor in the actions. The ISEA also 
has specialized tools available to make diagnostics and repairs. 
The ISEA flyaway team follows a process to diagnose and attempt repair of the 
failed system to the best of its abilities. This procedure is the same for nearly every 
element of every combat system aboard ships. The ISEA travels to the platform 
containing the system requiring repair. Diagnostics of the fault is then attempted using 
BIT and technical manuals as well as lessons learned from repairing systems on other 
platforms. All tests previously performed are re-run with new instrumentation. The ISEA 
must attempt repair and remain onboard until the problem is resolved. After diagnostics, 
a part may or may not be needed; if it is needed, the part may or may not be onboard. If a 
part if needed and not onboard, it must be ordered through the supply system. However, 
the ISEA has several resources that all other entities do not. The ISEA, at its discretion, 
may scavenge parts from test systems or engineering models, loan parts from 
accumulated high-value spares, loan parts from future install allocations, and in extreme 
cases, borrow parts from the manufacturer. After ordering or scavenging, the part must be 
delivered to the ship. The ISEA has at its discretion, overnight shipping. After receipt of 
the part, either through onboard spares or through the supply system, the part needs to be 
installed and operationally tested. After testing, the problem is either corrected or not. If 
the problem has not been corrected, the ISEA re-attempts repair until the problem is 
resolved. 
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3. No Distance Support 
The No Distance Support Model is a two level support model that consists only of 
sailor actions and contractor, in-port support. The model depicts a two-stage support 
model involving organizational level repair and contractor repair. Figure 92 details the 
model logic and functional flow decision process which governs the simulation. A basic 
depiction of the process can be seen in Figure 91 where many problems are encountered 
at the Organizational Level. Some are resolved, but most are passed to the next level of 
repair, to be performed by a contractor, when the ship is in port. The actual ExtendSim 
model used for simulation is shown as Figure 93. 
 




 DSHEL—No Distance Support Model Decisional Flow Figure 92.
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Figure 92 shows the decision path for system issue resolution in a theoretical 
current state in which DS is eliminated. It represents a major departure from the multi-tier 
level of support structure as described in DODD 4151.18. Instead it relies on only 
organizational-level maintenance and depot maintenance. 
In the decisional flow model, the sailor represents the organizational-level 
maintenance. The sailor recognizes the failure and performs diagnostics on the system. If 
it is within the sailor’s ability, he will attempt repair of the system. If the sailor exercises 
all known tech manual procedures assigned to their level of maintenance and the problem 
still exists, it is then elevated to contractor support and the system is left broken until the 
ship returns to port. If repair is attempted by the sailor, it is assessed if a part is needed. It 
will next be necessary to determine whether or not the part is available onboard. If not 
onboard, the part must be ordered through the supply system and delivered to the ship. If 
all required materials are present (a part is not needed, a part is needed but onboard, or a 
part is ordered and received), then the repair attempt is made on the system and 
operationally tested. Upon completion of the operational test, the system is assessed as 
fixed or not fixed. If the problem is fixed then the flow ends with a resolved issue. If the 
issue is assessed as not fixed, the sailor may or may not re-attempt repair of the issue. If 
re-attempt is decided, sailor diagnostics is restarted. If re-attempt is considered beyond 
the ability of the sailor, then the issue is elevated to contractor support. 
In relation to DODD 4151.18, in the decisional flow model, the contractor 
represents the depot maintenance. The contractor receives a failure notification from the 
sailor and meets the ship when it returns to port. The contractor performs diagnostics on 
the system. It is assessed if a part is needed. It will next be necessary to determine 
whether or not the part is available onboard. If not onboard, the part must be ordered 
through the supply system or borrowed from resources available to the contractor and 
delivered to the ship. If all required materials are present (a part is not needed, a part is 
needed but onboard, or a part is ordered and received), then the repair attempt is made on 
the system and operationally tested. Upon completion of the operational test, the system 
is assessed as fixed or not fixed. If the problem is fixed then the flow ends with a 
resolved issue. If the issue is assessed as not fixed, the contractor must re-attempt repair 
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 DSHEL—No Distance Support ModelFigure 93.
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a. Organizational Level Repair 
Organizational Repair, as applied to USN DS and this model is referred to in 
terms of “Sailor” actions. The sailor is expected to follow a process to diagnose and 
attempt repair of the failed system to the best of his or her abilities. This procedure is the 
same for nearly every element of every combat system aboard ships. The sailor receives 
notification of the fault through automated monitoring of the system and daily operational 
tests. Diagnostics of the fault is then attempted using BIT and technical manuals. 
Depending on the training of the sailor, the severity of the apparent fault, and the 
resources available to attempt repair, the sailor can either attempt repair or defer the fault 
to the next level. If repair is attempted at the organizational level, a part may or may not 
be needed; if it is needed, the part may or may not be onboard. If a part if needed and not 
onboard, it must be ordered through the supply system. After ordering, the part must be 
delivered to the ship. After receipt of the part, either through onboard spares or through 
the supply system, the part needs to be installed and operationally tested. After testing, 
the problem is either corrected or not. If the problem has not been corrected, the sailor 
may or may not re-attempt repair. If re-attempt is desired, re-diagnostics of the system is 
restarted. If re-attempt of repair is not sought, the problem is deferred to the next level of 
support. 
b. Contractor Repair 
Contractor repair, as applied to USN DS and this model is referred to in terms of 
contractor actions, as performed aboard ship, in port. Traditionally, depot maintenance is 
required as the last level of repair has failed or been deferred. However, the No Support 
distance support model requires the manufacturer representatives to travel to the ship to 
diagnose and repair systems as the only level of support available after organizational 
level repair efforts.  
The contractor team follows a process to diagnose and attempt repair of the failed 
system to the best of its abilities. This procedure is theoretical and is modeled to be 
generally applied. While content would be varying depending on the manufacturer and 
combat system element, the procedure should be delivered within the specification 
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written in the contract deliverables. It is assumed that the contractor travels to the 
platform containing the system requiring repair in order to meet the ship upon arrival in 
port. Diagnostics of the fault is then attempted using BIT and technical manuals as well 
as lessons learned from repairing systems on other platforms. After diagnostics, a part 
may or may not be needed; if it is needed, the part may or may not be onboard. If a part is 
needed and not onboard, it must be ordered through the supply system. However, the 
contractor has several resources that all other entities do not. The contractor may 
scavenge parts from engineering models, loan parts from future install allocations, and in 
extreme cases, manufacturer new parts. After ordering or scavenging, the part must be 
delivered to the ship. The contractor has at its discretion, overnight shipping. However, 
systems supported in this manner may not have parts available in-country and are likely 
subject to contracting activities to provide the parts. After receipt of the part, either 
through onboard spares or through the supply system, the part needs to be installed and 
operationally tested. After testing, the problem is either corrected or not. If the problem 
has not been corrected, the contractor re-attempts repair until the problem is resolved. 
D. MODEL INPUT 
The following section defines the input parameters to the models. Additionally, 
bounds and assumptions of the model are disclosed. 
1. Model Setup 
As illustrated in Figure 88, Figure 90, and Figure 93, the system fault is initialized 
by an “Initial Problem” block. This block generates a system problem at time zero. The 
problem then progresses through the model. When the issue is resolved, the age of the 
problem is calculated and recorded in a database at line one, the default line for the 
simulation. The problem is then delayed by a probability distribution represented by the 
MTBM, detailed further in this section, and exited from the simulation logic. The exit of 
the item causes the exit counter to increment by one. The counter is used to trigger the 
next problem to be created in the simulation. Additionally, the counter represents the 
current line of the database entry. So, one is added to the counter value to set the database 
line location for entry of the next problem resolution. 
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The simulation is configured to run to represent 30 systems operating for 20 years 
each. Simulations are run sequentially for ease of data collection but represent the same 
outcome as if they were run in parallel. The simulation is set to run for 600 system-years 
which equates to 5,259,600 hours shown in Table 12. A key consideration is that 
simulations with lower times to repair will have a greater number of failures over a 20-
year system life, as the system spends more time operational and subject to the MTBM. 
Table 12. Time Bases Model Time Parameter 
 Hours/Year Systems/Ship Ships Years Total 
HEL 8766 1 30 20 5,259,600 HEL Systems Hours 
 
2. Data Validation and Parameter Restriction Due to Classification 
The USN has many inconsistent sources of reliability data that is reported 
aggregated to the technical community. Detailed probability distributions of each process, 
as needed for the model, are not currently available. System performance parameters such 
as MTBF/MTBM, Ao, and mean time to repair (MTTR) are designated for official use 
only (FOUO) and above. For this reason, the models were built using aggregate 
knowledge and estimations across multiple established systems. The authors of this effort 
are self-sources for releasable estimates of distance support times and probability 
distributions for relevant USN weapon systems. In this way, no FOUO or above 
performance information is needed from any fielded systems. By drawing parallels across 
models, the differences can be studied without the need for un-releasable data. It is 
suggested as a follow-on effort to review and update USN reliability reporting to include 
detailed probability distributions for all sub-categorized resolution activities to assist in 
validating this and future DS models. 
3. Model Parameters and Assumptions 
Parameters of the models are detailed in the following sections: time scale, 
general assumptions, mean time between maintenance, mean time between failure, and 
status quo distance support values, integrated distance support values, no distance support 
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values, integrated distance support evolution from status quo distance support, and no 
distance support evolution from status quo distance support. 
a. Time Scale 
All time parameters are in hours. Because operations of a ship are day and night 
and not subject to office working hours, support and repair are to be measured the same. 
Hours in the model are assumed to be true day hours, twenty-four in a day. 
b. General Assumptions 
Values entered into this model are publically releasable. No value is 
representative of any single fielded system. These are an aggregate of multiple system 
broad estimates in order to avoid classification restrictions. When appropriate, values and 
distributions are the same across all three models in order to minimize unintended 
variation.  
The models depict the vast majority of repair attempts made to fielded systems 
and to theoretical systems. However, it does not cover all cases. It is believed that a large 
enough portion of all cases follow the models’ paths to deliver useful results. A 
suggestion for future work is to expand the model to include obscure case paths. 
c. Mean Time between Maintenance 
In the model, MTBF is substituted for MTBM and the terms are used 
interchangeably. The assumption is made that no preventative maintenance will be 
performed unless all supplies and tools are available to perform the prescribed 
maintenance. Also, it is assumed that all preventative maintenance shall take no more 
than two hours. Given the duration necessary to perform preventative maintenance is so 
small, a separate parameter was not created and the two hour duration lumped in with the 
total MTBM parameter. For clarity, the more common term of MTBF is used through the 
model. 
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d. Mean Time between Failure 
MTBF is assumed to be 500 Hours. It is also assumed that the time between 
failures follows a normal distribution. This is the same for all three models. 
e. Status Quo Distance Support Values 
Table 13. Model Parameters—Status Quo Distance Support Values 






MTBF * 268 Normal 500 100   
Sailor Diagnose 
1 
2 Normal 24 12   
Sailor Attempt Repair? 3 Percentage     80 
Sailor Need Part? 4 Percentage     80 
Part Onboard? 5 Percentage     20 
Sailor Order Part 6 Lognormal 24 12   
Sailor Receive Part 7 Lognormal 72 24   
Sailor Optest 8 Normal 12 6   
Sailor Fixed? 9 Percentage     70 
Sailor Re-Attempt Repair? 37 Percentage     10 
RMC Diagnose 
2 
48 Normal 48 24   
RMC Attempt Repair? 49 Percentage     80 
RMC Need Part? 50 Percentage     90 
Part Onboard? 51 Percentage     20 
RMC Order Part 52 Lognormal 24 12   
RMC Receive Part 53 Lognormal 72 24   
RMC Optest 54 Normal 12 6   
RMC Fixed? 55 Percentage     80 
RMC Re-Attempt Repair? 83 Percentage     10 
ISEA Diagnose 
3 
104 Normal 48 24   
ISEA Attempt Repair? 105 Percentage     95 
ISEA Need Part? 106 Percentage     90 
Part Onboard? 107 Percentage     20 
ISEA Order or Scavenge 
 
108 Lognormal 12 6   
ISEA Receive Part 109 Lognormal 24 6   
ISEA Optest 110 Normal 12 6   
ISEA Fixed? 111 Percentage     90 
ISEA Re-Attempt Repair? 139 Percentage     80 
Flyaway 
4 
187 Normal 48 24   
Flyaway Diagnose 156 Normal 24 12   
Flyaway Need Part? 158 Percentage     90 
Part Onboard? 159 Percentage     20 
ISEA Order or Scavenge 
 
160 Lognormal 12 6   
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Flyaway Receive part 161 Lognormal 24 6   
Flyaway Optest 162 Normal 6 3   
Flyaway Fixed? 201 Percentage     95 
f. Integrated Distance Support Values 
Table 14. Model Parameters—Integrated Distance Support Values 






MTBF * 63 Normal 500 100   
DS Diagnose 
1 
2 Normal 24 12   
DS Need Part? 4 Percentage     80 
Part Onboard? 5 Percentage     20 
ISEA Order or Scavenge 
 
6 Lognormal 12 6   
Sailor Receive Part 7 Lognormal 48 12   
DS Optest 8 Normal 12 6   
DS Fixed? 9 Percentage     90 
DS Re-Attempt Repair? 37 Percentage     90 
Flyaway 
2 
187 Normal 48 24   
Flyaway Diagnose 156 Normal 24 12   
Flyaway Need Part? 158 Percentage     90 
Part Onboard? 159 Percentage     20 
ISEA Order or Scavenge 
 
160 Lognormal 12 6   
Flyaway Receive Part 161 Lognormal 24 6   
Flyaway Optest 162 Normal 6 3   
Flyaway Fixed? 201 Percentage     95 
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g. No Distance Support Values 
Table 15. Model Parameters—No Distance Support Values 






MTBF * 268 Normal 500 100   
Sailor Diagnose 
1 
2 Normal 24 12   
Sailor Attempt Repair? 3 Percentage     80 
Sailor Need Part? 4 Percentage     80 
Part Onboard? 5 Percentage     5 
Sailor Order Part 6 Lognormal 24 12   
Sailor Receive Part 7 Lognormal 168 48   
Sailor Optest 8 Normal 12 6   
Sailor Fixed? 9 Percentage     20 
Sailor Re-Attempt 
 
37 Percentage     50 
Port Call 
2 
78 Lognormal 720 120   
Contractor Diagnose 48 Normal 24 12   
Contractor Need Part? 50 Percentage     90 
Part Present? 51 Percentage     20 
Order or Scavenge Part 52 Lognormal 24 12   
Contractor Receive part 53 Lognormal 96 48   
Contractor Optest 54 Normal 12 6   
 
h. Integrated Distance Support Evolution from Status Quo Distance 
Support 
Table 16 depicts the differences between the Status Quo Distance Support Model 
and the Integrated Distance Support Model as well as explanations for the value 
differences. Positive impacts on repair time are denoted in green and negative impacts are 
denoted in red. 
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Table 16. Integrated  Distance Support Evolution from Status Quo Distance Support 
 
Justification












MTBF * 268 Normal 500 100 MTBF * 63 Normal 500 100
Sailor Diagnose 2 Normal 24 12 DS Diagnose 1 2 Normal 24 12 Constrained by Sailor and Ship Operations Schedule
Sailor Attempt Repair? 3 Percentage 80
Sailor Need Part? 4 Percentage 80 DS Need Part? 4 Percentage 80
Part Onboard? 5 Percentage 20 Part Onboard? 5 Percentage 20
Sailor Order Part 6 Lognormal 24 12 ISEA Order or Scavenge Part 6 Lognormal 12 6 ISEA has part loaning and scavenging available at its discretion.
Sailor Receive Part 7 Lognormal 72 24 Sailor Receive Part 7 Lognormal 48 12 ISEA has overnight shipping available for scavenged part.
Sailor Optest 8 Normal 12 6 DS Optest 8 Normal 12 6
Sailor Fixed? 9 Percentage 70 DS Fixed? 9 Percentage 90 ISEA assistance through DS is expected to significantly improve probability of 
fault resolution.
Sailor Re-Attempt Repair? 37 Percentage 10 DS Re-Attempt Repair? 37 Percentage 90 Status Quo culture dictates passing up to the next level of repair. With DS, 
ISEA assistance is already retained. So, re-attempt by remote is highly likely.
RMC Diagnose 48 Normal 48 24
RMC Attempt Repair? 49 Percentage 80
RMC Need Part? 50 Percentage 90
Part Onboard? 51 Percentage 20
RMC Order Part 52 Lognormal 24 12
RMC Receive Part 53 Lognormal 72 24
RMC Optest 54 Normal 12 6
RMC Fixed? 55 Percentage 80
RMC Re-Attempt Repair? 83 Percentage 10
ISEA Diagnose 104 Normal 48 24
ISEA Attempt Repair? 105 Percentage 95
ISEA Need Part? 106 Percentage 90
Part Onboard? 107 Percentage 20
ISEA Order or Scavenge Part 108 Lognormal 12 6
ISEA Receive Part 109 Lognormal 24 6
ISEA Optest 110 Normal 12 6
ISEA Fixed? 111 Percentage 90
ISEA Re-Attempt Repair? 139 Percentage 80
Flyaway 187 Normal 48 24 Flyaway 187 Normal 48 24
Flyaway Diagnose 156 Normal 24 12 Flyaway Diagnose 156 Normal 24 12
Flyaway Need Part? 158 Percentage 90 Flyaway Need Part? 158 Percentage 90
Part Onboard? 159 Percentage 20 Part Onboard? 159 Percentage 20
ISEA Order or Scavenge Part 160 Lognormal 12 6 ISEA Order or Scavenge Part 160 Lognormal 12 6
Flyaway Receive part 161 Lognormal 24 6 Flyaway Receive part 161 Lognormal 24 6
Flyaway Optest 162 Normal 6 3 Flyaway Optest 162 Normal 6 3
Flyaway Fixed? 201 Percentage 95 Flyaway Fixed? 201 Percentage 95
2







Table 17. No Distance Support Evolution from Status Quo Distance  Support 
 
Justification












MTBF * 268 Normal 500 100 MTBF * 268 Normal 500 100
Sailor Diagnose 2 Normal 24 12 Sailor Diagnose 2 Normal 24 12
Sailor Attempt Repair? 3 Percentage 80 Sailor Attempt Repair? 3 Percentage 80
Sailor Need Part? 4 Percentage 80 Sailor Need Part? 4 Percentage 80
Part Onboard? 5 Percentage 20 Part Onboard? 5 Percentage 5 Minimal to no spares onboard.
Sailor Order Part 6 Lognormal 24 12 Sailor Order Part 6 Lognormal 24 12
Sailor Receive Part 7 Lognormal 72 24 Sailor Receive Part 7 Lognormal 168 48 Lack of a robust supply system support, dependence on contractor 
Sailor Optest 8 Normal 12 6 Sailor Optest 8 Normal 12 6
Sailor Fixed? 9 Percentage 70 Sailor Fixed? 9 Percentage 20 Lack of training due to dependence on contractor support.
Sailor Re-Attempt Repair? 37 Percentage 10 Sailor Re-Attempt Repair 37 Percentage 50 No help is available until port; re-attempt is significantly more likely.
RMC Diagnose 48 Normal 48 24
RMC Attempt Repair? 49 Percentage 80
RMC Need Part? 50 Percentage 90
Part Onboard? 51 Percentage 20
RMC Order Part 52 Lognormal 24 12
RMC Receive Part 53 Lognormal 72 24
RMC Optest 54 Normal 12 6
RMC Fixed? 55 Percentage 80
RMC Re-Attempt Repair? 83 Percentage 10
ISEA Diagnose 104 Normal 48 24
ISEA Attempt Repair? 105 Percentage 95
ISEA Need Part? 106 Percentage 90
Part Onboard? 107 Percentage 20
ISEA Order or Scavenge Part 108 Lognormal 12 6
ISEA Receive Part 109 Lognormal 24 6
ISEA Optest 110 Normal 12 6
ISEA Fixed? 111 Percentage 90
ISEA Re-Attempt Repair? 139 Percentage 80
Port Call * 78 Lognormal 720 120 No support method is based on leaving systems broken until the ship 
Flyaway 187 Normal 48 24 It is assumed that the contractor will be remotely notified and flyout to 
meet the ship.
Flyaway Diagnose 156 Normal 24 12 Contractor Diagnose 48 Normal 24 12
Flyaway Need Part? 158 Percentage 90 Contractor Need Part? 50 Percentage 90
Part Onboard? 159 Percentage 20 Part Present? 51 Percentage 20
ISEA Order or Scavenge Part 160 Lognormal 12 6 Order or Scavenge Part 52 Lognormal 24 12 Less spares available than a robust ISEA and supply system.
Flyaway Receive part 161 Lognormal 24 6 Contractor Receive part 53 Lognormal 96 48 Parts may be located out of country or endure contractual issues for 
Flyaway Optest 162 Normal 6 3 Contractor Optest 54 Normal 12 6 Ship's attention is divided in port.









i. No Distance Support Evolution from Status Quo Distance Support 
Table 17 depicts the differences between the Status Quo Distance Support Model 
and the No Distance Support Model as well as explanations for the value differences. 
Positive impacts on repair time are denoted in green and negative impacts are denoted in 
red. 
E. SUMMARY 
The following sections summarize the results of the M&S Effort. Details of the 
Frequency and Time Models are presented below. 
1. Frequency Models 
The results of the Frequency Models below provide a high-level analysis on MDT 
and Ao as single values. The Integrated Distance Support Model shows significant 
improvement over the Status Quo Distance Support Model, increasing Ao from 77.6% to 
85.6% without modifying the system to improve MTBM.  
The No Distance Support Model shows significant diminishment with respect to 
the Status Quo Distance Support Model, decreasing Ao from 77.6% to 61.6% without 
modifying the system to affect MTBM. Key results are denoted in bold in Table 18. 
Table 18. Frequency Models 






Mean Time Between 
Maintenance (MTBM) 500 500 500 Hours 
Mean Down Time (MDT)  
= Mbar + MLDT + MAdmDT 144 84 312 Hours 
Mean Active Maintenance Time 
(Mbar) 48 24 96 Hours 
Mean Logistics Delay Time 
(MLDT) 48 36 168 Hours 
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Mean Administrative Delay 
Time 
 
48 24 48 Hours 
     
Operational Availability (Ao) 
= MTBM/(MDT + Mbar) 0.776 0.856 0.616  
 
2. Time Models 
The results of the Time Models below provide a detailed analysis on MDT and Ao 
as probability distributions. 
a. Time Model—Status Quo Distance Support Results 
As illustrated in Figure 94, the Status Quo Distance Support Model results show 
two distinct areas of repair times. The shorter time window is believed to be a distorted 
normal distribution representing system problems fixed in one attempt, without outside 
assistance. The second window of repair times is believed to be a distorted Normal 
distribution representing multiple repair attempts and multiple repair entities 
participating. Remaining values, in excess of 200 hours are believed to be associated with 
required flyaway support and multiple rounds of re-attempted repair of the system by the 
same repair entity. 
The MDT for the Status Quo Distance Support Model is 149.0 Hours with a 
standard deviation of 91.5 Hours. The corresponding Ao is 0.770. These results are 
believed to be consistent with an aggregation of considered fielded systems. Results are 




 Status Quo Distance Support—Down Time Figure 94.
b. Time Model—Integrated Distance Support Results 
As illustrated in Figure 95, the Integrated Distance Support Model results show 
two distinct areas of repair times. The shorter time window is believed to be a distorted 
Normal distribution representing system problems fixed in one attempt. The second 
window of repair times is believed to be a distorted normal distribution representing 
multiple repair attempts. Remaining values, in excess of 140 hours are believed to be 
associated with required flyaway support and multiple rounds of re-attempted repair of 
the system. 
The MDT for the Status Distance Support Model is 83.8 Hours with a standard 
deviation of 44.9 Hours. The corresponding Ao is 0.856. These results are derived from 
status quo values, only modified for differences in the support methodologies, and 




 Integrated Distance Support—Down Time Figure 95.
c. Time Model—No Distance Support Results 
As illustrated in Figure 96, the No Distance Support Model results show two 
distinct areas of repair times. The shorter time window is believed to be an approximate 
Normal distribution representing system problems fixed by the sailor, onboard, without 
assistance. The second window of repair times represents multiple repair attempts by the 
sailor or waiting for contractor support when the ship returns to port.  
The MDT for the No Distance Support Model is 335.1 Hours with a standard 
deviation of 210.5 Hours. The corresponding Ao is 0.559. These results are derived from 
status quo values, only modified for differences in the support methodologies, and 
accepted as reasonable. Results are summarized in Table 19. 
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 No Distance Support—Down Time Figure 96.
d. Time Model—Summary Distance Support Results 
Table 19 is a summary of all three Time Model Results. The results below are 
denoted best to worst by green, yellow, and red, respectively. All model files are 
available upon request from The SE Department of NPS. 











Mean Down Time 
(MDT) 148.97 83.79 335.05 Hours 
Down Time (SD) 91.45 44.86 210.50 Hours 
Operational Availability 
(Ao) 
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VI. COST AND RISK ANALYSIS 
This chapter explores, estimates, and provides in-depth analysis regarding the 
various costs and risks associated with the realization of DSHEL. Recommendations for 
the best path forward are summarized in each of the analysis results. 
A. COST ANALYSIS APPROACH 
The following section addresses the various SE methodologies and estimation 
techniques for analyzing the cost impact of DSHEL. 
1. Systems Engineering 
The initial SE efforts during the acquisition phase of development contribute to a 
considerable amount of effort in terms of labor. This ranges from the acquisition, supply, 
technical management, system design, product realization, to the test and evaluation type 
activities which span from concept realization to operational transition. The accepted 
approach for estimating the cost of these SE activities is the Constructive Systems 
Engineering Model (COSYSMO) as leveraged in this chapter. The assumptions driving 
the COSYSMO input variables of the cost estimation model were leveraged from 
material already covered in this report, e.g., number of requirements, interfaces, and 
diversity of installation platforms. Once obtained, these values were used as the system 
size and system cost driver attributes in the NPS COSYSMO Systems Engineering Cost 
Model Advisor software tool to compute an estimate of SE cost (Madachy, COCOMO 
Suite of Constructive Cost Models 2014). 
2. Software Engineering 
The Constructive Cost Model II (COCOMO II) is widely used, thoroughly 
documented, and calibrated software cost model. COCOMO II provides a methodology 
similar to COSYSMO where the model offers insight into the root cause of cost 
variations. The overall effort is provided in person-months to help the project lead create 
an accurate schedule. One of the key inputs of this tool is the logical Source Lines of 
Code (SLOC). To obtain this, research was performed weighing the needs of DSHEL’s 
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functional requirements against available software applications. Once an application was 
selected as a candidate for estimation, a functional SLOC count was performed. To 
perform this SLOC count, a tool was leveraged from the University of Southern 
California (USC) Center for Systems and Software Engineering (CSSE), known as the 
Unified Code Count (UCC) (University of Southern California 2014). CSSE provides the 
raw open source code of UCC. This source code was compiled by the team using the 
GNU Compiler Collection G++ application under the Fedora Operating System. This tool 
was used to analyze the application candidate source code to produce SLOC metrics as a 
COCOMO II input parameter. Following this, the constructive analysis of software input 
parameters based on earlier research in this report, alongside given assumptions, were 
used to produce an overall estimate of the software engineering activities during the 
acquisition phase of DSHEL. 
3. Hardware Engineering 
Hardware cost estimates for a subsystem are unique when it comes to selecting a 
methodology. Traditionally, the Advanced Mission Cost Model (AMCM) is used for SE 
project estimations. However, that particular model is slated for large scale projects such 
as ships, tanks, and complete weapon systems. In the case of DSHEL being a small 
component, it was the recommendation of NPS Professor Raymond Madachy to cost out 
and compute directly, given that AMCM does not scale down for estimates this small in 
project size. Therefore, the proposed methodology was to perform market research of 
common naval computing equipment already used in the shipboard enterprise, select and 
compile the costs, and then multiply by the estimated number of shipboard installations 
of HEL to determine the material cost of the proposed DSHEL subsystem. 
4. Sustainment Engineering 
Sustainment engineering refers to the costs incurred by the program necessary for 
the ISEA community to sustain DSHEL once it is operational. This involves a variety of 
factors, however, the basic methodology tailored for DSHEL will include the hardware, 
software, and logistical support. For hardware, an assumption has been made regarding 
the necessary obsolescence management for the two major DSHEL components. 
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diminishing manufacturing sources and material shortages (DMSMS) processes manage 
the obsolescence of the hardware. The hardware will therefore follow the standard five 
year technical refresh model as dictated by USN ISEAs. The initial sparing cost will also 
be included. Software sustainment costs follow a similar methodology, however, 
leveraging the extension of software license management. The software process is 
computed by the annual cost of licenses multiplied by the number of shipboard 
installations of HEL. Both endeavors include the addition of: SE efforts, hardware 
engineering efforts, regression testing, and logistical efforts for engineering change 
proposal review and configuration management. 
5. Life-Cycle Cost Benefit Analysis 
To perform the cost benefit analysis, the entire life-cycle cost of DS must be taken 
into account. This includes the cost of acquisition systems, software, hardware, and 
sustainment engineering in addition to the cost per technical assistance in supporting the 
Fleet. The methodology for estimating this cost is calculated by taking the summation of 
all acquisition and sustainment costs and dividing by the expected service life. This 
results in the annual cost for DS. By taking known costs of technical assistance to the 
Fleet with and without DS, the annual cost of DSHEL can be added to the effort per each 
tech assist and plotted against the cost of no DS. In turn, the point at which the lines 
intersect is the breakeven point. This is where DSHEL begins to “pay for itself” and 
reduces life-cycle cost to the HEL program. 
B. COST ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
The following section shall present the application results from the 
aforementioned SE methodologies and estimation techniques used in analyzing the cost 
impact of DSHEL. 
1. Systems Engineering 
The system size and system cost driver attributes of the COSYSMO estimation 
methodology required numerous variables be explored and defined. This section 
iteratively explored each such variable, its relation to DSHEL based on the research 
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provided thus far in this report, and a rationale as to the selection for its attribute ranking 
based on accepted disposition definitions from the SE Cost Estimation Workbook 
(Madachy, Systems Engineering Cost Estimation Workbook 2014). 
The number of DSHEL specific “system requirements” was based on the quantity 
of those related to engineering the system interfaces, system specific algorithms, and 
operational scenarios. While these may be grouped as functional, performance, or service 
oriented, they are counted once decomposed to the lowest work breakdown structure 
allocation to avoid duplication of effort. Based on the results of the Requirements 
Analysis chapter, DSHEL had a total of 19 high level requirements. All 19 were 
determined to be difficult, given they were complex to engineer or implement, hard to 
trace to the source, contained a high degree of overlap, and required further 
decomposition from the USN Distance Support Handbook. 
The number of “system interfaces” was based on the quantity of internally shared 
physical and logical boundaries between DSHEL components and functions, as well as 
those external to the system. Formally, these can be defined by ISO/IEC 15288 defined 
system elements. Based on the results of Chapter IV, DSHEL has a total of 32 interfaces. 
Of those, 21 were determined to be easy based on the interface providing transport of 
simple uncoupled messages, being well behaved, and having strong consensus. The count 
of 21 resulted from the three interface types of keyboard, video, and mouse interfacing 
across seven main components of the platform of interest. Eleven were determined to be 
nominal given moderate complexity of the protocols, being loosely coupled, having 
moderate consensus, and predictable behavior. Among the sensor suite, beam former, 
optical bench, storage, power, and DSHEL server, none were determined to be difficult, 
composed of highly coupled or complex protocols. 
The number of “System Algorithms” was based on newly defined or altered reuse 
functions, which require mathematical functions to be created in order to meet system 
performance requirements. Given the focus of DSHEL in this report is scoped to the 
initial four pillars of DS, the number of algorithms are minimal given that the final two 
pillars of ePrognostics and Self Repair were slated for future work. Remote Monitoring 
involves an algebraic filter, which would send the appropriate system status results of 
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health, sensor, and BIT passively to the shore. Alongside these are also the network 
infrastructure status between the DSHEL system and the ship’s router, an external health 
status message to the system necessary for having situational awareness of the 
environment while troubleshooting. Given this is straightforward, algebraic, and a simple 
data type, the number of easy algorithms was determined to be four; whereas the number 
of nominal and difficult algorithms was determined to be zero. 
The number of “operational scenarios” was based on the normal stimulus-
response based operations alongside the malfunctioning scenarios in which DSHEL 
cannot operate properly (e.g., unavailable external systems, network connections or other 
interfaces, and invalid data). Given the focus of DSHEL in this report is scoped to the 
initial four pillars of DS; the normal operation count was determined to be four nominal 
scenarios. Given the areas where exception handling of HEL to DSHEL communication, 
bad data, infrastructure downtime, and satellite link malfunctions being non-normal 
operating conditions, the scenarios were determined to be two difficult and two nominal. 
The aggregate inputs for operational scenarios were then determined to be zero easy, six 
nominal, and two difficult. 
“Requirements understanding” encompasses the overall comprehension of system 
requirements by all stakeholders. While this report presents the DSHEL requirements and 
decomposes to a reasonable level, some areas were already determined to require further 
analysis given the HEL systems currently in the USN are in test bed status and not fully 
realized as a program of record (PoR). Until a final system architecture and design has 
been selected by ONR as a formal PoR, the Requirements Understanding of DSHEL shall 
remain nominal, translating to being reasonably understood with some undefined areas. 
“Architecture Understanding” relates to the difficulty in determining and 
managing the system architecture in terms of the platform, components, standards, and 
infrastructure. Similar to Requirements Understanding, this report presents the DSHEL 
architecture and decomposes to a reasonable level. The various shipboard platforms were 
addressed as various candidates, given their unique infrastructures alongside the standard 
design framework of a SSL. While the test bed has not been fully realized as a PoR, there 
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is still a strong understanding of the various architectures, GOTS systems, and few 
unfamiliar areas. The architecture understanding was determined to be high. 
“Level of Service” requirements defines the criticality and difficulty of satisfying 
KPPs, security, response time, safety, and other type “-ility” characteristics of the system. 
Given the performance and suitability requirements for DSHEL alongside the recent 
DOD memorandum of procedures for operational test and evaluation (OT&E) of 
Cybersecurity in Acquisition programs, core defense performance metrics in support of 
cyber reciprocity for HEL (via DSHEL) drive the Level of Service to be high given how 
coupled these parameters are and the impact of not meeting minimum threshold. 
“Migration Complexity” refers to the difficulty and extent which legacy systems 
can be reused, e.g., components, databases, workflows. While the DSHEL concept 
focuses on commercial and other “bolt on” distance support technologies, there exists 
limited to no legacy DS systems for reuse alongside the HEL. Merely business processes, 
lessons learned, studies, and the research from this capstone report serves as the basis for 
migration of DS into integration, development, architecture and design. Therefore, the 
migration complexity was determined to be very high. 
The overall “Technology Risk” of the system refers to the maturity, readiness, and 
obsolescence of the technology being implemented. In terms of DOD systems, there is a 
direct correlation to the Technology Readiness Level (TRL) which is used to assess 
maturity of evolving technologies during their development and early operations. 
Providing a few comparisons, a TRL of 7 describes readiness of a prototype where there 
exists a demonstration of the system in an operational environment. A TRL of 8 would 
describe readiness where an actual system has been completed and qualified through 
T&E and is ready for widespread adoption, and a TRL of 9 would describe readiness 
where the system has been proven through many operational missions. Using the 
aforementioned descriptions, DSHEL would have between a TRL of 8 and 9. Since it 
does not fully meet the readiness of TRL 9, the resulting assessment is that of TRL 8. 
This is due to the fact that distance support in the USN has already been proven through 
T&E and limited use in existing tactical systems. While not the standard in weapon or 
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combat systems, it is qualified and ready for widespread use. Therefore, the technology 
risk was determined to be low. 
Logistics artifacts such as documentation, formality, and necessary detail required 
for delivery of the DHSEL component, must be considered when taking the life-cycle 
support into account. While standard NAVSEA Logistics Center requirements mandate 
rigorous, strict standards and requirements, the detail necessary to guide the users through 
DS processes, must also leverage large amounts of documentation which are more 
rigorous relative to the life-cycle needs. This is due to the cybersecurity concerns and 
adherence to process compliance for necessary man-in-the-loop operations of DS. In turn, 
this leads the documentation assessment to be very high. 
As a subsystem component of HEL, DSHEL would then be installed upon the 
various afloat platforms targeted for directed energy mission employment. Per the focus 
of this capstone report and other studies performed by the ONR, this is to focus on 
destroyers and cruisers with an ISNS configuration and Littoral Combat Ships with a 
Total Ship Computing Environment. The number of install configurations is estimated to 
be at least three. However, all would be using industry standard protocol on a shipboard 
network. The operating environment would also meet all known operational requirements 
as shipboard data rooms are environmentally controlled for information systems. The 
diversity of “Installation Platforms was therefore determined to be high. 
The DSHEL “Recursive Levels of Design” span not only vertical and horizontal 
coordination between subsystem components, but also relate more complex 
interdependencies to coordinate the tradeoff analysis when determining which HEL 
components to monitor. Based on the architecture views previously created alongside the 
DS framework methodology, the recursive levels point to a nominal assessment. 
“Stakeholder Team Cohesion” defines how well a team collaborates. Future 
inputs to stakeholder team cohesion will most likely consist of NAVSEA, SPAWAR, 
ONR, and industry partners. The team is composed of personnel from similar 
organizations, share project culture, compatible organizational objectives, and clear roles 
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and responsibilities as defined by the warfare center technical capabilities. Therefore, 
cohesion was determined to be nominal. 
The “Team Capability” best describes the intellectual capacity and execution 
ability to analyze complex problems and manifest solutions, compared to the national 
pool of SE’s. Given that the field of DS, infrastructure, and naval engineering is 
proficient with SE, this was determined to be at least in the 75th percentile, leading to an 
assessment of high. 
“Personnel Experience and Continuity” relate to the applicability and consistency 
of the staff at the initial stage of the project, with respect to the system domain, customer, 
user, and technology. Given the pool of naval IT, infrastructure, and systems engineers 
who have already been in the test bed development stage of HEL, alongside the existence 
functional resources within the warfare centers, it is assumed there would at least be three 
years continuous experience available on average, and a turnover of less than 12%. The 
continuity was therefore determined to be nominal. 
The “Process Capability” describes the consistency and effectiveness of the 
project team performing the SE processes. Given the current industry and government 
HEL teams have defined SE processes, activities driven by benefit to the project, a 
process approach driven by the organizations involved, as well as a Capability Maturity 
Model Index (CMMI) assessment level of 3, this is synonymous with a high process 
capability per the Cost Estimation Workbook. 
“Multisite Coordination” on a USN project is an area that covers the location of 
stakeholders, team members, resources, and corporate collaboration barriers. Given the 
naval warfare centers, research labs, program offices, and test sites span the reaches of 
the country this leads to a team which is remotely collaborating at times. However, given 
criteria defined by the Cost Estimation Workbook as usage of wideband electronic 
communication, Internet based teleconference, and interactive development environments 
which employ collaborative tools and processes in place to mitigate these barriers; the 
coordination effort averages out to an assessment of high. 
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Considering the “Tool Support” coverage, integration, and maturity of toolsets in 
the naval SE environment is readily available, mature, and integrated with other 
disciplines, it is assumed these same resources will also be available to the DHSEL 
project team. The tool support was then assessed to be high. 
For consistency of other DS cost benefit studies performed, the labor rate was 
assumed to be burdened at approximately $10,000 per person month. This assumption 
was made for the reuse of Fleet technical assistance data and describes the average cost 
of technical assistance with and without distance support thereby normalizing the person 
hours used between the DSHEL estimates and existing Fleet data.  
Table 20 summarizes the input variables determined from the former analysis and 
was used as input to the COSYSMO tool, as well as the resulting estimation output in 
Figure 97 and Figure 98. 
Table 20. COSYSMO Tool Input Data 
Methodology Variable Value 
System Size - # of System Requirements (Easy) 0 
System Size - # of System Requirements (Nominal) 0 
System Size - # of System Requirements (Difficult) 19 
System Size - # of System Interfaces (Easy) 21 
System Size - # of System Interfaces (Nominal) 11 
System Size - # of System Interfaces (Difficult) 0 
System Size - # of Algorithms (Easy) 4 
System Size - # of Algorithms (Nominal) 0 
System Size - # of Algorithms (Difficult) 0 
System Size - # of Operational Scenarios (Easy) 0 
System Size - # of Operational Scenarios (Nominal) 6 
System Size - # of Operational Scenarios (Difficult) 2 
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Methodology Variable Value 
System Cost Drivers - Requirements Understanding NOMINAL 
System Cost Drivers -  Architecture Understanding HIGH 
System Cost Drivers -  Level of Service Requirements HIGH 
System Cost Drivers -  Migration Complexity VERY HIGH 
System Cost Drivers -  Technology Risk LOW 
System Cost Drivers - Documentation VERY HIGH 
System Cost Drivers - # and Diversity of Installations/Platforms HIGH 
System Cost Drivers - # of Recursive Levels in the Design NOMINAL 
System Cost Drivers - Stakeholder Team Cohesion NOMINAL 
System Cost Drivers - Personnel/Team Capability HIGH 
System Cost Drivers - Personnel Experience/Continuity NOMINAL 
System Cost Drivers - Process Capability HIGH 
System Cost Drivers - Multisite Coordination HIGH 
System Cost Drivers - Tool Support HIGH 
Maintenance Off 




 COSYSMO Data Input Figure 97.
 
 COSYSMO Analysis Results Figure 98.
Based on the resulting analysis, it can be estimated the total SE effort during 
acquisition would be 129 person months effort over a duration of seven months, totaling 
$1,290,569. 
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2. Software Engineering 
The “System Size” and “System Cost Driver” attributes of the COCOMO II 
estimation methodology required numerous variables be explored and defined. This 
section iteratively explored each variable, its relation to DSHEL, and each rationale as to 
the selection for its attribute ranking based on the accepted disposition definitions from 
the SE Cost Estimation Workbook (Madachy, Systems Engineering Cost Estimation 
Workbook 2014). 
A candidate for software use, based on the functional requirements of DSHEL, 
was performed assessing the ability to satisfy the needs of the four pillars of DS under 
evaluation. In accordance with the DOD Memorandum regarding free open source 
software (FOSS) (Department of Defense Chief Information Officer 2009), FOSS 
solutions were initially evaluated over COTS solutions, as mandated by this memo. The 
fundamental functions used in the private sector when evaluating this type of software 
falls into the realm of information technology (IT) system monitoring tools. This is an 
important factor to recognize that DSHEL, can be met with the 100% reuse of existing 
COTS or FOSS simply by providing the data in industry standard formats (e.g. SNMPv3, 
IPMI, etc.). Closed source COTS solutions, such as Splunk Enterprise (Splunk Inc.) or 
Solarwinds (Solarwinds Inc.), provide this functionality for service engineers to remotely 
monitor data centers, computing equipment, and environmental controls. After 
performing an AoA, FOSS alternative solutions were determined to be feasible: Nagios 
(Nagios Organization), Spiceworks (Spiceworks Inc.), and Zabbix (Zabbix Inc.). The 
needs of this COCOMO II estimate required ease of access to source code for analysis 
alongside little to no engineering integration involved (for the purposes of SLOC count). 
Nagios was chosen as the candidate for analysis. This was due to it having the highest 
adoption for use by the open source community, available documentation, and the source 
code for its core application and plugins were available without need to manually 
integrate. The latter options, Spiceworks and Zabbix, had drawbacks in that Spiceworks 
was recently acquired by a private company; thereby ending its continued development 
and the availability of usage. The documentation for Zabbix was limited. The UCC tool 
(v2013.4) was then used to perform an analysis on the Nagios Core application v4.0.8 
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and the Nagios Plugins v2.0.3 source code. The results are displayed in Table 22 and 
Table 23. 
Table 21. UCC Analysis Output for Nagios Core v4.0.8 
Language Name Number of Files Physical SLOC Logical SLOC 
Bash 3 4767 3835 
C_CPP 188 93681 72257 
CSS 35 1273 3252 
JavaScript 2 529 514 
Makefile 1 5 5 
Perl 16 1586 1417 
Ruby 1 95 76 
PHP 12 815 632 
HTML 7 600 340 
Total 265 103351 82328 
Table 22. UCC Analysis Output for Nagios Plugins v2.0.3 
Language Name Number of Files Physical SLOC Logical SLOC 
Bash 4 7319 5919 
C_CPP 222 59702 37841 
Makefile 2 1400 1247 
Perl 13 3013 2207 
Total 241 71434 47214 
 
The tool output categorized the various software languages used in the source 
code and provided metrics on actual number of files, alongside physical and logical 
SLOC. For the purposes of this analysis, Physical SLOC can be ignored as it is not used 
in the COCOMO II methodology; it applies only to traditional COCOMO where 
programmer comments, blank lines, and white spaces are counted. These provide no 
functional value to code execution; therefore, the improvements of COCOMO II only 
logical SLOC (lines of code executed by the computer) were counted for this this cost 
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estimation in accordance with the guidelines set by the Software Engineering Institute 
(SEI). Adding the resulting logical SLOC analysis results together, gave a reuse estimate 
of 129,542 source lines of code. 
The “Integration Required” refers to the amount of effort necessary to adapt the 
DSHEL software into its environment and test the product compared to the normal 
amount of integration and test effort for software of a comparable size. Given the 
application chosen not only meets the requirements of DSHEL, but has very few 
additional features not required in the plugins package, the amount of integration and test 
is comparable to a full IT monitoring suite. Given the available plugins with Nagios and 
the ones selected for DSHEL implementation, the Integration Required was estimated to 
be 90%. 
The reuse “Assessment and Assimilation” refers to the effort required when 
determining if a fully reused DSHEL software merits use to the application and if it is 
required to integrate its description into the overall HEL product description. Given there 
would be considerable module test and evaluation alongside additional documentation to 
adapt to HEL, the assessment and assimilation effort was rated at 6%. 
The “Precedentness” of the software describes the degree to which past 
experience applies for project execution, coupled with the relative age of the system. 
While the software chosen is widely used in the private sector and years of experience 
exist with IT System monitoring applications, the application to naval weapon systems is 
only generally familiar given the usage of DS. Given this is familiar to several previously 
developed naval PoRs, there is little need for the development of processing algorithms, 
and there exists a large organizational understanding of the DS objectives in the USN 
enterprise. The precedentedness was determined to be high. 
“Development Flexibility” is the need for the software to conform to specific 
requirements. Since the external interfaces specifications are modeled on known open 
standards such as TCP/IP and SNMPv3 for modern IEEE reporting standards, alongside 
the complete reuse of the application where only network configuration is necessary for 
basic interface, the Development Flexibility was determined to be extra high. 
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“Architecture and Risk Resolution” covers the degree of design thoroughness and 
risk elimination. Given this study has provided the DS framework, initial design, risk 
identification and mitigation paths for the identified 2–4 critical risk items, as well as a 
strong familiarity of the shipboard architecture; the rating was determined to be nominal. 
“Stakeholder Team Cohesion” defines how well a team collaborates. Future 
inputs to stakeholder team cohesion will most likely consist of NAVSEA, SPAWAR, 
ONR, and industry partners. The team is composed of personnel from similar 
organizations, share project culture, compatible organizational objectives, and clear roles 
and responsibilities as defined by the warfare center technical capabilities. Therefore, 
cohesion was determined to be nominal. 
The “Process Maturity” describes the consistency and effectiveness of the project 
team performing the SE processes. Given the current industry and government HEL 
teams have defined SE processes, activities driven by benefit to the project, a process 
approach driven by the organizations involved, as well as a CMMI assessment level of 3, 
this is synonymous with a high process capability per the Cost Estimation Workbook. 
The “Required Software Reliability” refers to the extent at which it must perform 
its intended DS function over time and the impact to operations and safety, if a failure 
occurs. DSHEL is a maintenance IT System supporting HEL. The event of DSHEL 
system failure would cause a person technical assistance to recover however the HEL 
would continue to operate. While this has a financial impact from in person travel, the 
loss is only moderate easily recoverable. Therefore, the required software reliability was 
determined to be nominal. 
The “Data Base Size” is an important factor to consider when performing a cost 
estimate for an application such as DSHEL. The rating is a logical comparison of the 
potential data base size to the existing SLOC count. This mainly focuses and drives the 
cost of test and evaluation, given the effort to generate the test data to exercise DSHEL 
and save results. Given the data base would have simulated input alongside the saved 
sensor, health status, and maintenance results of HEL, the data base would be quite large 
in bytes. Given an average data base record with twelve fields results in a storage size of 
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50 bytes, alongside a typical Navy Core Test (NCT) stress test scenario with 5000 
simulated inputs, the estimated data base size would then be: 3 data types (sensor, health, 
maintenance) * 5000 input records * 50 bytes/record + 3 data types * 5000 result records 
* 50 bytes/record = 1.5 Megabytes of data. The ratio of bytes in the database to SLOC is 
then 1,500,000 / 129,542 resulting in a ratio factor of approximately 12. By the 
COCOMO II assessment scale, this resulted in a data base size rating of nominal. 
The “Product Complexity” of DSHEL was assessed across five main areas: 
control operations, computational operations, device dependent operations, and user 
interface management options. Since the code is 100% reuse, the complexity of 
development, aligns with control operations having straight line code with few non-
nested operations. The device dependent operations have status checking of the HEL 
components, with moderately complex database operations for database queries and the 
user interface management options are provided with pre built dashboards with the option 
of using simple graphical user interface builders. The Product Complexity, given a 
variety across the main areas of assessment, therefore was determined to be low. 
“Development for Reuse” cost drivers account for the additional effort during 
acquisition such that DSHEL can be reused across other HEL platforms. Given the 
software itself is fully reused from another project, the effort is inherently low. However, 
careful design in architecture must be observed such that the DSHEL subsystem itself can 
be reused in future mods or HEL baselines. The reusability aspect was determined to be 
nominal, as the reuse design architecture was inherent from the initial components of 
DSHEL. 
Logistics artifacts such as documentation, formality, and necessary detail required 
for delivery of the DHSEL component, must be considered when taking the life-cycle 
support into account. While standard NAVSEA Logistics Center requirements mandate 
rigorous, strict standards and requirements, the detail necessary to guide the users through 
DS processes, must also leverage large amounts of documentation which are more 
rigorous relative to the life-cycle needs. This is due to the cybersecurity concerns and 
adherence to process compliance for necessary man-in-the-loop operations of DS. In turn, 
this leads the documentation assessment to be very high 
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“Analysts Capability” refers to those personnel responsible for requirements, high 
level design, and detail design. This has overlap with the SE capability also performing 
very similar efforts. Given that the field of DS, infrastructure, and naval engineering is 
competent with SE, this was determined to be at least in the 75th percentile, leading to an 
assessment of high. 
The “Programmer Capability” describes the ability, efficiency, and thoroughness 
of the software engineering alongside communication and cooperation skillsets. Given 
the code is reused, Nagios is widely known and used by the IT Administrator community, 
and the software only required modification to the configuration of the HEL system for 
SNMP traps alongside the shipboard infrastructure configuration for email and chat 
server IP addresses, the assessment rating was determined to be in the 90th percentile at 
very high. 
“Personnel Continuity” relate to the applicability and consistency of the staff at 
the initial stage of the project, with respect to the system domain, customer, user, and 
technology. Given the pool of naval IT, infrastructure, and systems engineers who have 
already been in the test bed development stage of HEL, alongside the existence functional 
resources within the warfare centers, it is assumed there would at least be three years 
continuous experience available on average, and a turnover of less than 12%. Therefore, 
the continuity was determined to be nominal. 
“Application Experience” relates to the level of experience of the team 
developing, or in the case of DSHEL software reuse, application configuration and 
installation in terms of the software subsystem. Given the DSHEL personnel 
requirements for cybersecurity workforce and information technology engineers, the team 
can assume to have application experience of at least three years to meet the project 
needs, which led to an application experience of high. 
“Platform Experience” relates to the applicability and consistency of the staff at 
the initial stage of the project, with respect to the system domain, customer, user, and 
technology. Given the pool of DE and naval systems engineers who have already been 
involved on the development stage of maritime HEL systems would also be involved in 
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the development of the DSHEL component, it is estimated by the time DSHEL would be 
integrated there would at least be three years continuous experience available on average, 
leading to an assessment of high. 
“Language and Toolset Experience” describes the measure of the software 
application experience of the team developing the DSHEL subsystem. It includes the use 
of tools that perform requirements and design representation and analysis, configuration 
management, document extraction, library management, program style and formatting, 
consistency checking, planning and control. Given these type of system design tools and 
remote monitoring applications common to those within the naval software engineering 
community and IT infrastructure domain, the language and toolset experience was 
assessed to be very high. 
The execution “Time Constraint” refers to the measure of limitation imposed on 
the reactiveness and execution of the software application. Given this is a system status 
and maintenance reporting system, not affecting the performance of the HEL, the 
execution Time Constraint was assessed to be nominal given neither real time nor near-
real time execution is required for DSHEL. 
The “Storage Constraint” parameter describes the limits on storage of data in 
memory or hard drive of the system. Given the cost of storage has dropped dramatically 
to where a stock computing storage device measured in multiples of terabytes costs less 
than $100 in FY14, alongside the already estimated database size of storing records being 
far less, the main Storage Constraint was conservatively estimated to be less than 70% 
usage of the available storage leading to an assessment of high. 
The “Platform Volatility” of DSHEL, in terms of software, refers to the relative 
frequency of change with respect to operating system, computing hardware, and HEL 
system under monitoring. Given the acquisition focus of naval weapons is to develop and 
freeze a baseline for multiple years in terms of system stability, the amount of change is 
measured to be greater than a major change every year with a minor change monthly. At 
most, the Platform Volatility in terms of the COCOMO II time constraints was assessed 
to be low. 
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The “Use of Software Tools” for DSHEL development describes the rating of 
simple tools for purposes of simple edits to coding and life-cycle management tools. 
Given the tools for editing the selected FOSS are readily available (e.g. Eclipse integrated 
development environment and subversion (SVN) configuration management version 
control software) and are well integrated with controlled processes and methods, the use 
of software tools was assessed to be very high. 
“Multisite Coordination” on a USN project is an area that covers the location of 
stakeholders, team members, resources, and corporate collaboration barriers. Given the 
naval warfare centers, research labs, program offices, and test sites span the reaches of 
the country this leads to a team which is remotely collaborating at times. However, given 
criteria defined by the Cost Estimation Workbook as usage of wideband electronic 
communication, Internet based teleconference, and interactive development environments 
which employ collaborative tools and processes in place to mitigate these barriers, the 
coordination effort averages out to an assessment of high. 
The “Required Development Schedule” constraint refers to the measure of 
limitation imposed on the development of the software application. It is a percentage ratio 
of schedule with respect to the nominal project length, or rather the available schedule to 
the nominal schedule. Given the initial PoR fielding aims to the FY18 timeframe and the 
DSHEL software reuse efforts are relatively executable in the next four years (FY14-
FY18), the normal execution of this effort would only take 1–2 person years at most. This 
is approximately 130–150% of the available execution time is estimated to be needed for 
completion before HEL is fielded. The execution time constraint was assessed to be high. 
For consistency of other distance support cost benefit studies performed, the labor 
rate was assumed to be burdened approximately $10,000 per person month. This 
assumption was made for the reuse of Fleet technical assistance data and describes the 
average cost of technical assistance with and without distance support, thereby 
normalizing the person hours used between this DSHEL estimates and existing Fleet 
data.  
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Table 23 summarizes the input variables determined from the former analysis and 
was used as input to the COCOMO II tool, as well as the resulting estimation output in 
Figure 99 and Figure 100. 
Table 23. COCOMO II Tool Input Data 
Methodology Variable Value 
Software Size - New Source Lines of Code (SLOC) 0 
Software Size - Modified Source Lines of Code (SLOC) 0 
Software Size - Reused Source Lines of Code (SLOC) 129,542 
Software Size - Reused % Integration Required 90% 
Software Size - Reused Assessment and Assimilation 6% 
Software Scale Drivers - Precedentedness HIGH 
Software Scale Drivers - Development Flexibility EXTRA HIGH 
Software Scale Drivers - Architecture / Risk Resolution NOMINAL 
Software Scale Drivers - Team Cohesion NOMINAL 
Software Scale Drivers - Process Maturity HIGH 
Software Cost Drivers Product - Required Software Reliability NOMINAL 
Software Cost Drivers Product - Database Size NOMINAL 
Software Cost Drivers Product - Product Complexity LOW 
Software Cost Drivers Product - Developed for Reusability NOMINAL 
Software Cost Drivers Product - Documentation to Life-cycle Needs VERY HIGH 
Software Cost Drivers Personnel - Analyst Capability HIGH 
Software Cost Drivers Personnel - Programmer Capability VERY HIGH 
Software Cost Drivers Personnel - Personnel Continuity NOMINAL 
Software Cost Drivers Personnel - Application Experience HIGH 
Software Cost Drivers Personnel - Platform Experience HIGH 
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Methodology Variable Value 
Software Cost Drivers Personnel - Language and Toolset Experience VERY HIGH 
Software Cost Drivers Platform - Time Constraint NOMINAL 
Software Cost Drivers Platform - Storage Constraint HIGH 
Software Cost Drivers Platform - Platform Volatility LOW 
Software Cost Drivers Project - Use of Software Tools VERY HIGH 
Software Cost Drivers Project - Multi Site Development HIGH 
Software Cost Drivers Project - Required Development Schedule HIGH 




 COCOMO II Data Input Figure 99.
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 COCOMO II Data Analysis Results Figure 100.
Based on the resulting analysis, it was estimated that the total Software 
Engineering effort during acquisition would be 45.2 person months effort over a duration 
of 16.8 months, totaling $452,246. 
3. Hardware Engineering 
The hardware engineering material cost was a straightforward identification of 
computing resources necessary to meet shipboard environment and DSHEL functional 
requirements. 
The main host of the DSHEL, an 86x64 bit architecture computer, was evaluated 
in comparison to existing AEGIS Combat System, DDG and CG ISNS, and Littoral 
Combat Ship Total Ship Computing Environment (TSCE) computing systems. The basic 
server meeting the shipboard grade B environmental shock and computing resource 
requirements for Red Hat Enterprise Linux, as well as the associate IT monitoring 
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application software, was identified as a Hewlett Packard HPDL320. The assumption to 
use existing COTS already in use on USN PoRs is that the platform is already proven 
viable in the operational environment as well as to minimize developmental logistics 
costs of the USN supply system, provisioning, tech manuals, etc. Based on market cost of 
the USN supply system, a standard configuration of the HPDL320 had an average cost in 
FY15 dollars of $1,500. 
The secondary human systems integration interface, which remotely extends the 
maintenance console of the afloat HEL, via DSHEL, to the ashore support engineer is an 
Internet protocol based keyboard video and mouse switch (iKVM). When access is 
permitted by the shipboard operators, iKVM works by taking the digital signals used 
from operator input and provide a secure encrypted TCP/IP interface via the GIG such 
that an operator can remotely login and troubleshoot a system. An evaluation of iKVMs 
in comparison to existing USN KVM switches in the supply system was made. The basic 
iKVM meets security and functional requirements of DSHEL as identified by Raritan 
Dominion KX III. The same assumption was used by existing COTS equipment in use on 
USN PoRs. These platforms have already proven viable in the operational environment 
as well as to minimize developmental logistics costs of the USN supply system, 
provisioning, and tech manuals. Based on market cost of the USN supply system, a 
standard configuration of the iKVM had an average cost in FY15 dollars of $2,000. 
The amount of data collected regarding sensors, system health, and BIT results 
require a large supply of available data storage. A typical configuration for this is a set of 
hard drives using a Redundant Array of Independent Disks (RAID) configuration. RAID 
is a technology which provides extended reliability, availability, and maintainability for 
IT systems by independently creating backups of data stored across multiple hard drives. 
In essence, failures can occur without impact to operations or loss of data. Technology 
such as RAID bundled in a network storage device is known as Network Attached 
Storage (NAS). COTS NAS devices exist in common use across the USN enterprise and 
a component common to naval weapon and combat systems is the Hewlett Packard Store 
Easy 1600 NAS. Based on market cost of the USN supply system, a standard 
configuration of the HP NAS had an average cost in FY15 dollars of $10,000. 
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Given the current test bed application of HEL has yet to reach program of record 
status or develop a HEL fielding plan, an assumption was made for producing the a cost 
estimate in terms of DSHEL development. The DDG, CG, and LCS platforms have been 
identified for future HEL employment. Therefore, a conservative estimate of 10 HEL per 
ship, resulting in 10 DSHEL per ship, alongside an additional system at the HEL land 
based test site was assumed. An estimate of miscellaneous parts necessary for installation 
(e.g., bracketing, cables, screws) was estimated at $2,000. To overcome defective units 
which fail prior to their MTBF, an initial sparing of 20% of the total 30 DSHEL was 
assumed, acquiring an additional six units. No spare units were assumed to be procured 
for the land based test site as this is normal practice given the negligible impact to 
shipboard operations. As with the production of any system, hardware costs diminish 
with a marginal benefit per unit produced and this should be taken into account when an 
actual fielding plan exists for HEL. The hardware cost estimate is indicated in Table 24 
and Table 25. 
Table 24. DSHEL Hardware Parts Breakdown Estimate 
DSHEL Components Cost Quantity Total Cost Per HEL 
Computer Server $1,500 1 $1,500 
Network Attached Storage $10,000 1 $10,000 
iKVM $2,000 1 $2,000 
Install Misc (brackets, cables) $2,000.00 1 $2,000 




Table 25. DSHEL Total Estimate Based on Number of HEL Sites and Spares 






DSHEL HW Cost 
DDG 10 2 12 $186,000 
CG 10 2 12 $186,000 
LCS 10 2 12 $186,000 
Land Based Test Site 1 0.2 1 $15,500 
    $573,500 
 
Based on the resulting analysis, it is estimated the total DSHEL COTS Hardware 
Engineering effort during acquisition would be a material cost of $573,500. 
4. Sustainment Engineering 
For estimating the hardware cost, the aforementioned sustainment methodology 
was applied taking in to account obsolescence management, engineering analysis, as well 
as logistics efforts. The cost of the replacement parts was assumed to be equivalent given 
COTS successors are relatively the same as the original unit. The engineering analysis 
effort was assumed to be two person-months at the standard labor rate of $10,000 per 
month. The effort to perform regression testing, logistics artifact updates, and change 
control review with configuration management were also assumed to be a person-month 
equally. Given the cost analysis only focuses on the DSHEL component of HEL, it can 
be assumed similar obsolescence management efforts are occurring in parallel with HEL; 
thereby leveraging the shipboard hardware installation and checkout activities as a sunk 
cost which occurs with or without the presence of DSHEL. The assumed service life of 
HEL was also assumed to be consistent with the normal 20 year system life span; life-
cycle occurrences of this effort are the number of times the event would occur between 
transition and retirement. The hardware sustainment cost estimate is shown in Table 26. 
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Table 26. DSHEL Sustainment Hardware Estimate 
Hardware Cost Qty. Life-cycle Occurrences Total 
Computer Server Obsolescence $1,500 37 3 $166,500 
NAS Spares and Obsolescence $10,000 37 3 $1,110,000 
iKVM Switch Obsolescence $2,000 37 3 $222,000 
HW Obsolescence Analysis Effort $20,000 1 3 $60,000 
HW Regression Testing $10,000 1 3 $30,000 
HW ILS Artifact Updates $10,000 1 3 $30,000 
HW ECP Review and Configuration 
Mgmt. $10,000 1 3 $30,000 
    $1,648,500 
 
For estimating the software cost, the aforementioned sustainment methodology 
was applied, taking in to account the software license management efforts of the 
operating system, engineering analysis, regression testing, as well as logistics efforts. 
Given the FOSS application chosen, Nagios, is native to the Linux platform, Red Hat 
Enterprise Linux (RHEL) was assumed as the operating system employed on DSHEL as 
is standard with most Linux based USN PoRs. The software license is a one time or 
recurring usage fee for OSs and applications. RHEL uses a subscription based license for 
expedited security and functional system patches. RHEL is open source to use given it is 
FOSS. The subscription is paying for support which is mandated in order to maintain a 
security accreditation. The annual price assumed was that of the commercial sector for 
extended support, $1,300 a year per installation (shipboard and lab). It is fair to note 
government pricing and volume purchases decrease the price; however, that is a 
contractual agreement between the government and Red Hat, beyond the scope and 
distribution disclosure of this paper. Therefore, the flat private sector price was assumed 
for input. Similarly, for the VMWare virtualization platform ESXi hypervisor, the 
licensing costs are determined per version per core of the HPDL320 server. Given the 
HPDL320 has four cores, at a licensing cost of $2000 per core; the cost per DSHEL is 
$8,000. Regression testing, engineering change proposal development and review, 
alongside configuration management and logistics processes necessary, were all assumed 
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to be a person-month each. It was assumed that since the ship platforms with the ISNS, 
CANES, and TSCE infrastructures already provide workstations to enable email and 
chat, that DSHEL would inherit this infrastructure service and not have to additionally 
install Microsoft Windows to satisfy these requirements. The cost was then applied 
towards the 30 shipboard installations of DSHEL and the single land based test site. It 
was assumed that modern web based patch distribution via the GIG shall be leveraged for 
DSHEL patch installation and update. Sailor 2.0, a system managed by SPAWAR 
Systems Center (SSC) Pacific, is used for many applications in which patches are 
downloaded and installed by the shipboard crew Information Technology Chief (ITC) or 
Fire Controlman Chief (FCC) to avoid physical visits by the ISEA or SSA for 
installation. The assumed service life of HEL was also assumed to be consistent with the 
normal 20-year system life span. Life-cycle occurrences of this effort are life span driven 
by the necessary annual renewal of licenses or required patch update periodicity. The 
periodicity of life-cycle occurrences for software differs from hardware, in that software 
licenses occur annually and patching occurs semi-annually. Therefore, the quantity 
represents how many times a year the event occurs, not including the initial year which 
transitions to operation or the disposal year. While RHEL OS licensing costs occur 
annually resulting in 18 life-cycle occurrences, the VMWare ESXi licenses are perpetual 
until a major version upgrade. The assumed software tech insertion refresh is then once 
every year for VMWare, resulting in six life-cycle occurrences. The software sustainment 
cost estimate is shown in Table 27. 
Table 27. DSHEL Sustainment Software Estimate 
Software Cost Qty. Life-cycle Occurrences Total 
Red Hat Linux Software License and Patches $1,300 31 18 $806,000 
VMWare eSXI License and Patches $8,000 31 6 $1,488,000 
SW Update/Patch Regression Testing $10,000 2 18 $400,000 
SW Update/Patch ILS Artifact Updates $10,000 2 18 $400,000 
SW ECP Review and Configuration Mgmt $10,000 2 18 $400,000 
    $3,293,400 
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In summary, the total hardware sustainment costs of $1,648,500 and software 
sustainment costs of $3,293,400 result in an aggregate DSHEL sustainment cost of 
$4,941,900 over the 20-year service life, captured in FY15 dollars. 
5. Life-Cycle Cost Benefit Analysis 
Tying together the aforementioned estimates, the purpose of this section is to 
summarize the costs associated with the acquisition and sustainment of DSHEL. This 
estimate describes the DSHEL life-cycle cost to the HEL program and determines the 
breakeven point in which DSHEL “pays for itself.” 
Incorporating the previous results from modeling and simulation, it was 
determined that the average downtime of a system with no distance support, the “status 
quo” methodology, was six days. Downtime associated with the use of a DSHEL 
component resulted in an estimate of two days. Using the cost estimates associated with 
technical assistance, an approximation can be made on the cost per event. The status quo 
methodology uses common DOD budgeting place holders for $5,000 per person, per 
week for OCONUS travel to account for airfare and hotel. A normal work day of eight 
person hours can be assumed during each day of system downtime. On average, two in 
service engineering agents are sent on site to provide assistance, typically a hardware and 
software subject matter expert. By multiplying the number of days of downtime, by eight 
hours per day, by the number of people, and finally adding the travel cost per person, an 
estimate per cost of technical assistance can be made. This estimate was then performed 
on the modeling and simulation results in Table 28. 












DSHEL 10.47375 83.79 1 $0 $60 $5,027 
M&S with 
Status Quo 18.62125 148.97 2 $10,000 $60 $18,938 
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Refining the above estimate, studies on mature legacy naval weapon systems have 
been performed by PEO IWS in relation to DS and the cost of technical assistance. The 
cost savings of execution effort provided by DS provided by this external study (Smith, 
Leonard and Jones 2012) showed cost savings where the average cost of per technical 
assistance event is $1,140 when integrated DS is employed and $15,390 with status quo 
assistance. The average cost was based on a labor rate of a $10,000 person month 
(approx. $60 per hour) burdened labor rate of onsite technicians and in service engineers, 
including travel. This data, while only applicable to legacy weapons systems, is being 
included for comparison as the M&S results are applied to DSHEL with the HEL POI. 
While the PEO IWS study provides valuable data, it was performed on legacy weapons 
systems, with a large SME support base, for systems which have been deployed in the 
Fleet for decades. The M&S was tailored towards HEL, which is a first of its kind 
weapon system and a smaller SME support base for the USN. 
Table 29 summarizes the life-cycle costs under analysis for determining when the 
amount of technical assistance requests reaches a point when DSHEL begins to pay for 
itself, also known as the “breakeven” point.  
Table 29. DSHEL Life-Cycle Cost with Downtime Estimate 
Cost Type Total 
DSHEL Acquisition Systems Engineering $1,290,569 
DSHEL Acquisition Software Engineering $452,246 
DSHEL Acquisition Hardware Engineering $573,500 
DSHEL Total Acquisition Cost $2,316,315 
DSHEL Sustainment Engineering (SE/SW/HW) $4,941,900 
DSHEL Total Life-cycle Cost $7,258,215 
DSHEL Service Life (Years) 20 
Average DSHEL Life-cycle Cost per Year $362,911 
M&S DSHEL Cost per Technical Assistance $5,027 
M&S Status Quo Cost per Technical Assistance $18,938 
Legacy DSHEL Cost per Technical Assistance $1,140 
Legacy Status Quo Cost per Technical Assistance $15,390 
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By using the known cost of technical assistance with and without distance support 
from the M&S results in this capstone, as well as the legacy PEO IWS study costs for 
comparison, the average DSHEL life-cycle cost per year can then be combined into a 
linear formula for predicting cost based on the number of technical assistance requests by 
the Fleet. These results are illustrated in Figure 101 and Figure 102. 
 
𝑀𝑀&𝑆𝑆 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑆𝑆𝑠𝑠 𝑄𝑄𝑆𝑆𝑓𝑓 𝐷𝐷𝑆𝑆 𝐶𝐶𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡 (# 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑐𝑐ℎ 𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠)  = $18,938 ∗  (# 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑐𝑐ℎ 𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠)  
 
𝑀𝑀&𝑆𝑆 𝐷𝐷𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷𝐸𝐸𝐿𝐿 𝐶𝐶𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡 (# 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑐𝑐ℎ 𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠)  = $5,027 ∗  (# 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑐𝑐ℎ 𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠)  +  $362,911  
 
𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑆𝑆𝑠𝑠 𝑄𝑄𝑆𝑆𝑓𝑓 𝐷𝐷𝑆𝑆 𝐶𝐶𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡 (# 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑐𝑐ℎ 𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠)  = $15,390 ∗  (# 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑐𝑐ℎ 𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠)  
 
𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿 𝐷𝐷𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷𝐸𝐸𝐿𝐿 𝐶𝐶𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡 (# 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑐𝑐ℎ 𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡) = $1,140 ∗  (# 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑐𝑐ℎ 𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠)  + $362,911  
 
 Annual Cost of Technical Assistance with Legacy Estimate  Figure 101.
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 Annual Cost of Technical Assistance with M&S Estimate  Figure 102.
Table 30. Annual Cost of Technical Assistance  
# Tech 
Assists 




M&S Cost  
w/ DSHEL 
M&S Cost  
w/out DSHEL 
1 $364,051 $15,390 $367,938 $18,938 
2 $365,191 $30,780 $372,966 $37,876 
3 $366,331 $46,170 $377,993 $56,815 
4 $367,471 $61,560 $383,020 $75,753 
5 $368,611 $76,950 $388,048 $94,691 
6 $369,751 $92,340 $393,075 $113,629 
7 $370,891 $107,730 $398,103 $132,567 
8 $372,031 $123,120 $403,130 $151,506 
9 $373,171 $138,510 $408,157 $170,444 
10 $374,311 $153,900 $413,185 $189,382 
11 $375,451 $169,290 $418,212 $208,320 
12 $376,591 $184,680 $423,240 $227,258 








M&S Cost  
w/ DSHEL 
M&S Cost  
w/out DSHEL 
14 $378,871 $215,460 $433,294 $265,135 
15 $380,011 $230,850 $438,322 $284,073 
16 $381,151 $246,240 $443,349 $303,011 
17 $382,291 $261,630 $448,377 $321,949 
18 $383,431 $277,020 $453,404 $340,888 
19 $384,571 $292,410 $458,431 $359,826 
20 $385,711 $307,800 $463,459 $378,764 
21 $386,851 $323,190 $468,486 $397,702 
22 $387,991 $338,580 $473,514 $416,640 
23 $389,131 $353,970 $478,541 $435,579 
24 $390,271 $369,360 $483,568 $454,517 
25 $391,411 $384,750 $488,596 $473,455 
26 $392,551 $400,140 $493,623 $492,393 
27 $393,691 $415,530 $498,651 $511,331 
28 $394,831 $430,920 $503,678 $530,270 
29 $395,971 $446,310 $508,705 $549,208 
30 $397,111 $461,700 $513,733 $568,146 
 
Initially, it can be seen that the cost of no development or inclusion of a DSHEL 
is far cheaper when the Fleet has very few technical assistance requests to support HEL. 
However, as the number of tech assists per year grows, the breakeven point becomes 
apparent (highlighted in Table 30). More specifically, 26 technical assistance requests in 
a year is the breakeven point in which DSHEL begins to “pay for itself” based on the 
legacy average cost of technical assistance study. However, given HEL is an immature 
weapon system compared to legacy systems, comparatively the tailored M&S results 
determined the breakeven point to be 27 technical assistance requests. While the plots 
intersect at a point in between 26 and 27 technical assistance requests, the breakeven 
point is rounded up to account for the fact that it is impossible to have a fraction of 
technical assistance. 
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The model not only provided additional validation to studies performed by an 
external organization, but provided validation that the relevancy and accuracy of the 
estimate is on par with the assumptions made in this cost analysis. It must be noted that 
this cost estimate was based on a limited number of ships with HEL actually employed, 
leveraging a DSHEL subsystem to enable distance support. Further expanding on the 
results from the legacy estimate, given the number of ships with HEL in this model was 
assumed to be 30, the likelihood of 27 technical assistance request per year is quite 
probable given the severe complexity of the HEL system and its introduction to the Fleet 
as a never before seen weapon system type. Future work to refine this model is necessary 
once a PoR configuration of HEL has been identified to identify a fielding plan for 
number of shipboard installations. However, even in the current legacy cost model, if 
every ship with HEL in this analysis at least submitted one help ticket request for their 
system per year, the comparison for supporting 30 technical assistance requests with 
DSHEL had an annual estimate of $513,733 compared to supporting requests without 
DSHEL at an estimate of $568,146. That result is an annual labor and travel cost savings 
of $54,413 per year, or more importantly $1.09M over the 20-year life cycle. In addition 
to the increased issue resolution and overall Ao to perform the mission, this cost benefit 
analysis has shown the significant financial savings DSHEL would provide to USN. As a 
reminder, this cost benefit is limited to the labor and travel associated with technical 
assistance. Future work involving ePrognostics and Self Repair and Healing (the latter 
two pillars of DS) is expected to reveal even greater cost savings in the failure prevention 
of expensive HEL subsystem components. 
C. RISK ANALYSIS APPROACH 
This section aimed to objectively present the findings of research theories, 
processes, DOD mandates, stakeholder requirements, and methodologies applicable to 
the risk management of the DSHEL subsystem. 
Risk is inherent to any engineering or management effort. Overall, it is the 
probability that given a series of one or more events, something with a negative outcome 
will occur. There are many ways to categorize types of risk, but for the purposes of this 
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capstone report focusing on SE of a defense program, those categories were stated in 
terms of cost, schedule, and technical performance. Cost risk is the probability which the 
allocated budget of the project will be exceeded in some manner. Schedule risk is the 
probability which the project will fail to meet key dates or milestones by a specified 
duration. Technical performance risk is the probability which the key performance 
parameters of the system are negatively affected. Regardless of the risk type, there needs 
to exist a formalized process to identify, assess, and prioritize each risk; this is known as 
risk management. 
The practice of risk management is broken down into an iterative process which 
extends the life of the program from cradle to grave. Blanchard and Fabrycky describe 
this process as follows (Blanchard and Fabrycky 2011, 692): 
1. Risk planning—includes the development of a risk management plan or a 
given program. 
2. Risk identification—includes the screening of all cost, schedule, and 
technical performance requirements and to identify which of those are 
likely not to be met. 
3. Risk assessment—pertains to determining the probability of failure to 
meet a specified requirement and the possible consequences of not 
meeting the requirement. 
4. Risk analysis—is accomplished to determine the way in which the risk can 
be eliminated or minimized (if the risk cannot be eliminated altogether). 
5. Risk handling—includes the activities associated with the incorporation of 
changes to business process or system modification which are 
recommended as a solution to the identified problem. 
While the aforementioned steps are specific in high level guidance, different 
methodologies exist for tailoring the process to best fit the project. The remaining 
sections explored a few of these methodologies, their capabilities and limitations, for the 
identification of stakeholder requirements and management of risk to DSHEL. 
1. DOD Risk Management Guide 
The Department of Defense Risk Management Guide (Department of Defense 
2006) exists to assist DOD and contractor Program Managers (PMs), Program Offices, 
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and integrated product teams (IPTs) to effectively manage risks during the life cycle of a 
program. It provides a standard framework and methodology of assessment and 
presentation which is common to all branches of DOD. By using this framework to 
manage risk, a format which is common to program managers and officers of the DOD, 
the methodology of status reporting can be normalized for the program. The RMG 
dictates that every program shall create a risk management plan specifically tailoring the 
individuals responsible for the integrated product teams, those accountable, and 
responsible for the process of risk management. 
 
 DOD Risk Management Process (after Department of Defense 2006) Figure 103.
While the plan is tailored via the SE process to best fit the need of the program, 
the general process described in the Figure 103. When risks are identified, they shall be 
expeditiously entered in to the risk management process where an IPT will assess their 
impact. Assessment is performed during the analysis phases where a number of criteria 
based on cost, schedule, and technical performance are used to determine the Likelihood 
and Consequence of occurrence. Table 31 displays the standard nomenclature for 
translating probability of occurrence to the wording of a given likelihood. This is to be 
used when another standard doesn’t already exist to refine and supersede the assessment 
criteria presented in the RMG. For the purposes of DSHEL, the team also included 
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NAVSEAINST 9410.2A for Warfare System Certification or MILSTD-882G for Safety 
assessments to better refine the risk model.  
Table 31. Risk Analysis for Levels of Likelihood (from Department of Defense 2006) 






d 1 Not Likely ~10% 
2 Low Likelihood ~30% 
3 Likely ~50% 
4 Highly Likely ~70% 
5 Near Certainty ~90% 
 
Consequence assessment, however, is more involved as it is assessing the impact 
in relationship to cost, schedule, and performance. Cost and schedule are based upon 
known quantities of the project and how a risk could impact a given percentage of the 
budgeted resource. Those details are outlined in the risk management plan when such 
project details are known; however, this capstone will later identify and refine risks 
following methodology assessments based on the cost analysis and projection scale. 
Technical performance impact requires a breadth of technical knowledge of the system 
risk being analyzed to properly categorize impact. However, just as with the likelihood 
criteria, the RMG provides a boilerplate guideline which is allowed to be superseded 
when other DOD instructions exist, which refine or tailor the process. For the purposes of 
DSHEL, the team also included the DOD Information Assurance Risk Management 




Table 32. DOD Levels and Type of Consequence Criteria (Department of Defense 2006) 
Level Technical Performance Schedule Cost 
1 Minimal or no consequences to technical performance 
Minimal or no 
impact 
Minimal or no 
impact 
2 
Minor reduction in technical 
performance or supportability, 
can be tolerated with little or no 
impact on program 
Able to meet key 
dates 
 
Slip < * day(s) 
Budget increase or 
unit production cost 
increases 
 
< ** (1% of Budget) 
3 
Moderate reduction in technical 
performance or supportability 
with limited impact on program 
objectives 
Minor schedule slip. 
Able to meet key 
milestones with no 
schedule float 
 
Slip < * day(s) 
 
Sub-system 
slip > * day(s) plus 
available float 
Budget increase or 
unit production cost 
increases 
 
< ** (5% of Budget) 
4 
Significant degradation in 
technical performance or major 
shortfall in supportability; may 




Slip < * days 
Budget increase or 
unit production cost 
increase 
 
< ** (10% of 
Budget) 
5 
Severe degradation in technical 
performance; cannot meet KPP or 
key technical/supportability 
threshold; supportability; will 
jeopardize program success 
Cannot meet key 
program milestones 
 




> ** (10% of 
Budget) 
 
Following analysis, the risk mitigation path is equally as involved and important. 
This is where the IPT decides the best path forward to manage the risk before it occurs 
(or mitigate the issue if it has already manifested itself). This kicks off an iterative 
process of planning, executing, and status reporting until the risk can be minimized or 
eliminated altogether. The status is tracked and continuously reported out to the Project 
Manager by the systems engineer. A feedback loop exists in the process for refinement. 
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An example of a risk status reporting matrix can be seen in Figure 104 showing a 
“stoplight” assessment where the likelihood and consequence results fall into a risk area 
of high (red), medium (yellow), or low (green). 
 
 Example Risk Matrix Figure 104.
Overall, the DOD RMG provides the necessary framework to facilitate effective 
communication of DSHEL risk in a manner which is familiar to programmatic 
stakeholders. It is the recommended methodology by DOD to formalize risk management 
into the process familiar to the organization such that the IPTs can focus their energy 
more on managing risk rather than explaining a unique unfamiliarity. 
2. DOD Risk Management Framework 
The DOD Information Assurance Risk Management Framework (RMF) ties 
together the aforementioned topics of cybersecurity and risk management. This process is 
meant to better refine the technical impact of risk when it relates to information 
assurance. The overall instruction derives from the National Institute of Standards and 
Technology (NIST) 800–53 and better aligns the DOD with the rest of the Federal 
government in how it shall identify, assess, manage, and report cybersecurity risk. While 
the specific implementation of the Naval Instruction tailoring for DON has not been 
released at the time of this writing, it shall align with the RMF. Therefore, this capstone 
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report focused on the instruction set forth by DOD with the caveat that when creating a 
DSHEL further refinement and tailoring for the USN RMF process. DOD is not requiring 
immediate transition to the RMF upon release in order to allow time for critical 
supporting guidance, automated tool updates, and training from DOD and the 
components to be developed and released. By FY15, the DON chief information officer 
(DON CIO) will release policy addressing component specific guidance regarding 
transition of all DON information systems and platform IT systems to the RMF in 
accordance with the DOD timelines (Department of Navy 2014). 
Where the RMF specifically aligns with the DOD RMG, is in the assessment 
portion of the risk management process. During development of a system, for purposes of 
accreditation, the information technology system shall be identified as an information 
system, platform information technology, IT services, or IT products as indicated in 
Figure 105.  
 
 DOD Information Technology Categorization for RMF (from Department Figure 105.
of Defense 2014) 
Based on a system’s required functionality and capabilities, once it is categorized, 
the RMF provides a set of cybersecurity requirements alongside STIGs as well as 
whether or not the system requires an authorization in addition to risk assessment. Not all 
requirements can be 100% implemented as it would degrade performance of the system 
from executing some functions. RMF dictates that as many of the requirements as 
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feasible shall be implemented until required functionality or technical performance is 
impacted and design cannot be mitigated to accommodate the security control. At this 
point whatever security vulnerabilities are left open must be identified as known risks to 
the system and can be assessed for consequence in accordance with the Committee of 
National Security Systems Instruction CNSSI-1253. Cybersecurity has created its own 
sub framework for risk management, it is the amount a risk the program office, customer, 
and certification officials are willing to accept based on required functionality therewith 
the mitigation of security vulnerabilities which remain. 
The RMF process shows the certification and authorization procedures necessary 
for IA. The assessment step, the fourth box, can directly correlate and report out to the 
overall risk management process for conveying risk to the project sponsor. In tandem, it 
provides a dual feedback loop where the sponsor can be informed of overall 
programmatic risk. While specific to cybersecurity, the risk can be conveyed to the 
designation officials determining if the system is secure enough to obtain certification. 
The RMF consists of the steps depicted in Figure 106. This process parallels the system 
life cycle with the RMF activities being initiated (a program or system inception, i.e., 
documented during capabilities identification or at the implementation of a major system 
modification). Per the updated instruction, “failure to initiate the RMF at system or 
program inception is not a justification for ignoring or not complying with the RMF” 
(Department of Defense 2014, 27). While the full details are contained in the instruction 
itself, this necessity is not to be taken lightly. The proper management of cybersecurity in 
accordance with RMF is the responsibility of all programs in DOD. Passive stakeholder 
requirements will need to be captured in any project’s risk management plan such that in 
addition to cost, schedule, and technical performance, cybersecurity becomes a technical 
subset of the performance categorization. 
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 RMF for Information Systems and PIT Systems (from Department of Defense 2014) Figure 106.
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In accordance with the NAVSEA Warfare System Certification criteria defined in 
NAVSEAINST 9410.2A, the following risk assessment priorities have been defined with 
respect to IA and the impacts to certification and systems performance. It must be noted, 
that unlike the DOD RMG which assess risk with Consequence 1 being the best case and 
Consequence 5 being the worst, the rating factor is switched where there worst case is 
Consequence 1 and best case is Consequence 5. The worst case, Consequence 1, defines 
risk as a “Problem that negatively impacts information systems security posture and 
results in the loss of authority to operate (ATO)” (Naval Sea Systems Command 2012). 
Consequence 2 defines risk as a “Problem (that) degrades / adversely affects information 
security posture and results in a reduced set of capabilities.” Consequence 3 defines risk 
as a “Problem that degrades/adversely affects information systems security posture but 
allows an interim authority to operate (IATO).” Consequences 4 and 5 do not provide any 
definitions to assess information assurance related risk, as beyond level three they do not 
impact certification. At this point, the consequence can be treated generically as any other 
technical impact, where a Consequence 4 “Problem results in user/operator 
inconvenience or annoyance and does not affect required operational or mission essential 
capability (or) results in a minor system degradation that does not prevent ownership 
accomplishment of an operational or mission critical/essential function and/or ship 
operations.” Consequence 5 defines risk as “An error that does not affect the system or 
operator from accomplishing a function in accordance with system requirements; a 
specification error that does not affect the software; an error that does not affect warfare 
systems operations.”  
3. Tailored Risk Management Methodology 
By leveraging the aforementioned guidance on cybersecurity, warfare systems 
certification, and resulting cost analysis, the DOD RMG table for assessing risk 
consequence was tailored for DSHEL technical performance, schedule, and cost. With 
regards to cybersecurity, the risk assessment relating to warfare systems certification 
shall be included into the appropriate technical performance areas; their consequences 
obviously being switched to align properly given the assessment scale for RMG goes 
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from 1 to 5, and warfare systems certification goes from 5 to 1, describing best to worst 
case. Schedule was leveraged from the COSYSMO and COCOMO II estimates, with 
initial SE efforts supporting Software in parallel with an estimate of 16.8 person months 
(67 person weeks). Given the development of a detailed project schedule is beyond the 
scope of this study, the higher level COCOMO schedule was used to identify key periods 
and milestones: 2.1 months for the inception phase, 6.3 months for the elaboration phase, 
10.5 months for construction, and 2.1 months for transition to operation. The individual 
phases will be used to assess duration impact to meet key dates, with the assumption that 
25–30% float exists to accommodate a schedule slip within an individual phase. Given 
the project’s critical elaboration phase has only 6.3 months (25.2 weeks) for execution, 
these estimates approximately 7.5 weeks of slippage until the critical path is affected. The 
resulting schedule impacts were then assessed proportionately. Finally, with respect to 
Cost, the total budget for DSHEL acquisition was estimated to be $2,316,315, whereas 
1% impact would be $23,163, 5% would be $115,816, and 10% would be $231,632 
respectively. Table 33shows the resulting risk management assessment criteria, tailored 
for the specifics of DSHEL. 
Table 33. DSHEL Tailored Risk Management Assessment Criteria (after Department of 
Defense 2006) 
Level Technical Performance Schedule Cost 
1 Minimal or no consequences to technical performance 
Minimal or no 
impact 
Minimal or no 
impact 
2 
Minor reduction in technical 
performance or supportability, can 
be tolerated with little or no impact 
on program 
Able to meet key 
dates 
Slip < 2 Weeks 
Budget increase 




Level Technical Performance Schedule Cost 
3 
Moderate reduction in technical 
performance or supportability with 
limited impact on program 
objectives 
Problem that degrades/adversely 
affects information systems security 
posture but allows an Interim 
Authority to Operate (IATO) 
Minor schedule 
slip. Able to meet 
key milestones with 
no schedule float 
Slip < 3.25 Weeks 
Sub-system slip > 
3.25 Weeks plus 
available float 
Budget increase 




Significant degradation in technical 
performance or major shortfall in 
supportability; may jeopardize 
program success 
Problem degrades / adversely affects 
information security posture and 




Slip < 7.5 Weeks 
Budget increase 




Severe degradation in technical 
performance; Cannot meet KPP or 
key technical/supportability 
threshold; supportability; will 
jeopardize program success 
Problem that negatively impacts 
information systems security posture 
and results in the loss of ATO 
Cannot meet key 
program milestones 




D. RISK ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
The following section applies the tailored risk management assessment criteria to 
risks identified during the research of DSHEL. This included assessments of likelihood 
and consequence, alongside recommended mitigations. 
1. Risk 1—Maturity of RMA Data 
Accurate data of a system regarding its components reliability, maintainability, 
and availability presents a complex issue when planning for DS. Real world data is 
needed for refined results that represent an operational maritime environment; however, 
this is not readily available for a first of its kind system such as HEL. Not knowing the 
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true reliability of these laser components leads to the possibility of over monitoring HEL 
components or not monitoring the correct ones. Fortunately, many of the HEL 
components require system monitoring for normal operations to compute battle damage 
assessment as well as determining ready to fire status. The critical components will most 
likely be monitored and their status made available for DSHEL to pull. However, the risk 
exists that without operationally RMA data, it is unknown exactly which HEL 
components merit monitoring in a maritime environment and a critical component may 
not be monitored. 
• Risk Nomenclature: (R1) Maturity of RMA Data 
• Consequence: Moderate reduction in technical performance or supportability 
with limited impact on program objectives  
• Likelihood: Likely ~ 50% 
• Recommended Mitigation: Directed Energy SME analysis is necessary in 
tandem with logistical efforts to create Failure Mode, Effects, and Criticality 
Analysis (FMECA) to predict and identify critical parts for sensorization. 
FMECA is a required logistics artifact necessary as entrance criteria to present 
at Milestone B, finalized by Milestone C. By leveraging this data, an educated 
prediction can be made with respect to monitor the correct parts and refined 
over time as the system operates and real world data is collected. 
The R1 risk assessment is determined to be (Consequence = 3, Likelihood = 3). 
2. Risk 2— Common USN Data Format 
The USN has moved away from MILSTD type requirements for transmitting and 
reporting system status, leaning more towards the recommendation that a program will 
use open standards. While this gives flexibility to the contractors, it results in a wide 
diversity in data reporting formats across all USN systems, resulting in not having a 
single program of record software application which can read and reuse this data. To 
minimize the cost of DS by reuse of existing COTS/FOSS software applications, it is 
imperative that a standardized open format is chosen for use, and that HEL reports its 
data in this format to DSHEL. The data format requirement from DSHEL recommends a 
common industry standard reporting format on HEL to help mitigate this, such as simple 
network management protocol version 3 (SNMPv3). Without doing this, the risk is that 
DSHEL will not be able to integrate, read, and report status ashore to meet its mission 
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requirements. It is not likely that this would happen as HEL is early in the development 
cycle and this requirement is being proposed early on for the inclusion of DSHEL. 
• Risk Nomenclature: (R2) Common USN Data Format not defined 
• Consequence: Cannot meet key technical/supportability threshold and will 
jeopardize program success  
• Likelihood: Near Certainty ~ 90%  
• Recommended Mitigation: Require use of industry standard IEEE defined 
data formats for HEL sensorization, health monitoring, and test results 
(SNMPv3) such that FOSS can be leveraged for software functionality. 
The R2 risk assessment is determined to be (Consequence = 5, Likelihood = 5). 
3. Risk 3—Classification of HEL Data 
The classification of weapon system data, specifically HEL, drives the 
cybersecurity requirements and controls necessary to obtain an ATO. HEL is unique in its 
application, as it is a ship self-defense weapon and an extremely accurate long range 
optical sight which could be used as an ancillary shipboard sensor. The former use, as 
ship self-defense, is typically unclassified. However, shipboard sensors and optical sights 
typically have a classified data set as they provide unique information used to create 
tracks managed by the ship’s combat system. The risk is that an assumption is made to 
use DSHEL with an unclassified data set when in the future the classification of HEL 
could be escalated given an ancillary use, thereby invalidating the existing DSHEL 
cybersecurity accreditation. 
• Risk Nomenclature: (R3) Classification of HEL Data 
• Consequence: Problem that negatively impacts information systems security 
posture and results in the loss or inability to obtain ATO 
• Likelihood: Not Likely ~ 10% 
• Recommended Mitigation: Assume worst case that HEL data is classified and 
structure security posture to satisfy these controls with the RMF 
confidentiality rating of high  
The R3 risk assessment is determined to be (Consequence = 5, Likelihood = 1). 
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4. Risk 4—Hardware Processing Drives Software Licensing Costs 
The use of COTS/FOSS software comes with OEM license agreements for 
operational usage and support in the form of patches and updates. Regardless of the 
operational usage or performance requirements, licensing is sometimes based on the 
number of processing cores on the computer’s central processing unit (CPU). Given that 
the cost of CPU performance is relatively cheap, hardware engineers have the risk of 
“gold plating” their choice of computing servers and using processors which are above 
and beyond what is necessary. The software operating platform was chosen to run 
virtualized on top of VMWare ESXi to minimize risk of future hardware technology 
refresh. Virtualization adds an abstraction layer between the operating system and 
computing hardware, thereby making the hardware appear static to the operating system 
no matter what the choice of hardware is. This incurs an upfront cost of software 
licensing to minimize the risk of integration efforts further on in the life cycle when 
hardware driver issues or software library compatibility typically has issues with 
hardware upgrades. The overall risk is that given this choice of architecture, choosing a 




• Risk Nomenclature: (R4) Hardware Processing Drives Software Licensing 
Costs 
• Consequence: Exceeds APB threshold > $231,632 
• Likelihood: Low Likelihood ~ 30%  
• Recommended Mitigation: SE must enable and manage communication 
between hardware and software engineering teams that “gold plating” of a 
computer server processor impacts software licensing costs, set objective and 
threshold requirements for processor cores. 
The R4 risk assessment is determined to be (Consequence = 5, Likelihood = 2). 
5. Risk 5—Training 
The shipboard process of enabling distance support for active methods, such as 
remote repair or remote technical assistance, mandates a “man in the loop” philosophy to 
ensure the oversight, control, and operational security necessary to protect the system. 
Given active DS methodologies are not common or organic to naval weapon systems, it 
is imperative that detail standard operating procedures, technical manuals, and training 
are present to ensure process is adhered to in the interest of cybersecurity and mission 
success. The risk of not following process would delay the responsiveness of DS and 
increase system downtime. 
• Risk Nomenclature: (R5) Training 
• Consequence: Moderate reduction in supportability with limited impact on 
program objectives. 
• Likelihood: Low Likelihood ~ 30%  
• Recommended Mitigation: Detailed documentation and hands on sailor 
training at ISEA Laboratory to ensure the user is familiar with DSHEL usage 
and DS process adherence. 
The R5 risk assessment is determined to be (Consequence = 3, Likelihood = 2). 
6. Risk 6—Integration 
As the HEL is being developed, components and their internal level of integration 
are in flux. DSHEL depends on known interfaces and message types to enable mission 
success. As the HEL progresses to a mature program of record, the risk of change 
impacts integration efforts, causing setbacks to reconfigure DSHEL to monitor the 
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appropriate components. While there is an expected common message type, the HEL 
architecture and its interfaces must be relatively static to complete successful integration 
efforts. 
• Risk Nomenclature: (R6) Integration 
• Consequence: Minor schedule slip, able to meet key milestones, slip < 3.25 
Weeks 
• Likelihood: Highly Likely ~ 70%  
• Recommended Mitigation: HEL engineering changes during development 
shall identify impacted interfaces, physical and logical. These interfaces shall 
be captured in a detailed interface control document and specification. A 
change to any HEL interface will trigger review by the DSHEL team for 
integration impact. 
The R6 risk assessment is determined to be (Consequence = 3, Likelihood = 4). 
E. SUMMARY 
The following risk matrix, shown in Figure 107, is an aggregate rollup of all risks 
identified with the SE efforts associated with DSHEL. While a majority of the risk is 
medium (yellow), the mitigation paths presented can effectively prevent or mitigate this 
risk from occurring to achieve successful realization of DSHEL. 
 
 DSHEL Risk Matrix Figure 107.
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• Risk Matrix Key 
R1 = Maturity of RMA Data 
R2 = Common USN Data Format 
R3 = Classification of HEL Data 
R4 = Hardware Processing Drives Software Licensing Costs 
R5 = Training 
R6 = Integration 
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VII. CAPSTONE SUMMARY 
A. TECHNICAL OUTCOMES 
The first section of Technical Outcomes covers the development of the distance 
support decision process, which gave the support provider the ability to determine how 
much distance support is required and to what level the system might be sensorized. The 
second section discusses the modeling and simulation findings derived from an existing 
distance support process. The last section details the findings related to the cost analysis 
that was performed for the DSHEL system. 
1. Distance Support Decision Process 
In determining how much DS is required and to what level a system must be 
sensorized, an analysis of the POI as well as the PSP culture and strategy must be 
conducted. The PSP culture and strategy must first be understood in order to know what 
type of DS is needed. This raised the question of whether DS was a product or a service. 
This is dependent on PSP culture and how execution of DS is delivered. However, the 
PSP strategy must also be taken into account, as an organization will evolve over time. 
Providing quality DS is the progressive evolution of a PSP creating an environment in 
which they are no longer involved. 
DS for a POI begins with the understanding of the POI’s environment and 
interface interactions. A holistic systems view must be taken. DS is not isolated to one 
DS element: PSP, ESI, or POI. DS is the effective collaboration of these elements 
through SLAs and OLAs within the enterprise ecosystem. Only when these interactions 
and business process flows are understood, can an analysis of the POI begin. The POI 
must be classified as an “independent platform” or as a “guest platform contained within 
a host platform.” This classification offers insight into the next decision, DSX 
configuration. The multiple DSX configurations (integrated – single-point all inclusive, 
encompassing – single-point semi inclusive, distributed – multipoint all inclusive, 
distributed – multipoint semi inclusive) offer the PSP flexibility in terms of POI life-
cycle phase, cost, capability, scalability, and complexity. These are used to meet the 
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minimum data picture completeness threshold to provide meaningful I2DF in delivering 
quality DS. 
The level of sensorization and sensor collection network topology chosen by the 
PSP for the POI is highly dependent on the minimum data picture completeness threshold 
set by the PSP. Once the above steps are met, the PSP executes a POI system 
decomposition to an acceptable level where the I2DF set is adequately detailed. These 
components are then analyzed for inherent sensor capabilities and are either sensorized or 
added to the sensor collection network with characteristics as defined by the POI SMEs. 
2. Modeling Distance Support  
Through the employment of modeling and simulation tools, the effects of three 
types (no DS, status quo DS, integrated DS) of distance support were analyzed. The time-
based analysis showed significant reduction in mean down time (MDT) for integrated 
distance support while it significantly increased for no distance support in relation to the 
status quo. Reduction in MDT, ceteris paribus, causes improvement in Ao. The baseline 
status quo distance support model indicated a MDT of 149.0 hours, a standard deviation 
of 91.5 hours, with a resulting Ao of 0.770. Integrated distance support showed 
significant improvement with a MDT of 83.8 hours, a standard deviation of 44.9 hours, 
with a resulting Ao of 0.856. Conversely, elimination of distance support was detrimental 
to reliability with a mean downtime of 335.1 hours, a standard deviation of 210.5 hours, 
and Ao of 0.559. The M&S portion of this study details the simulated downtime 
distributions that are suggested for use in future distance support decision making as 
related to HEL and other USN systems. 
3. Cost Analysis 
By applying the high-level requirements set, which drove the DS framework, 
architecture interfaces, and M&S results to standard systems engineering cost estimation 
methodologies based on COSYSMO and COCOMO II, cost savings were shown over the 
life cycle of HEL. This analysis, based on a 20 year life cycle of HEL installed on 30 
shipboard platforms, resulted in an estimate of $7,258,215 for the addition of a DSHEL 
component, an average of $362,911 a year. The cost of a system, throughout its life cycle, 
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is thereby shown to grow based on how much support it requires and cost per technical 
assistance. By incorporating the estimated DSHEL life-cycle cost with the M&S results 
for estimated downtime, a cost per technical assistance was determined to show the 
eventual breakeven point in which a distance support subsystem, such as DSHEL, would 
pay for itself. Given 30 HEL platforms, the integrated results from M&S have shown that 
DSHEL would begin to show a return on investment once 27 technical assistance 
requests have occurred as shown in Figure 108. This accounts for the fact that a fractional 
technical assistance request is impossible and that it must round up to the next technical 
assistance request to cross the break-even point. 
 
 Annual Cost of Technical Assistance Figure 108.
Overall, given the complexity of a system such as HEL being first of its kind in 
the Fleet, it is reasonable to assume at least 27 technical assistance requests a year are 
resolved by distance support, thereby alleviating unnecessary travel and labor associated 
with “boots on deck” support by an ISEA. The cost analysis has shown that DSHEL will 
eventually pay for itself and provide cost savings over the life cycle of the HEL platform. 
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4. Research Question Findings 
The following research questions were answered by this capstone report:  
• How will DS affect the overall cost and risk in HEL shipboard 
implementation? 
Over the life cycle of the HEL program, DSHEL will provide cost savings. An 
annual labor and travel reduction of $54,413 per year is realized. Resulting in 
$1.09M over a 20 year life cycle, spread across 30 ships. Aggregate risk was 
shown to be moderate with six risks identified: one low, four medium, and 
one high.  
• What type of infrastructure is required to adequately perform DS for HEL? 
In analyzing only the POI: selected sensors (as detailed in Chapter III), single 
rack mount server, IP KVM, NAS, and system monitoring software. 
• Are there any existing DS frameworks that can be applied to DSHEL? 
No existing DS framework could be applied to DSHEL. Other frameworks 
were analyzed for best practices and then tailored to fit generic 
edge/peripheral devices.  
• Of the HEL components, which information is the most important to collect? 
o Total intensity over time  
o Total energy in pulse  
o Spectral content  
o Degree of polarization  
o Angular divergence  
o Intensity profile  
o System temperature 
 
B. CONTRIBUTION TO BODY OF KNOWLEDGE 
The contribution to the BoK consisted of three topic areas. The first section 
discusses the distance support framework. The next section covers the functional analysis 
that was completed to map the various distance support functions to system/subsystem 
components within DSHEL. The final section details the DS System design that was 
developed in Chapter IV.   
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1. Distance Support Framework 
The USN has a very complex organizational structure as well as many systems at 
different phases within their life cycles. A robust framework was needed that could 
account for all USN products and services, while adhering to the many policies and 
regulations that affect (directly/indirectly) them. In order to complete this task, a systems 
view of the concept was taken and current architecture frameworks were analyzed for 
best practices. Ultimately, a DS framework had to be constructed from the ground up. 
With the goal being to deliver quality DS from the information and data collected, 
DS was broken down into three basic elements: PSP, ESI, and POI. Each of these 
elements play an important role in this goal and interacts with one another through the 
use of SLAs. Each basic element can further be broken down into a subset of elements. 
These subsets of elements, which define a successful organization, are people, process, 
and technology. The internal interactions of these subset elements are governed by OLAs. 
Through the use of OLAs and SLAs, quality DS is provided through the evidence passed, 
generated, and shared that these DS elements, collect, verify, record, validate, store, 
process, filter, log, compress, and analyze. This is done in order to produce an I2DF set 
that meets the minimum data picture completeness threshold.  
The framework offers multiple views that must be taken when providing DS. 
These views start with the POI interfaces and slowly expand the scope to POI 
interactions. This includes: POI classification (independent platform vs. guest platform 
contained within host platform), DSX configuration (integrated—single-point all 
inclusive, encompassing—single-point semi inclusive, distributed—multipoint all 
inclusive, distributed—multipoint semi inclusive), enterprise ecosystem entities, and 
global environment externalities. 
 263 
 
 DS Application Context Diagram Figure 109.
2. Distance Support Functional Analysis  
The functional analysis explored in chapter IV mapped four out of the six distance 
support pillars down to their most basic of functions. This was done using the IDEF0 
modeling framework. The IDEF0 modeling framework shed light on the distance support 
pillars that the Navy has developed, namely that they might be structured improperly. 
When completing the functional analysis, the results indicated that although the Navy has 
broken out the distance support functions into six individual pillars, the Remote 
Diagnostics, Remote Repair and Validation, and Remote Monitoring pillars are a subset 
of the Remote Technical Assistance pillar.    
This is the result of the way in which maintenance and repair is currently 
conducted in the USN. To date, the USN has been reluctant to allow remote connectivity 
and repair onboard ship due to the desire for human interface to ensure accountability. 
Much of the maintenance is driven through email or shore based databases that manage 
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logistic functions for the ship. Verified in the IDEF0 diagrams in chapter four, all major 
outputs from the context diagram are outputs of the function performing remote technical 
assistance for the system. All other functions analyzed only provided outputs in the form 
of feedback to the function of providing remote technical assistance.  
3. Distance Support System Design 
In addition to the functional analysis that was accomplished in chapter four, the 
chapter also took on the task of creating a notional physical architecture for a generic DS 
system. The design analyzed both the hardware and software that could potentially be 
involved in developing the DS system. This allows system engineers to have a working 
prototype from which cost estimates and implementation strategies are developed. 
Although it is not advisable to develop a standalone system rather than integrating into 
the POI, it is useful for a program to know the TOC of a distance support capability. 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The first section summarizes evidence from the capstone to support the need for 
distance support. This evidence is detailed further in Chapters V and VI of this capstone. 
The next section discusses the need for the establishment of detailed SLA/OLA’s 
between organizations needing to develop a plan for distance support. The last section 
provides recommendations for developing the distance support functions. 
1. Design-In Distance Support 
Reiterating the findings from the HEL Master Plan, it was stated that there would 
be acquisition challenges in fielding a laser weapon, given the limited community of 
subject matter experts. Extending this original challenge of acquisition to in-service, it 
follows that the sustainment of a laser weapon has equal challenges given the few to 
many relationship of supporting these systems with a limited community of subject 
matter experts. Integrated distance support serves as a force multiplier and bridges the 
gap via service level agreements, to provide remote access and faster response time for 
issue resolution among the pool of support resources to the afloat HEL assets. Cost 
savings have been shown based on legacy and modeled technical assistance from the 
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Fleet in leveraging a knowledgebase of SME’s ashore to resolve problems remotely. It 
was shown through modeling and simulation that system integrated distance support also 
has the potential to significantly decrease mean down time. By putting complete 
diagnostics data into the hands of the most experienced engineers and technicians at the 
onset of a system issue, problems are resolved faster. The reduction in mean down time 
dramatically increased Ao without modification to the host system. Given the results 
from M&S show a shorter duration in issue resolution time, alongside the reduction in 
travel and labor cost, it is the recommendation of this report to design in a distance 
support subsystem to the high energy laser.  
2. Establish Service and Operational Level Agreements 
Without communication and transmission of data, DSHEL would not function.   
DSHEL’s entire layout and key principles were dependent upon the sharing and 
transmission of data between a PSP and a POI. As a result, SLAs and OLAs were 
paramount to establishing and maintaining the necessary communication paths for DS. 
SLAs and OLAs work together in order to facilitate agreements between service 
providers and end users (SLAs) and internal groups within an element (OLAs). This was 
the key description of the aforementioned PSP and POI sharing information and data. 
SLAs therefore proved essential to set up data transmission. These agreements are for 
products and services. In DSHEL’s case, they were for the transmission, monitoring, and 
receipt of data as well as the implied sub categories and needs inherent to those functions. 
The number and type of SLA or OLA was dependent upon the portion of the platform in 
question that was under review. It is the recommendation that SLAs and OLAs are 
established in order to accomplish the internal and external communication essential to 
DS. 
3. Redefine Distance Support for the U.S. Navy 
Previously completed analysis indicates that the current DS efforts in use by the 
USN lack certain key qualities. The preconceived notion was that DS was composed of 
Six Pillars. This belief leads to the misconception that all pillars are equal in weight and 
importance and that they evenly share responsibility. However, choosing to separate DS 
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into several pillars creates a fractured environment and is not cohesive. Also, the belief 
that each successive pillar is just as important as the last adds instability to the DS 
environment. DS is not a set of pillars that can be segregated; rather, it is a Service 
Oriented Architecture that takes into account (Service Oriented Architecture 
Organization 2013): 
• business value over technical strategy 
• strategic goals over project-specific benefits 
• intrinsic interoperability over custom integration 
• shared services over specific-purpose implementations 
• flexibility over optimization 
• evolutionary refinement over pursuit of initial perfection 
This capstone has developed a DS framework that elevates the discussion of how 
best to apply Distance Support for a specific POI. This framework takes into account not 
just what is needed for the POI, but also what is needed for the ESI, and PSP. This 
encompassing approach to the application of DS as a service is a more comprehensive 
solution to the larger USN life-cycle support philosophy. It is the recommendation of this 
capstone that the USN redefine their current DS methods and adopt the DS framework 
outlined in this capstone. 
D. FUTURE EXPLORATIONS 
The following section describes areas of future work, which is outside the scope 
of this research, as well as areas, which could be refined by further analysis. The first 
section discusses the need for mapping the current DS pillar structure into the DS 
framework. The next section brings to light the benefits of using real world data to 
support the modeling and simulation and the cost analysis for a DS system. The last 
section calls attention to further research that could be done to explore the USN big data 
problem. 
1. ePrognostics, and Self Repair and Healing 
The focus of this capstone was on the application of the first four pillars of 
distance support to HEL. By expanding the initial focus to include the latter two pillars, 
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ePrognostics and Self Repair & Healing, is expected to reveal even greater cost savings. 
Given the current cost analysis was only capturing the reduction of onsite travel and 
labor, inclusion of the last two pillars would result in the failure prevention of expensive 
HEL subsystem components, thereby adding additional material cost savings and 
increased uptime. Subsequent updates to system requirements, functional analysis, M&S, 
and risk analysis should be investigated.   
2. Vetted Parameters as Inputs to Modeling and Cost Analysis 
A challenge faced in this study was the immaturity of existing HEL systems and 
real world in service engineering and maintenance data. This was overcome by the use of 
M&S, as well as comparative and composite inputs for response times and costs from 
legacy PEO IWS studies for other weapon systems. As the HEL goes from a test bed 
status into a full-fledged Program of Record (PoR), the opportunity will exist to refine the 
models and estimates in this capstone with real world data. These sources will be 
contained in the Navy-311 Help Desk database, Command Issue Manager (CIM), and 
Maintenance Figure of Merit (MFOM) AWN system. The methodologies in this report 
were presented in a flexible and transparent manner, such that the variables could be 
updated for future studies. As it was necessary to use composite estimates as input 
parameters due to classification restrictions, it is suggested that the mean down time 
models be modified and analyzed for current fielded systems to assess potential impact of 
integrated distance support. It is the recommendation that as DSHEL is fielded and 
sustained, these simulations and analyses be performed annually and tailored by the 
program systems engineer to include the operational failure and response time data. This 
will enable the PEO and in-service community to make HEL system sustainment and 
modernization decisions based on data which includes the distance support 
methodologies.  
3. DS Framework Expansion 
The DS framework focused on the POI; follow-on work to expand and analyze 
the PSP and ESI in depth is needed. Within the PSP element, attention is needed in 
developing the proper resources requirements, infrastructure, manning levels, associated 
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training programs, knowledge management tools, and product/service feedback 
improvement. The ESI element would benefit from future research and development into 
information transport mediums and infrastructure, cybersecurity challenges, and signal 
reconstruction/acquisition techniques.    
4. U.S. Navy’s Big Data Problem  
In Chapter I, the amount of data generated by a typical Boeing 737 engine was 
extrapolated to a USN Arleigh Burke Class Guided Missile Destroyer (gas turbine 
engines only) and then compared to all the total amount of information contained within 
the Library of Congress. It was surmised that a typical deployment of a single ship lasting 
six months would generate 438 times more data than that of the entirety of the Library of 
Congress. This amount of data only accounts for the gas turbine engines alone and does 
not include the rest of the systems on board of the ship (radar, communication, weapons, 
mechanical, network, etc.). While data filtering can account for 80% data reduction 
(Porsche, Wilson, Johnson, Tierney, and Saltzman 2014), this would still leave 87 
Library of Congress’ worth of relevant data to be analyzed and transported. 
As the USN becomes more networked, the Internet of Things (IoT) concept may 
be adopted by the USN and become, in the case of surface combatants, a Ship of Things 
(SoT). Research and development in the area of big data and data science needs to be 
increased to keep the USN from drowning in a flood of its own data.  
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APPENDIX A. KPP, KSA, MOP, AND MOE 
A. KPP AND KSA 
KPPs are defined as “Performance attributes of a system considered critical to the 
development of an effective military capability. A KPP normally has a threshold 
representing the minimum acceptable value achievable at low-to-moderate risk, and an 
objective, representing the desired operational goal but at higher risk in cost, schedule, 
and performance (Defense Acqusition University 2014).” 
KPPs are not to be confused with KSAs. KSAs, “A Key System Attribute (KSA) 
is a system capability considered crucial in support of achieving a balanced 
solution/approach to a system, but not critical enough to be designated a KPP (Defense 
Acqusition University 2014).” 
 
 “CDD in the Acquisition/JCIDS Process” (from ACQNotes 2014) Figure 110.
KSAs, and KPPs, are developed and described in the CDD (Capability 
Development Document). This document is developed in coordination with the system’s 
development. In Figure 109, the general process for the development of this and other 
components of the acquisition process is displayed. However, it was necessary to 
consider the standard KPPs and KSAs as laid out by the JCIDS. These KPPs and KSAs 
and how they were applicable to DSHEL are listed below:  
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1. Mandatory KPP—Force Protection 
For this particular KPP, it would not be applicable to the DSHEL system. “The 
intent of the FP KPP is to address protection of the system operator or other personnel 
rather than protection of the system itself (Survivability).” (Department of Defense 2012, 
B-A-2) In order for this official call to be made it would be necessary for, “the Protection 
FCB will assess the FP KPP, or Sponsor justification of why the FP KPP is not 
applicable, for any document with a JSD of JROC or JCB Interest (Department of 
Defense 2012, B-A-2).”  Considering that DSHEL is a monitoring and reporting system, 
it was considered unlikely that force protection would be part of DSHEL. 
2. Mandatory KPP—Survivability 
Survivability, which deals with the ability of a system to maintain working status 
while under attack, is not applicable to DSHEL.  “The intent of the Survivability KPP 
includes reducing a system’s likelihood of being engaged by hostile fire, through 
attributes such as speed, maneuverability, detectability, and countermeasures; reducing 
the system’s vulnerability if hit by hostile fire, through attributes such as armor and 
redundancy of critical components; and allowing the system to survive and continue to 
operate in a chemical, biological, radioactive, and nuclear (CBRN) environment, if 
required.” (Department of Defense 2012, B-A-2)  The individual monitored components 
that compose DSHEL require this KPP; however, DSHEL itself would not. Individual 
components reporting to HEL have potential to be “engaged by hostile fire;” however, 
DSHEL as a monitoring and reporting system, would not. 
3. Mandatory KPP—Net-Ready 
The Net-Ready KPP referred to “The NR-KPP is applicable to all documents 
addressing IS and National Security Systems (NSS) used in the automated acquisition, 
storage, manipulation, management, movement, control, display, switching, interchange, 
transmission, or reception of DOD data or information regardless of classification or 
sensitivity (Department of Defense 2012, B-A-3).”  This KPP was directly related to 
DSHEL. One of the primary functions of DSHEL was the transmission of information 
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between the POI and an off-site facility. Therefore, it was necessary to ensure the Net-
Ready KPP was included. 
4. Mandatory KPP—Sustainment 
Sustainment KPPs were defined as, “The Sustainment KPP and two supporting 
KSAs (Reliability, Operation and Support (O&S) Cost) are applicable to all documents 
addressing potential acquisition category (ACAT) I programs. The intent of the 
Sustainment KPP is to JCIDS Manual 19 Jan 2012 B-A-3 Appendix A Enclosure B 
ensure that sustainment planning “upfront” enables the requirements and acquisition 
communities to provide a system with optimal availability and reliability to the 
warfighter at an affordable cost” (Department of Defense 2012, B-A-2).   Since HEL 
could potentially become an ACAT I program and DSHEL is a subsystem component of 
HEL, there exists the possibility that DSHEL would then inherit the Sustainment KPP. 
5. Mandatory KPP—Availability 
According to JCIDS, the Availability KPP gets divided into Material Availability 
and Ao. 
a. Mandatory KPP Subset—Materiel Availability 
For the Materiel Availability portion, “Materiel Availability is the measure of the 
percentage of the total inventory of a system operationally capable, based on materiel 
condition, of performing an assigned mission. This can be expressed mathematically as 
the number of operationally available end items/total population. The total population of 
operational end items includes those in training, attrition reserve, pre-positioned, and 
temporarily in a non-operational materiel condition, such as for depot-level maintenance, 
shipyard repair, etc. Materiel Availability covers the total life-cycle timeframe, from 
placement into operational service through the planned end of service life” (Department 
of Defense 2012, B-E-3). DSHEL would be concerned with “Ao” and operational 
statuses so considered this to be an applicable KPP. DSHEL required the monitoring of 
various components of the HEL system and as a result, cared about the status of “materiel 
condition” of HEL components. 
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b. Mandatory KPP Subset—Operational Availability 
Operational Capability is the second component of the Availability KPP and 
included, “Operational availability is the measure of the percentage of time that a system 
or group of systems within a unit are operationally capable of performing an assigned 
mission and can be expressed as (uptime/(uptime + downtime)).” (Department of Defense 
2012, B-E-3) As with the Material Availability, DSHEL was concerned with the Ao of 
the HEL system. This KPP subset represented the connection between availability of the 
system and the more specific concern of the availability of system components and their 
status, which was considered to be a key component to DS. 
6. Selectively Applied KPP—System Training 
The Training KPP encompassed, “The Training KPP is applicable to all 
documents addressing potential ACAT I programs. The intent of the Training KPP is to 
ensure that training requirements are properly addressed from the beginning of the 
acquisition process, in parallel with the planning and material development, and updated 
throughout the program’s Acquisition Life-Cycle.” (Department of Defense 2012, B-E-3)  
As stated previously in the Sustainment KPP, if DSHEL were to be considered an ACAT 
I program, this KPP would be necessary. Training should be considered to be a potential 
requirement for the DSHEL users. 
7. Selectively Applied KPP—Energy Efficiency 
The Energy KPP includes, “The Energy KPP is applicable to all documents 
addressing systems where the provision of energy, including both fuel and electric power, 
to the system impacts operational reach, or requires protection of energy infrastructure or 
energy resources in the logistics supply chain.” (Department of Defense 2012, B-A-3). 
This particular KPP was not considered to be important to include in DSHEL because 
from the perspective of power usage, DSHEL is not a major component.   
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8. Mandatory KSA—Reliability 
The Reliability KSA states that, “Reliability is a measure of the probability that 
the system will perform without failure over a specific interval, under specified 
conditions. Reliability shall be sufficient to support the warfighting capability 
requirements, within expected operating environments. Considerations of reliability must 
support both availability metrics.” (Department of Defense 2012, B-E-3). This particular 
KSA was applicable to DSHEL as it was a general, all-encompassing statement of the 
need for any system to perform the way in which it is designed to, whenever called upon 
to do so.  
9. Mandatory KSA—Operations and Support Cost 
The Operations and Support Cost KSA was described as, “O&S Cost metrics 
provide balance to the sustainment solution by ensuring that the O&S costs associated 
with availability and reliability are considered in making decisions.” (Department of 
Defense 2012, B-E-3)  As well as, “Costs are to be included regardless of funding source 
or management control. The O&S value should cover the planned life cycle timeframe, 
consistent with the timeframe and system population identified in the Materiel 
Availability metric.” (Department of Defense 2012, B-E-3)  Operations and Support costs 
were considered to be inherent to establishing a new system, including DSHEL. 
DSHEL’s constant monitoring and data transmission would add to the need for this KSA. 
Costs from data storage, transmission, SME representatives, and facilities would all 
contribute to this KSA. 
B. MOP AND MOE 
MOEs, are defined as “the data used to measure the military effect (mission 
accomplishment) that comes from the use of the system in its expected environment. That 
environment includes the system under test and all interrelated systems, that is, the 
planned or expected environment in terms of weapons, sensors, command and control, 
and platforms, as appropriate, needed to accomplish an end-to-end mission in combat” 
(Defense Acqusition University 2012). Therefore, the MOEs would be the resultant data 
from the testing of the DS system with respect to the HEL platform. Suggested data 
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collection included: thermal testing, vibrations testing, Kbps and data size data, SME 
access and availability data, and frequency of data transmission. MOPs are defined as 
“System-particular performance parameters such as speed, payload, range, time-on-
station, frequency, or other distinctly quantifiable performance features. Several MOPs 
may be related to the achievement of a particular Measure of Effectiveness (MOE).” 
MOPs would be reflective of the performance requirements (Defense Acquisition 
University 2012). As a result, based on the suggestions made for performance 
requirements above, MOPs would focus on data transfer as well as the POI. MOPs would 
be focused on the actual frequencies, temperatures, Bps, that would be again linked to the 
MOEs for data collection. As an example of a MOE and a MOP being part of the KPP, 
and developmental process, the following example from JCIDS was considered (Table 34 
courtesy of JCIDS table B-F-1, “NR-KPP Development”): 
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 Relationships between Requirements, KPPs, MOPs, and MOEs Figure 111.
Table 34 and Figure 110 gave an example of how requirements and KPPs are 
linked to MOEs and MOPs. The KPP stood as the main need for the system, while the 
MOE and MOP gave support to and classification or credence to the existence of the 
KPP. As the Key Performance Parameter would be representative of “attributes of a 
system considered critical,” (Department of Defense 2012, B-F-1), the diagram above 
emphasizes the connection between what the focus of the functional and performance 
requirements would be, and how the KPPs would logically reflect the same areas. These 
figures detailed the domino effect of requirements writing. The functional requirements 
are linked to the performance requirements. These requirements dictate and influence the 
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KPPs which then are verified and measured by the MOEs and MOPs. These figures 
underlined the importance for clarity and carefully worded language that was detailed 
previously in this chapter. Keeping requirements clear has a ripple effect on the 
subsequent KPPs, KSAs, MOEs and MOPs. Requirements, KPPs, KSAs, MOEs, and 
MOPs work in a linked process that requires balance and systematic collaboration.  
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APPENDIX B. MODEL PARAMETERS 
The following data is representative of the modeling and simulation effort 
performed as part of this effort. The included data tables directly exported from 
ExtendSim for each of the three models. While the model, in its most flexible form, is 
available from the SE Department at the Naval Postgraduate School, this data collection 
shall serve as a backup for the data, should the original files be lost. 
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